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THE NEW WISCONSIN RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
CHAPTERS 801 - 803
CHARLES D. CLAUSEN* and DAVID P. LOWE**
INTRODUCTION
In his introduction to Jerome Frank's Courts on Trial, Ed-
mond Cahn suggests, not ungraciously, that lawyers are better
at remembering than at learning and that, accordingly, innova-
tion is as welcome to lawyers as a wrinkle is to a woman. If the
resistance to change on the part of lawyers was culpable at the
time Cahn's introduction was written (1963), or at the time
Frank's book was written (1949), the resistance is at least easy
to sympathize with (if no less culpable) today. Since Cahn
wrote his note, Wisconsin lawyers have had to learn to operate
with major statutory revisions (and, one hopes, reforms) in
criminal procedure, probate law, consumer law, property law,
commercial law, small claims practice, and, of course,
hundreds of changes wrought by case law-both federal and
state. Pending before the legislature as this preface is written
are extensive revisions in the automobile reparations system,
a system that-until a short time ago-we seldom thought of
in terms of "system" at least not as a system distinct from the
"judicial system." And now Wisconsin lawyers and judges are
faced with rather complete revision (dare I say "reform"?) of
the most basic rules of civil procedure. One can hardly blame
those who say "enough already."
Nonetheless, it is probably accurate to say that a revision
of the civil procedure rules has long been overdue. Our current
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"rules" consist basically of Field Code provisions written in the
1840's and adopted in Wisconsin in 1856. The Field Code was,
of course, a tremendous step forward in the development of
modern civil procedure. It did away with "technicalism" as the
animating spirit of procedure and in this respect, it represented
a step away from the "sporting" or "fight" theory of litigation
and a step toward the "truth" theory. Good as it has been,
however, the Code has not been without its deficiencies. Its
pleading rules, for example, lent themselves to fairly extensive
motion practice, and its discovery rules, were terribly inade-
quate, at least as viewed from the modern perspective. In order
to correct the deficiencies, the Code has been rather extensively
patched up over the 118 years that it has governed Wisconsin
litigation. Not a small number of the patches applied to the
Code have been cut from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Since its adoption in 1936, many have argued that the Fed-
eral Rules are as superior to the Field Code as the Field Code
was to common law procedure. The new "Wisconsin Rules of
Civil Procedure" is the result of a lengthy study of both the
Federal Rules and our patched-up Field Code by members of
the judiciary, the bar, and the state's two law schools. It will
be apparent to all who study the new rules that, although they
are comprised of many Federal Rule provisions, the Wisconsin
Rules do not represent a complete adoption of the Federal
Rules, or even of a patched-up version of the Federal Rules.
Although most of the provisions governing pleading, parties,
and discovery are derived from the Federal Rules, the provi-
sions on commencement of actions, trials, and to a lesser de-
gree, judgments, are different from both the Code provisions
and the Federal Rules. Regardless of the sources of the new
rules, however, it is hoped that each of their provisions reflects
the study and effort devoted to them by the Judicial Council
Civil Rules Committee.
CHAPTER 801
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION AND VENUE
801.01 Kinds of proceedings; scope of Title XLII-
A. (1) KINDS. Proceedings in the courts are divided into
actions and special proceedings. "Action," as used in this
title, includes "special proceeding" unless a specific provision
of procedure in special proceedings exists.
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(2) SCOPE. The sections in this title govern procedure
and practice in circuit and county courts of the state of Wis-
consin in all civil actions and special proceedings whether
cognizable as cases at law, in equity or of statutory origin
except where different procedure is prescribed by statute or
rule. They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action.
(3) EFFEcTIVE DATES. (a) Chapters 801 to 803 shall apply
to all actions commenced on or after January 1, 1976.
(b), Chapters 804 to 807 shall apply to all actions pend-
ing or commenced on or after January 1, 1976 except those
actions in which trial has commenced prior to January 1,
1976, as to which the statutes and rules in effect prior to
January 1, 1976 shall continue to apply.
(c) Amendments and repeals of sections outside of chs.
801 to 807 shall be effective as follows:
1. Amendments and repeals effected in order to conform
with provisions in chs. 801 to 803 shall apply to all actions
commenced on or after January 1, 1976.
2. Amendments and repeals other than those effected in
order to conform with provisions in chs. 801 to 803 shall take
effect on January 1, 1976 as to all actions then pending or
thereafter commenced, except as provided in par. (b).
This rule replaces former sections 260.01, 260.02, 260.03,
260.05 and 260.08. The first sentence of subsection (1) is sub-
stantially equivalent to section 260.02. The second sentence of
subsection (1) obviates the necessity of repeating throughout
the rules "actions and special proceedings," even when it is
clear that a provision is to apply to both. The first sentence of
subsection (2) serves the same function as section 260.01 for-
merly did, i.e., limiting the scope of the Title. The last sentence
of subsection (2) should be read with section 802.02 (6), "Con-
struction of Pleadings," and with section 805.19, "Mistakes
and Omissions, Harmless Error." These provisions provide a
mandate for the construction of these rules. Many of the rules
are adaptations of various rules of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to state practice. The guiding principle of the Fed-
eral Rules is the guiding principle of these rules: the elimina-
tion of delay, of technicality and of unnecessary cost.
Under Wisconsin law, statutes which have received judicial
construction in another state and then have been adopted by
Wisconsin, are taken with the construction which has been
given to them; the same rule applies when Wisconsin adopts
language of federal statutes which have been construed by the
1976]
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United States Supreme Court.' Presumably the same result
should obtain with respect to rules of procedure promulgated
by the United States Supreme Court. Most of the judicial con-
struction of the Federal Rules, however, is found in decisions
of the United States District Courts and courts of appeal. As
might be expected, those decisions are not always consistent
and, by virtue of their origin in inferior courts, are of lesser
precedential value than decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court. Nevertheless, the decisions of the federal lower
courts, to the extent that they show a pattern of construction,
should be considered persuasive authority in construing the
rules in this Title which are based on them.
Former section 260.03 has been repealed. No significant
advantage was seen in retaining the statutory definitions of
actions and special proceedings. Section 260.03 was lifted from
sections 7 and 8 of the Field Code. It was useful at the time of
the adoption of the Field Code because of the Code's abolition
of the "forms of action" in favor of the unitary "civil action."
The definitions are no longer very useful. Moreover, the defini-
tion of "action" in section 260.03 is not even successful in defin-
ing, that is, precisely delimiting, that which it purports to de-
fine. Proceedings in which extraordinary relief is sought, for
example, would not appear to be "ordinary court proceedings"
so as to be classified as "actions." Nevertheless, it is clear that
in Wisconsin, such proceedings are indeed "actions" and not
"special proceedings."'2
Former section 260.05 which stated the distinction between
civil actions and criminal actions has also been repealed. Inso-
far as it purported to define criminal actions, it was inconsist-
ent with the scope provisions of section 260.01 which limited
all the provisions of Title XXV to civil matters.
Former section 260.08, which purported to abolish not only
the forms of action but also the distinction between actions at
law and suits in equity and which also defines "plaintiff" and
"defendant," has been repealed. The forms of action having
been abolished at least as far back as 1856, it was not felt
necessary or desirable to retain any references to them in a
modem procedural code. To the extent that section 260.08 pur-
l. In re Adams Machinery, Inc., 20 Wis. 2d 607, 123 N.W.2d 558 (1963); Pomeroy
v. Pomeroy, 93 Wis. 262, 67 N.W. 430 (1896).
2. See State ex rel. Durner v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 85 N.W. 1046 (1901); State ex
rel. Milwaukee Medical College v. Chittenden, 127 Wis. 468, 107 N.W. 500 (1906).
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ported to abolish all distinctions between actions at law and
suits in equity, it suffered from overbreadth. The distinction
between law and equity was not rendered entirely meaningless
by the abolition of the forms of action. For example, the dis-
tinction may be quite important in determining the appropri-
ate statute of limitations.3 The distinction is also important, of
course, in determining whether a constitutional right to a trial
by jury exists.4
801.02 Commencement of action. (1) A civil action in
which a personal judgment is sought, other than certiorari,
habeas corpus, mandamus or prohibition, is commenced as
to any defendant when a summons and a complaint naming
him as defendant are filed with the court, provided service of
an authenticated copy of the summons and of the complaint
is made upon him under this chapter within 60 days after
filing.
(2) A civil action in which only an in rem or quasi in rem
judgment is sought is commenced as to any defendant when
a summons and a complaint are filed with the court, provided
service of an authenticated copy of the commons and of either
the complaint or a notice of object of action under s. 801.12
is made upon him under this chapter within 60 days after
filing.
(3) The original summons and complaint shall be filed
together. The authenticated copies shall be served together
except:
(a) In actions in which a personal judgment is sought, if
the summons is served by publication, only the summons
need be published, but a copy of the complaint shall be
mailed with a copy of the summons as required by s. 801.11,
and;
(b) In actions in which only an in rem or quasi in rem
judgment is sought, the summons may be accompanied by a
notice of object of action pursuant to s. 801.12 in lieu of a copy
of the complaint and, when the summons is served by publi-
cation, only the summons need be published, but a copy of
the complaint or notice of object of action shall be mailed
with the copy of the summons as required by s. 801.12.
(4) No service shall be made under sub. (3) until the
action has been commenced in accordance with sub. (1) or
(2).
3. See Wis. STAT. § 893.18(4) (1973).
4. See Wis. CONST., ART. I, § 5; Schneider v. Fromm Laboratories, 262 Wis. 21, 53
N.W.2d 737 (1952); Wilson v. Johnson, 74 Wis. 337. 43 N.W. 148 (1889).
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(5) An action of certiorari, habeas corpus, mandamus or
prohibition is commenced by service of an appropriate origi-
nal writ on the defendant named in the writ. A copy of the
writ shall be filed forthwith.
(6) In all civil actions, the clerk's fee and suit tax, if
applicable, shall be paid at the time of filing.
This rule abolishes the mode of commencement of action by
service of summons. It should be read together with section
893.39, "Action, when commenced."
Under the new rule, actions are commenced by filing the
summons and the complaint. Since the complaint must be
filed to commence the action, pre-pleading discovery, formerly
permitted by section 887.12(6), will not be permitted under the
new rules. The Judicial Council Committee's decision to abol-
ish pre-pleading discovery was based in large part on the no-
tions that: (a) there was little difference between the affidavit
required for pre-pleading discovery and the type of complaint
required by the new section 802.02(1); and (b) the court should
be able to ascertain the nature of the action early on to deter-
mine whether a scheduling conference will be necessary or
whether a standard scheduling order should be used. With re-
spect to the similarity between the section 887.12(6) affidavit
and the section 802.02(1) complaint, it should be noted that
there is at least one significant difference between the two; the
pre-pleading discovery affidavit was not required to reveal any
legal theory of the case, whereas the complaint should be sus-
tainable against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.' That is to say, the facts
alleged in the complaint must show that the pleader is entitled
to relief under some theory of liability, but the facts recited in
the pre-pleading affidavit were required to only identify the
occurrence out of which the action arose. There will be cases
under the new rules where plaintiffs will lose a tactical advan-
tage because of the abolition of pre-pleading discovery. It will
occur whenever early disclosure of the theory of liability is
undesirable. It may not be unreasonable, however, to expect
that any plaintiff's counsel who perceives a substantial disad-
vantage to early disclosure of the true theory of his lawsuit will
discover available means to keep the theory undisclosed until
such time as disclosure becomes prudent. The liberal right to
5. See Wis. STAT. § 802.06(2)(f).
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amend pleadings under section 802.09(1) should be noted.
This rule relating to commencement of action is of truly
critical significance only in the statutes of limitation context.
Section 893.40 of the former statutes provided a safety-valve
for the plaintiff whose claim was approaching the bar-date of
the statute of limitations by providing that an action was
deemed commenced on the date the summons was delivered to
the sheriff for service, provided service was effected within
sixty days thereafter. The sixty day period within which service
must be accomplished under this new rule corresponds to the
safety-valve provision of section 893.40, which was repealed
effective January 1, 1976.
The sixty day proviso in this new rule may create problems.
At least two important questions come immediately to mind.
First, may the sixty day period be enlarged by motion under
paragraph (2)(a) of section 801.15? By its terms, paragraph
(2) (a) would seem to permit enlargement. Where the effect of
enlargement, however, would be to extend the statutory period
of limitation, a real question arises concerning the effect of
court-made procedural rules affecting substantive rights. The
writer has not encountered any case in which the sixty day
grace period in section 893.40 was sought to be enlarged under
the provisions of former section 269.45, the predecessor of sec-
tion 801.15(2). In any event, it would seem to be desirable to
amend either section 801.02 or section 801.15(2) to provide that
the sixty day service period may not be enlarged if the effect
of such enlargement is to further extend the period of limita-
tion.
Second, what is the legal effect- of a later service, that is, one
accomplished after the sixty day period has passed? Consider
a rather horrible example. On January 5, 1976, X's attorney
files a summons and complaint with the clerk of court, naming
X as plaintiff and Y and Z as defendants. X effects proper
service on Y on January 10, but does not properly serve Z until
March 12, more than sixty days after the date of filing. Both
Y and Z file and serve notices of appearance and retainer and
serve and file answers. On April 1, the statute of limitation runs
on X's claim against Y and Z. Prior to the scheduling confer-
ence, Z appears by his attorney at all depositions noticed by
X or Y and responds fully and promptly to all interrogatories
served on him by X or Y. On April 5, at the scheduling confer-
ence, Z's attorney serves an amended answer asserting as new
1976]
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defenses: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2)
lack of jurisdiction over the person of Z; (3) insufficiency of
summons; (4) insufficiency of service of summons; and, of
course, (5) statute of limitations. Both X and Y object and
move the court to forbid the filing of the amended answer. Z's
attorney moves for dismissal on the grounds newly asserted in
the amended answer as well as on the ground of X's failure to
comply with the rules (section 805.03). Who wins?
The problem is plausible because of: (1) the failure of sec-
tion 801.02 to state the legal effect of late service; (2) the rules
respecting preservation of jurisdictional defenses found in
section 802.06(8) (a); and (3) the very liberal amendment of
pleading rule found in section 802.09(1). The reader is invited
to study the rules cited, as well as section 802.06(2), in order
to see clearly that the hypothetical problem above became a
nonhypothetical problem on the effective date of the new rules.
The central question, of course, is whether a late service
gives rise to a jurisdictional defense. If it does, the jurisdic-
tional defense is not waived by appearance, by participation in
discovery, or otherwise than by failing to assert it in accordance
with section 802.06(8)(a), which permits the defense to be
raised by answer or by amendment to the answer permitted as
a matter of course under section 802.09(1). Since one amend-
ment is permitted as a matter of course under section 802.09(1)
at any time prior to the entry of the scheduling order, the
potential for "sand-bagging" illustrated in the hypothetical is
very real.
It may be, of course, (and the writer would argue that it
should be) that the supreme court will, if presented with the
issue, hold that a late service does not create jurisdictional
defenses, but rather constitutes simply a failure to comply with
the rules giving rise to such sanctions as are appropriate under
section 805.03. Unfortunately, unless and until the issue is
raised in a proper case, the bench and bar will be subject to a
regretable uncertainty about the legal effect of a late service.
A clarifying amendment to section 801.02 providing that late
service does not impair either the subject matter jurisdiction
or personal jurisdiction of the court, but is subject to section
805.03, would be preferable to awaiting resolution of the issue
by case law.
On the other hand, service of a summons on a defendant
before the action is commenced by filing should be held to be
[Vol. 59
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ineffective to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defen-
dant. Subsection (4) of section 801.02 expressly forbids pre-
filing service and any deviation from this rule by recognizing a
pre-filing service as effective for any purpose, could lead to a
continuous vitality for "hip pocket actions" (those which are
not a matter of public record and on which no suit tax is paid)
which this rule was intended to abolish.
801.03 Jurisdiction; definitions. In this chapter, the
following words have the designated meanings:
(1) "Person" means any natural person, partnership,
association, and body politic and corporate.
(2) "Plaintiff" means the person named as plaintiff in a
civil action, and where in this chapter acts of the plaintiff are
referred to, the reference attributes to the plaintiff the acts
of his agent within the scope of his authority.
(3) "Defendant" means the person named as defendant
in a civil action, and where in this chapter acts of the defen-
dant are referred to, the reference attributes to the defendant
any person's acts for which acts the defendant is legally re-
sponsible. In determining for jurisdiction purposes the defen-
dant's legal responsibility for the acts of another, the sub-
stantive liability of the defendant to the plaintiff is irrele-
vant.
The Judicial Council Committee made no substantial
changes in the jurisdiction statutes formerly found in Chapter
260, not only because those statutes were considered to be sat-
isfactory, but also because changes in them would require legis-
lative action. Section 801.03 is former section 262.03 renum-
bered.
801.04 Jurisdictional requirements for judgments
against persons, status and things. (1) JURISDIcTION OF
SUBJECT MATTER REQUIRED FOR ALL CIVIL ACTIONS. A court of this
state may entertain a civil action only when the court has
power to hear the kind of action brought. The power of the
court to hear the kind of action brought is called "jurisdiction
of the subject matter." Jurisdiction of the subject matter is
conferred by the constitution and statutes of this state and
by statutes of the United States; it cannot be conferred by
consent of the parties.
Nothing in this title affects the subject matter jurisdiction of
any court of this state.
(2) PERSONAL JURISDICTION. A court of this state having
jurisdiction of the subject matter may render a judgment
19761
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against a party personally only if there exists one or more of
the jurisdictional grounds set forth in s. 801.05 or 801.06 and
in addition either:
(a) A summons is served upon the person pursuant to s.
801.11; or
(b) Service of a summons is dispensed with under the
conditions in s. 801.06.
(3) JURISDICTION IN REM OR QUASI IN REM. A court of this
state having jurisdiction of the subject matter may render a
judgment in rem or quasi in rem upon a status or upon a
property or other thing pursuant to s. 801.07 and the judg-
ment in such action may affect the interests in the status,
property or thing of all persons served pursuant to s. 801.12
with a summons and complaint or notice of object of action
as the case requires.
This section is former section 262.04 renumbered.
801.05 Personal jurisdiction, grounds for generally. A
court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter
has jurisdiction over a person served in an action pursuant to
s. 801.11 under any of the following circumstances:
(1) LOCAL PRESENCE OR STATUS. In any action whether
arising within or without this state, against a defendant who
when the action is commenced:
(a) Is a natural person present within this state when
served; or
(b) Is a natural person domiciled within this state; or
(c) Is a domestic corporation; or
(d) Is engaged in substantial and not isolated activities
within this state, whether such activities are wholly inter-
state, intrastate, or otherwise.
(2) SPECIAL JURISDICTION STATUTES. In any action which
may be brought under statutes of this state that specifically
confer grounds for personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
(3) LOCAL ACT OR OMISSION. In any action claiming injury
to person or property within or without this state arising out
of an act or omission within this state by the defendant.
(4) LOCAL INJURY; FOREIGN ACT. In any action claiming
injury to person or property within this state arising out of an
act or omission outside this state by the defendant, provided
in addition that at the time of the injury, either:
(a) Solicitation or service activities were carried on
within this state by or on behalf of the defendant; or
(b) Products, materials or things processed, serviced or
manufactured by the defendant were used or consumed
within this state in the ordinary course of trade.
[Vol. 59
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(5) LOCAL SERVICES, GOODS OR CONTRACTS. In any action
which:
(a) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plain-
tiff or to some third party for the plaintiffs benefit, by the
defendant to perform services within this state or to pay for
services to be performed in this state by the plaintiff; or
(b) Arises out of services actually performed for the
plaintiff by the defendant within this state, or services ac-
tually performed for the defendant by the plaintiff within this
state if such performance within this state was authorized or
ratified by the defendant; or
(c) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plain-
tiff or to some third party for the plaintiffs benefit, by the
defendant to deliver or receive within this state or to ship
from this state goods, documents of title, or other things of
value; or
(d) Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things
of value shipped from this state by the plaintiff to the defen-
dant on his order or direction; or
(e) Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things
of value actually received by the plaintiff in this state from
the defendant without regard to where delivery to carrier oc-
curred.
(6) LOCAL PROPERTY. In any action which arises out of:
(a) A promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some
third party for the plaintiffs benefit, by the defendant to
create in either party an interest in, or protect, acquire, dis-
pose of, use, rent, own, control or possess by either party real
property situated in this state; or
(b) A claim to recover any benefit derived by the defen-
dant through the use, ownership, control or possession by the
defendant of tangible property situated within this state ei-
ther at the time of the first use, ownership, control or posses-
sion or at the time the action is commenced; or
(c) A claim that the defendant return, restore, or ac-
count to the plaintiff for any asset or thing of value which was
within this state at the time the defendant acquired posses-
sion or control over it.
(7) DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT ON LOCAL FORECLOSURE OR
RESALE. In any action to recover a deficiency judgment upon
a mortgage note or conditional sales contract or other security
agreement executed by the defendant or his predecessor to
whose obligation the defendant has succeeded and the defi-
ciency is claimed either:
(a) In an action in this state to foreclose upon real prop-
erty situated in this state; or
19761
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(b) Following sale of real property in this state by the
plaintiff under ch. 846; or
(c) Following resale of tangible property in this state by
the plaintiff under ch. 409.
(8) DIRECTOR OR OFFICER OF A DOMESTIC CORPORATION. In
any action against a defendant who is or was an officer or
director of a domestic corporation where the action arises out
of the defendant's conduct as such officer or director or out
of the activities of such corporation while the defendant held
office as a director or officer.
(9) TAXES OR ASSESSMENTS. In any action for the collec-
tion of taxes or assessments levied, assessed or otherwise im-
posed by a taxing authority of this state after July 1, 1960.
(10) INSURANCE OR INSURERS. In any action which arises
out of a promise made anywhere to the plaintiff or some third
party by the defendant to insure upon or against the happen-
ing of an event and in addition either:
(a) The person insured was a resident of this state when
the event out of which the cause of action is claimed to arise
occurred; or
(b) The event out of which the cause of action is claimed
to arise occurred within this state, regardless of where the
person insured resided.
(11) CERTAIN MARITAL ACTIONS. In any action to deter-
mine a question of status under s. 247.05 (1), (2) and (3), or
in an independent action for support, alimony or property
division commenced in the county in which the plaintiff re-
sides at the commencement of the action when the defendant
resided in this state in marital relationship with the plaintiff
for not less than six consecutive months within the six years
next preceding the commencement of the action, and after
the defendant left the state the plaintiff continued to reside
in this state, and the defendant cannot be served under s.
247.06 but is served under s. 247.062 (1).
(12) PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE. In any action against a
personal representative to enforce a claim against the de-
ceased person represented where one or more of the grounds
stated in subs. (2) to (11) would have furnished a basis for
jurisdiction over the deceased had he been living and it is
immaterial under this subsection whether the action had
been commenced during the lifetime of the deceased.
(13) JOINDER OF CLAIMS IN THE SAME ACTION. In any action
brought in reliance upon jurisdictional grounds stated in
subs. (2) to (11) there cannot be joined in the same action any
other claim or cause against the defendant unless grounds
exist under this section for personal jurisdiction over the de-
[Vol. 59
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fendant as to the claim or cause to be joined.
(14) ENERGY SUPPLIES. In any action under ss. 125.03 to
125.06 to obtain information from any energy supplier as pro-
vided therein.
This section is former section 262.05 renumbered.
801.06 Personal jurisdiction, grounds for without serv-
ice of summons. A court of this state having jurisdiction of
the subject matter may, without a summons having been
served upon him, exercise jurisdiction in an action over a
person with respect to any counterclaim asserted against that
person in an action which he has commenced in this state and
also over any person who appears in the action and waives the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person as provided in
s. 802.06 (8). An appearance to contest the basis for in rem
or quasi in rem jurisdiction under s. 802.06 (2) (c) without
seeking any other relief does not constitute an appearance
within the meaning of this section.
The first sentence of this rule is nothing more than former
section 262.07 adapted to conform with the new procedure for
asserting law defenses under section 802.06.
The second sentence gives a limited protection to out of
state defendants whose property is attached or garnisheed. It
permits such a defendant to appear for the sole purpose of
contesting the jurisdiction of the cqurt over his property with-
out becoming subject to personal jurisdiction. This sentence
does not permit him to defend the claim on the merits without
being subject to personal jurisdiction. The limited appearance
concept approved in the Restatement of Judgments, section 40
is not authorized by this provision.' Assuming that there exists
a valid basis for the assertion of jurisdiction over the res, the
effect of this provision is to force the out-of-state defendant to
exercise an unenviable choice between declining to defend on
the merits, in which case a default judgment against the res
will be rendered, and defending the claim on the merits, in
which event a personal judgment may be rendered against him
in an amount greater than the value of the res he wished to
defend.7
801.07 Jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem, grounds
for generally. A court of this state having jurisdiction of the
6. See United States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956).
7. See Cheshire National Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916).
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subject matter may exercise jurisdiction in rem or quasi in
rem on the grounds stated in this section. A judgment in rem
or quasi in rem may affect the interests of a defendant in the
status, property or thing acted upon only if a summons has
been served upon the defendant pursuant to s. 801.12. Juris-
diction in rem or quasi in rem may be invoked in any of the
following cases:
(1) When the subject of the action is real or personal
property in this state and the defendant has or claims a lien
or interest, actual or contingent, therein, or the relief de-
manded consists wholly or partially in excluding the defen-
dant from any interest or lien therein. This subsection shall
apply when any such defendant is unknown.
(2) When the action is to foreclose, redeem from or sat-
isfy a mortgage, claim or lien upon real estate within this
state.
(3) When the defendant has property within this state
which has been attached or has a debtor within the state who
has been garnished. Jurisdiction under this subsection may
be independent of or supplementary to jurisdiction acquired
under subs. (1) and (2).
This section is former section 262.08 renumbered.
801.08 Objection to personal jurisdiction. (1) All is-
sues of fact and law raised by an objection to the court's
jurisdiction over the person or res as provided by s. 802.06 (2)
shall be heard by the court without a jury in advance of any
issue going to the merits of the case. If, after such a hearing
on the objection, the court decides that it has jurisdiction, the
case may proceed on the merits; if the court decides that it
lacks jurisdiction, the defendant shall be given the relief re-
quired by such decision. Such decision upon a question of
jurisdiction shall be by order which is appealable.
(2) Factual determinations made by the court in deter-
mining the question of personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant shall not be binding on the parties in the trial of the
action on the merits.
(3) No guardian or guardian ad litem may, except as
provided in this subsection, waive objection to jurisdiction
over the person of the ward. If no objection to the jurisdiction
of the court over the person of the ward is raised pursuant to
s. 802.06 (2), the service of an answer or motion by a guardian
or guardian ad litem followed by a hearing or trial shall be
equivalent to an appearance and waiver of the defense of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the ward.
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Under the former statutes, section 262.16 governed the rais-
ing and hearing of objections to the court's jurisdiction over the
person. The experience under this section has not been com-
pletely felicitous. See, for example, Pavalon v. Thomas Holmes
Corp. ,' where the defendant wished both to object to the court's
jurisdiction over its person on the basis of nonamenability and
to demur to the complaint on the grounds of failure to state a
cause of action. Section 262.16, by its terms, required the juris-
dictional defense to be raised by answer. If the defendant had
answered the complaint, it would not have been entitled to
demur later; if it had simply interposed a general demurrer, it
would have constituted a waiver of the jurisdictional defense.
The supreme court removed the defendant from the horns of
this dilemma by ruling, contrary to the language of section
262.16(2), that the defendant could raise his jurisdictional de-
fense by motion served with his demurrer.
Under the new practice, the jurisdictional defense and all
other law defenses may be raised by either a motion to dismiss
or an answer, at the option of the defendant.' Thus, the
Pavalon dilemma should not arise.
801.09 Summons, contents of. The summons shall
contain:
(1) The title of the cause, specifying the name of the
court in which the action is brought, the name of the county
designated by the plaintiff as the place of trial, and the
names of the parties to the action, plaintiff and defendant.
(2) A direction to the defendant summoning and requir-
ing him to serve upon the plaintiff's attorney, whose address
shall be stated in the summons, either an answer to the com-
plaint if a copy of the complaint is served with the summons
or a demand for a copy of the complaint. The summons shall
further direct the defendant to serve the answer or demand
for a copy of the complaint:
(a) Within 20 days, or within 45 days if the defendant is
the state or an officer or agency of the state, exclusive of the
day of service, after the summons has been served personally
upon the defendant or served by substitution personally upon
another authorized to accept service of the summons for him;
or
(b) Within 40 days after a date stated in the summons,
8. 25 Wis. 2d 540, 131 N.W.2d 331 (1964).
9. See Wis. STATS. § 802.06(2) and (8).
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exclusive of such date, if no such personal or substituted
personal service has been made, and service is made by publi-
cation. The date so stated in the summons shall be the date
of the first required publication.
(3) A notice that in case of failure to serve an answer or
demand for a copy of the complaint within the time fixed by
sub. (2), judgment will be rendered against the defendant
according to the demand of the complaint. The summons
shall be subscribed with the handwritten signature of the
plaintiff or his attorney with the addition of his post-office
address, at which papers in the action may be served on him
by mail. If the plaintiff is represented by a law firm, the
summons shall contain the name and address of the firm and
shall be subscribed with the handwritten signature of one
attorney who is a member or associate of such firm. When the
complaint is not served with the summons and the only relief
sought is the recovery of money, whether upon tort or con-
tract, there may, at the option of the plaintiff, be added at
the foot a brief note specifying the sum to be demanded by
the complaint.
(4) There may be as many authenticated copies of the
summons and the complaint issued to the plaintiff or his
counsel as are needed for the purpose of effecting service on
the defendant. Authentication shall be accomplished by the
clerk's placing his filing stamp indicating the case number on
each copy of the summons and the complaint.
Subsections (1), (2) and (3) are virtually identical to former
section 262.10 except that the new rule requires that the origi-
nal summons be signed with a handwritten signature rather
than be simply "subscribed," and, under subsection (2), the
state is given forty-five days to answer rather than the normal
twenty."0
Subsection (4) is new. The original summons stays with the
file. Authenticated copies are used for service. The copies are
not required to contain a handwritten signature; that is to say,
"conformed" copies, properly authenticated, are adequate.
The preparation of the original summons, as well as the copies,
is the responsibility of the person effecting the filing or seeking
authentication. The clerk's role is limited to authentication,
not preparation.
801.10 Summons, by whom served. (1) WHO MAY
10. See commentary to Wis. STAT. § 802.06(1), infra p. 51.
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SERVE. An authenticated copy of the summons may be served
by any adult resident of the state where service is made who
is not a party to the action. Service shall be made with rea-
sonable diligence.
(2) ENDORSEMENT. At the time of service, the person who
serves a copy of the summons shall sign his name thereto and
shall indicate thereon the time, place and manner of service
and upon whom service was made. If the server is a sheriff or
deputy sheriff, he shall add his official title. Failure to make
the endorsement shall not invalidate a service but the server
shall not collect his fees for the service.
(3) PROOF OF SERVICE. The person making service shall
make and deliver proof of service to the person on whose
behalf service was made who shall promptly file such proof
of service. Failure to make, deliver, or file proof of service
shall not affect the validity of the service.
(4) PROOF IF SERVICE CHALLENGED. If the defendant ap-
pears in the action and challenges the service of summons
upon him, proof of service shall be as follows:
(a) Personal or substituted personal service shall be
proved by the affidavit of the server indicating the time,
place and manner of service, that the server is an adult resi-
dent of the state of service not a party to the action, that he
knew the person served to be the defendant named in the
summons and that he delivered to and left with him an au-
thenticated copy of the summons. If the defendant is not
personally served, the server shall state in his affidavit when,
where and with whom the copy was left, and shall state such
facts as show reasonable diligence in attempting to effect
personal service on the defendant. If the copy of the summons
is served by a sheriff or deputy sheriff of the county in this
state where the defendant was found, proof may be by the
sheriff's or deputy's certificate of service indicating time,
place, manner of service and, if the defendant is not person-
ally served, the information required in the preceding sent-
ence. The affidavit or certificate constituting proof of service
under this paragraph may be made on an authenticated copy
of the summons or as a separate document.
(b) Service by publication shall be proved by the affida-
vit of the publisher or printer, or his foremen or principal
clerk, stating that the summons was published and specifying
the date of each insertion, and by an affidavit of mailing of
an authenticated copy of the summons, with the complaint
or notice of the object of the action, as the case may require,
made by the person who mailed the same.
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(c) The written admission of the defendant, whose sig-
nature or the subscription of whose name to such admission
shall be presumptive evidence of genuineness.
Former section 262.14 purported to express the qualifica-
tions of the person effecting service of the summons. While that
section did not by its terms require the server to be an adult,
former section 262.17 did require an affidavit of adulthood,
inter alia, for proof of personal or substituted personal service.
Subsection (1) of the new rule makes the qualifications of the
server required by the substantive statute conform to the quali-
fications required for proof of service.
Subsection (2) requires the person who serves the summons
to endorse on the copy served not only his name (and title, if
any) but also the time, place and manner of service and upon
whom service was made. This additional information should be
useful to attorneys in deciding whether to raise jurisdictional
or statute of limitations defenses. (It should be noted that the
official Judicial Council Committee's Note to this rule contains
a patent misstatement for which the author of those notes must
take the blame. The committee note indicates that the en-
dorsement should recite such facts as show reasonable dili-
gence in attempting to effect personal service on the defendant.
As the rule itself clearly shows, the recitals respecting reasona-
ble diligence are required only on the proof of service, not on
the endorsement on the copy served.)
Unlike the provisions of former section 262.14, which did
not require the filing of proof of service, subsection (3) of the
new rule requires the person who causes service to be made to
file the proof of service promptly. This filing will cause the
court file to reflect the fact that personal jurisdiction over the
defendant has been obtained.
Subsection (4) replaced former section 262.17, which re-
quired that, if substituted personal service was made by the
sheriff or a deputy, his certificate of service needed to indicate
only place, time and manner of service. If substituted personal
service was made by anyone other than the sheriff or his dep-
uty, the server had to indicate when, where and with whom the
summons was left. Subsection (4) requires the sheriff's certifi-
cate to provide the same information respecting substituted
personal service as the non-sheriff's proof of service contains.
It is important to note the added requirement when substituted
personal service is made that the proof recite such facts as show
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reasonable diligence in attempting personal service. In the ab-
sence of reasonable diligence to effect personal service, substi-
tuted personal service is constitutionally defective."
801.11 Personal jurisdiction, manner of serving sum-
mons for. A court of this state having jurisdiction of the
subject matter and grounds for personal jurisdiction as pro-
vided in s. 801.05 may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant by service of a summons as follows:
(1) NATURAL PERSON. Except as provided in sub. (2) upon
a natural person:
(a) By personally serving the summons upon the defen-
dant either within or without this state.
(b) If with reasonable diligence the defendant cannot be
served under par. (a), then by leaving a copy of the summons
at the defendant's usual place of abode within this state in
the presence of some competent member of the family at least
14 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof.
(c) If with reasonable diligence the defendant cannot be
served under par. (a) or (b), service may be made by publica-
tion of the summons as a class 3 notice, under ch. 985, and
by mailing. If the defendant's post-office address is known or
can with reasonable diligence be ascertained, there shall be
mailed to the defendant, at or immediately prior to the first
publication, a copy of the summons and a copy of the com-
plaint. The mailing may be omitted if the post-office address
cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence.
(d) In any case, by serving the summons in a manner
specified by any other statute upon the defendant or upon an
agent authorized by appointment or by law to accept service
of the summons for the defendant.
(2) NATURAL PERSON UNDER DISABILITY. Upon a natural
person under disability by serving the summons in any man-
ner prescribed in sub. (1) upon such person under disability
and, in addition, where required by par. (a) or (b), upon a
person therein designated. A minor 14 years of age or older
who is not mentally incompetent and not otherwise under
guardianship is not a person under disability for purposes of
this subsection. (a) Where the person under disability is a
minor under the age of 14 years, summons shall be served
separately in any manner prescribed in sub. (1) upon a parent
or guardian having custody of the child, or if there is none,
upon any other person having the care and control of the
11. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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child. If there is no parent, guardian or other person having
care and control of the child when service is made upon the
child, then service of the summons shall also be made upon
the guardian ad litem after he has been appointed pursuant
to s. 803.01.
(b) Where the person under disability is known by the
plaintiff to be under guardianshil of any kind, a summons
shall be served separately upon his guardian in any manner
prescribed in sub. (1), (5), (6) or (7). If no guardian has been
appointed when service'is made upon a person known to the
plaintiff to be incompetent to have charge of his affairs, then
service of the summons shall be made upon the guardian ad
litem after he has been appointed pursuant io s. 803.01.
(3) STATE. Upon the state, by delivering a copy of the
summons and of the complaint to the attorney general or
leaving them at his office in the capitol with his assistant or
clerk.
(4) OTHER POLITICAL CORPORATIONS OF BODIES POLITIC. (a)
Upon a political corporation or other body politic, by person-
ally serving any of the specified officers, directors, or agents:
1. If the action is against a county, the chairman of the
county board or the county clerk;
2. If against a town, the chairman or clerk thereof;
3. If against a city, the mayor, city manager or clerk
thereof;
4. If against a village, the president or clerk thereof;
5. If against a vocational, technical and adult education
district, the district board chairman or secretary thereof;
6. If against a school district, school board, the presi-
dent, secretary or clerk thereof; and
7. If against any other body politic, an officer, director,
or managing agent thereof.
(b) In lieu of delivering the copy of the summons to the
person specified, the copy may be left in the office of such
officer, director or managing agent with the person who is
apparently in charge of the office.
(5) DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN CORPORATIONS, GENERALLY.
Upon a domestic or foreign corporation:
(a) By personally serving the summons upon an officer,
director or managing agent of the corporation either within
or without this state. In lieu of delivering the copy of the
summons to the officer specified, the copy may be left in the
office of such officer, director or managing agent with the
person who is apparently in charge of the office.
(b) If with reasonable diligence the defendant cannot be
served under par. (a), then the summons may be served upon
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an officer, director or managing agent of the corporation by
publication and mailing as provided in sub. (1).
(c) By serving the summons in a manner specified by
any other statute upon the defendant or upon an agent ani-
thorized by appointment or by law to accept service of the
summons for the defendant.
(d) If against any domestic or foreign insurance corpora-
tion, to any agent of such corporation as defined by the insur-
ance laws of this state. Service upon such agent of a domestic
or foreign insurance corporation is not valid unless a copy of
the summons and proof of service is sent by registered mail
to the principal place of business of such corporation within
five days after service upon the agent. Service upon any do-
mestic or foreign insurance corporation may also be made
under par. (a).
(6) PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS. A summons shall be
served individually upon each general partner known to the
plaintiff by service in any manner prescribed in sub. (1), (2)
or (5) where the clairu sued upon arises out of or relates to
partnership activities within this state sufficient to subject a
defendant to personal jurisdiction under s. 801.05 (2) to (10).
A judgment rendered under such circumstances is a binding
adjudication individually against each partner so served and
is a binding adjudication against the partnership as to its
assets anywhere.
(7) OTHER UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS AND THEIR
OFFICERS. A summons may be served individually upon any
officer or director known to the plaintiff of an unincorporated
association other than a partnership by service in the manner
prescribed in sub. (1), (2), (5) or (6) where the claim sued
upon arises out of or relates to association activities within
this state sufficient to subject a defendant to personal juris-
diction under s. 801.05 (2) to (10). A judgment rendered
under such circumstances is a binding adjudication against
the association as to its assets anywhere.
This section is identical to former section 262.06 except that
section 262.06(2)(c) relating to commencement of actions
against minors was striken as inconsistent with the mode of
commencement under the new section 801.02(1), and the terms
"board of education" and "director" in section 262.06(4)(a)6
were stricken to conform with recent changes in school law
found in Wisconsin statutes Chapters 117 through 121.
801.12 Jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem, manner of
serving summons for; notice of object of action. (1) A court
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of this state exercising jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem
pursuant to s. 801.07 may affect the interests of a defendant
in such action only if a summons and either a copy of the
complaint or a notice of the object of the action under sub.
(2) have been served upon the defendant as follows:
(a) If the defendant is known, he may be served in the
manner prescribed for service of a summons in s. 801.11, but
service in such a case shall not bind the defendant personally
to the jurisdiction of the court unless some ground for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction exists.
(b) If the defendant is unknown the summons may be
served by publication thereof as a class 3 notice, under ch.
985.
(2) The notice of object of action shall be subscribed by
the plaintiff or his attorney and shall state the general object
of the action, a brief description of all the property affected
by it, if it affects specific real or personal property, the fact
that no personal claim is made against such defendant, and
that a copy of the complaint will be delivered personally or
by mail to such defendant upon his request made within the
time fixed in s. 801.09(2). If a defendant upon whom such
notice is served unreasonably defends the action he shall pay
costs to the plaintiff.
This section is virtually identical to former section 262.09
except that the word "verified" has been removed from the
phrase "verified complaint." The new section abolishes verifi-
cation of pleadings. Subsection (2) is taken from former section
262.12(2).
801.13 Summons; when deemed served. A summons is
deemed served as follows:
(1) A summons served personally upon the defendant or
by substituted personal service upon another authorized to
accept service of the summons for the defendant is deemed
served on the day of service.
(2) A summons served by publication is deemed served
on the first day of required publication.
This section is former section 262.15 renumbered.
801.14 Service and filing of pleadings and other
papers. (1) Every order required by its terms to be served,
every pleading unless the court otherwise orders because of
numerous defendants, every paper relating to discovery re-
quired to be served upon a party unless the court otherwise
orders, every written motion other than one which may be
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heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, de-
mand, offer of judgment, undertaking, and similar paper
shall be served upon each of the parties. No service need be
made on parties in default for failure to appear except that
pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against
them shall be served upon them in the manner provided for
service of summons in s. 801.11.
(2) Whenever under these statutes, service of pleadings
and other papers is required or permitted to be made upon a
party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made
upon the attorney unless service upon the party himself is
ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon a
party shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by mailing
it to him at his last known address, or, if no address is known,
by leaving it with the clerk of the court. Delivery of a copy
within this section means: handing it to the attorney or to the
party; or leaving it at his office with his clerk or other person
in charge thereof; or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it
in a conspicuous place therein; or, if the office is closed or the
person to be served has no office, leaving it at his dwelling
house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein. Service by mail is
complete upon mailing. The first sentence of this subsection
shall not apply to service of a summons or of any process of
court or of any paper to bring a party into contempt of court.
(3) In any action in which there are unusually large
numbers of defendants, the court, upon motion or on its own
initiative, may order that service of the pleadings of the de-
fendants and replies thereto need not be made as between the
defendants and that any cross claim, counterclaim, or matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense contained
therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other
parties and that the filing of any such pleading and service
thereof upon the plaintiff constitutes due notice of it to the
parties. A copy of every such order shall be served upon the
parties in such manner and form as the court directs.
(4) All papers after the summons required to be served
upon a party shall be filed with the court within a reasonable
time after service. The filing of any paper required to be
served constitutes a certification by the party or attorney
effecting the filing that a copy of such paper has been timely
served on all parties required to be served, except as the
person effecting the filing may otherwise stipulate in writing.
(5) The filing of pleadings and other papers with the
court as required by these statutes shall be made by filing
them with the clerk of the court, except that the judge may
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permit the papers to be filed with him, in which event he
shall note thereon the filing date and forthwith transmit
them to the office of the clerk.
This section is substantially the same as Federal Rule 5. It
requires that a copy of all pleadings, written motions, and other
important papers be served upon other parties, unless the court
orders otherwise under subsection (3) because the parties are
too numerous.
The service requirement is somewhat broader under this
section than under the Wisconsin statutes which it has re-
placed. Section 262.12 provided for the service of the complaint
either with the summons or upon demand by the defendant.
Section 269.32(2) required that copies of all records and papers
upon which a motion or order to show cause is grounded except
such as had previously been filed or served in the same action
or proceeding, be served with the notice of motion or order to
show cause. Section 263.10 required that amended complaints
be served. Section 263.15(1) required that a defendant or a
person interpleaded or intervening who sought affirmative re-
lief by way of cross-complaint or counterclaim, serve an appro-
priate pleading upon the party against whom the relief is asked
or "upon such person, not a party, upon his being brought in."
Subsection (2) of section 263.15 provided that the court may
make such orders for the service of the pleadings as are just.
Section 260.185 provided for the service of the complaint or
notice of object of action upon new defendants and existing
parties whenever new defendants were added by the plaintiff.
Section 260.19(1) provided for service of the third-party sum-
mons, third-party complaint and a copy of all prior pleadings
when new parties were added by the defendant. Section
260.205 provided that if the court granted a motion to inter-
vene, it was required to indicate in its order the existing parties
on whom the pleading should be served, and the time within
which it should be served. Section 269.02 provided that an offer
of judgment was to be served upon the plaintiff and the notice
of acceptance thereof should be served upon the offeror (but
not on other parties).
Subsection (1) is comprehensive: all important papers are
to be served on all parties (except those in default for failure
to appear) unless the court orders otherwise. Not just motions
and pleadings are included, but also "every written notice,
appearance, demand, offer of judgment, designation of record
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on appeal and similar paper." The rule is designed to provide
fair notice to all parties and to relieve attorneys of the time-
wasting necessity of checking the file in the clerk's office to
determine whether an important paper has been filed.
Because rigid rules tend to promote unnecessary technical-
ity, the court is given discretionary power to modify the re-
quirements of subsection (1) if justice or good sense requires it.
This power is restricted, however, to limiting the parties or
papers that must be served. The court does not have the power
to alter the methods of service under subsection (2) or the
methods of filing under subsections (4) and (5).
Although the papers required to be served are enumerated
in the subsection, inclusion of the words "similar paper" is
intended to make it clear that this enumeration is not exhaus-
tive.
Subsection (2) is virtually identical to Federal Rule 5(b)
and replaced section 269.34. Section 269.34(1) gave to the per-
son required to serve a paper the option of serving the party
himself or his attorney. Subsection (2) makes service on the
attorney mandatory unless the court orders service on the party
himself. The mandatory nature of the federal rule is considered
superior because: (1) it comports with the actual practice by
attorneys; and, (2) it provides for greater efficiency inasmuch
as a party served with a paper or pleading would deliver it to
his attorney anyway.
The provisions of former section 269.34(2) dealing with serv-
ice on an attorney and former section 269.34(3) dealing with
service on a party were somewhat more specific than the provi-
sions of the new section 801.14(2). For example, section
269.34(3) provided that service on a party could be made by
leaving a copy of the paper at the party's residence between the
hours of six in the morning and nine in the evening with some
person of suitable age and discretion. Subsection (2) does not
limit the hours within which service may be made but only
requires that the paper be left at the party's dwelling or usual
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein. Aside from the deletion of the hour limitation
in section 269.34(3), however, the provisions of that former
statute and subsection (2) are substantially identical.
Subsection (3) is based on Federal Rule 5(c) and gives the
court considerable discretion in cases involving numerous de-
fendants. Subsection (3) is the only instance in which the pro-
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visions of section 802.01(1) respecting required pleadings are
permitted to be relaxed. The relaxation goes only to the extent
of permitting the court to make an order dispensing with the
necessities of replies to counterclaims and answers to cross
claims in an action in which there are unusually large numbers
of defendants.
Subsection (4) is based on Federal Rule 5(d) and should be
read in conjunction with section 801.02(1) requiring that the
summons be filed before it or the complaint is served. Under
this section, it is service that must be made within the times
prescribed in the various rules; filing is permitted to be made
within a reasonable time thereafter. It should be remembered,
however, that when the court orders that pleadings among de-
fendants need not be served under subsection (3), such plead-
ings must be filed within the prescribed period of time. Under
subsection (3), it is the act of filing rather than service which
is considered notice to the parties.
The second sentence of subsection (4) is designed to reduce
the unnecessary paperwork generated by a lawsuit. Proof of
service of papers (other than the summons) unnecessarily clut-
ters the court files and can be avoided simply by requiring the
attorney who files any paper to certify (by virtue of this sent-
ence) that all parties required to be served have been served.
Subsection (5) is identical to Federal Rule 5(e) and defines
the act of filing pleadings and other papers. This subsection
provides two alternative methods of filing. Delivery to the clerk
has long been used and needs little explanation. Filing with the
judge would be expedient when it is necessary for the party to
obtain immediate court action which would be delayed by first
filing papers with the clerk, for example, when a party needs a
restraining order.
801.15 Time. (1) Notwithstanding ss. 985.09 and 990.001
(4), in computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by
sections within this title, by any other statute governing ac-
tions and special proceedings, or by order of court, the day
of the act, event, or default from which the designated period
of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of
the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Satur-
day, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, Saturdays, Sun-
days, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computa-
tion. As used in this section "legal holiday" means any state-
wide legal holiday provided in s. 256.17.
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(2) (a) When an act is required to be done at or within
a specified time, the court may order the period enlarged but
only on motion for cause shown and upon just terms. If the
motion is made after the expiration of the specified time, it
shall not be granted unless the court finds that the failure to
act was the result of excusable neglect. The order of enlarge-
ment shall recite by its terms or by reference to an affidavit
in the record the grounds for granting the motion.
(b) The time within which a motion challenging the suf-
ficiency of the evidence or for new trial must be decided shall
not be enlarged except for good cause. The order of extension
must be made prior to the expiration of the initial decision
period.
(c) The time for appeal under s. 817.01, for motions after
verdict under s. 805.16, and for motions for relief from judg-
ment or order under s. 806.07 may not be extended, except
as provided in par. (b).
(3) The period of time provided for the doing of any act
or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by
the continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The
continued existence or expiration of a term of court in no way
affects the power of a court to do any act or take any proceed-
ing in any civil action which has been pending before it.
(4) A written motion, other than one which may be
heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be
served not later than five days before the time specified for
the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by statute or by
order of the court. Such an order may for cause shown be
made on ex parte motion. When a motion is supported by
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and
opposing affidavits may be served not later than one day
before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served
at some other time. All written motions shall be heard on
notice unless a statute or rule permits the motion to be heard
ex parte.
(5) Whenever a party has the right or is required to do
some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period
after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, three days shall
be added to the prescribed period.
Subsection (1) is based on Federal Rule 6(a) and comports
more realistically with the working hours of attorneys and
judges than does section 990.001(4) of the former statutes. Both
the former statute and the new rule provide that in computing
time periods within which some actions must be taken, the first
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day of the period is excluded and the last day is included.
However, subsection (1) is more flexible than section
990.001(4) insofar as it excludes from the computation, Satur-
days, Sundays and legal holidays which happen to coincide
with the last day of the period computed. Section 990.001(4)
excludes Saturdays only if the place at which the action was
to occur is a governmental office which, under "the duly estab-
lished official office hours," is closed on Saturdays. There ap-
pears to be no good reason for distinguishing between lawyers'
offices which are closed on Saturdays and clerks' offices which
are closed on Saturdays. Also, the method of computation
found in subsection 990.001(4) contains no provision for exclud-
ing Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays when they fall
within a prescribed time period that may already be quite lim-
ited. Subsection (1) provides for exclusion when the prescribed
period is less than seven days.
Paragraph (2)(a) replaces section 269.45 which required the
motion for enlargement of time to be accompanied by an affi-
davit showing cause, even when the motion was interposed
prior to the expiration of the time period sought to be enlarged.
The new rule does not require an affidavit in such circumstan-
ces since the affidavit would only say in writing what the attor-
ney would ordinarily say to the court. To require a sworn, writ-
ten statement in such circumstances seems to be needless for-
malism leading to unnecessary paperwork. It should also be
noted that the proposed rule does not permit ex parte enlarge-
ments under any circumstances. In this respect it differs from
former section 269.45.
No motion for enlargement which is interposed after the
expiration of the specified time may be granted under the new
rule unless the court finds that the failure to act was the result
of excusable neglect. The term "excusable neglect" is an im-
precise one which has led to rather variant holdings in the
federal courts and in the state courts. It seems clear that nei-
ther inadvertence nor oversight is a sufficient grounds for en-
largement of time, 2 but the distinction between "inadvert-
ence" and "excusable neglect" can be a tenuous one.' 3
12. Driver v. Gindy Mfg. Corp., 24 F.R.D. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Mason v. British
Overseas Airways Corp., 20 F.R.D. 213 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
13. See Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. North American Chem. Corp., 238 F. Supp. 81
(S.D. N.Y. 1964).
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In Giese v. Giese," the Wisconsin Supreme Court said
"'excusable neglect' is not synonymous with neglect, careless-
ness or inattentiveness, but rather is that neglect which might
have been the acts of a reasonably prudent person under the
same circumstances.' 5
Attorneys should note that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
has held in Millis v. Raye,"1 that an enlargement of time will
be allowed after the time has run only when the initial failure
to do the act was the result of excusable neglect and there has
been no inexcusable delay in moving for enlargement. Thus,
the excusable neglect provision, by interpretation, has been
made to apply to the time within which the motion for enlarge-
ment of time is made. 7
Paragraph (2) (b) as it now reads is quite different from the
committee's original version. In January of 1974, a tentative
draft of the proposed rules was published in a special edition
of the Wisconsin Law Review. 8 The tentative draft of para-
graph (2) (b) provided that the time within which motions chal-
lenging the sufficiency of evidence or for new trial had to be
decided could not be enlarged except for disability of the judge
before whom the motion was pending, in which event the pe-
riod might be extended for one additional thirty day period.
The philosophy underlying the tentative draft was that it does
little good to get cases tried reasonably soon after commence-
ment of action if one must wait an inordinate length of time
after trial for decisions on motions after verdict. The tentative
draft received rather substantial opposition from both the
bench and the bar. Although some judges and lawyers were of
the fixed opinion that post-verdict motions would be better
decided if they were "called from the bench" when the evi-
dence is freshest in the judge's mind, more were of the opinion
that the ninety days provided by section 805.16 for decisions on
motions after verdict might be insufficient in many cases. The
strict provisions of the tentative draft were abandoned and the
final draft permits enlargement of time for decisions on motion
after verdict "for good cause."
Paragraph (2)(c) permits extension of the time for appeal,
14. 43 Wis. 2d 456, 168 N.W.2d 832 (1969).
15. Accord, Stryker v. Town of La Pointe, 52 Wis. 2d 228, 190 N.W.2d 178 (1971).
16. 16 Wis. 2d 79, 113 N.W.2d 820 (1962).
17. See also Briggson v. City of Viroqua, 264 Wis. 40, 58 N.W.2d 543 (1953).
18. 1973 Wis. L. REV. 3.
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for motions after verdict, and for motions for relief from judg-
ment or order, but only for good cause. In the first published
tentative draft of this paragraph, in January, 1974, no exten-
sions were permitted, regardless of cause. In the second draft,
the first tentative draft was modified in a way which the writer
can neither explain nor understand. The second draft provided
that extensions could not be had "except as provided in par.
(b)." Paragraph (b) at that time still provided that the time
within which motions after verdict must be decided could not
be extended except for disability of the judge before whom the
motion was pending. The meaning of paragraph (c) thus ap-
peared to be that the time for appeal and for making certain
post-verdict and post-judgment motions could be extended if
the trial judge was disabled. Such a rule, of course, makes little
if any sense and the writer has not been able to ascertain from
the records of the Judicial Council Committee the source of
that cryptic clause "except as provided in par. (b)."
Furthermore, in the third and final draft of section 801.15
appearing in the Wisconsin Reports,'9 paragraph (b) had been
amended to provide that the time for decision of post-verdict
motions could be extended "for cause shown," but the mysteri-
ous clause tagged onto the tail of paragraph (c) remains. As a
result, under the rule as it presently appears, upon a proper
showing of good cause, one is presumably entitled to an exten-
sion of the time for appeal, for motions after verdict under
section 805.16, and for motions for relief from judgment on
order under section 806.07. The effect of such a rule will be to
impair substantially the finality of judgments. It is suggested
that the mysterious clause of unknown origin which has created
this problem should be stricken by amendment as soon as prac-
ticable. Unless and until such amendment occurs, however,
one might reasonably expect that one moving for an extension
of time under this paragraph will bear a heavy burden in at-
tempting to show "good cause."
Subsection (3) is taken directly from Federal Rule 6(c). It
should be noted that the Judicial Council has recommended to
the supreme cburt that terms of court be abolished. If the rec-
ommendation is accepted by the supreme court, this subsec-
tion will be stricken.
Subsection (4) is based on Federal Rule 6(d). Formerly
19. 67 Wis. 2d at 610-11.
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under section 269.31, a notice of motion, when required, had to
be served eight days before the time appointed for the hearing,
unless, of course, a shorter time was prescribed by order to
show cause. Subsection (4) reduces the time period to five days.
This subsection, however, must be read in conjunction with
subsection (1) which provides that when a time period pre-
scribed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sun-
days and legal holidays shall be excluded from the time compu-
tation. Also, under subsection (1), the first day from which the
designated period begins to run is excluded. Thus, if a notice
of motion is served on a Monday, the five-day period will not
elapse until the following Monday, Saturday and Sunday hav-
ing been excluded from the computation. The five-day notice
of motion is thus effectively a seven-day notice, one day less
than under section 269.31.
Subsection (4) also provides that a different period may be
fixed by order of court for cause shown on ex parte application.
Thus the flexibility of the order to show cause is retained.
Subsection (5) is based on Federal Rule 6(e). It changes the
law by reducing the additional time added after service by mail
from five days to three days. The Field Code allowed an in-
crease of one day for every fifty miles in cases of service by
mail. When the Wisconsin legislature adopted the Code in
1856, it declined to adopt the one day per fifty mile formula but
instead provided that mail service simply doubled the time
required when personal service was used."0 In 1956, by supreme
court rule, section 269.36 was amended by deleting the time-
doubling language and substituting therefor a provision that
mail service increased by five days the time required or allowed
to do an act.2" The three day period provided by the new rule
seemed to the Judicial Council Committee to be an adequate
allowance of additional time after mail service.
CHAPTER 802
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND PRETRIAL PRACTICE
802.01 Pleadings allowed; form of motions. (1)
PLEADINGS. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply
to a counterclaim denominated as such; an answer to a cross
20. Wis. Laws, 1856, ch. 120, § 315.
21. Wis. STAT. ANNO. § 269.36, Interpretive Commentary, p. 452-53 (1957).
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claim, if the answer contains a cross claim; a third-party
complaint, if a person who was not an original party is sum-
moned under s. 803.05, and a third-party answer, if a third-
party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be al-
lowed, except that the court may order a further pleading to
a reply or to any answer and a party who contests a claim for
contribution shall answer or reply to the pleading in which
the claim is asserted.
(2) MOTIONS. (a) How made. An application to the court
for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a
hearing or trial, shall be made in writing, shall state with
particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the
relief or order sought. The requirement of writing is fulfilled
if the motion is stated in a written notice of the hearing of
the motion. Unless specifically authorized by statute, orders
to show cause shall not be used.
(b) Supporting papers. Copies of all records and papers
upon which a motion is founded, except those which have
been previously filed or served in the same action or proceed-
ing, shall be served with the notice of motion and shall be
plainly referred to therein. Papers already filed or served
shall be referred to as papers theretofore filed or served in the
action. The moving party may be allowed to present upon the
hearing, records, affidavits or other papers, but only upon
condition that opposing counsel be given reasonable time in
which to meet such additional proofs should request therefor
be made.
(c) Recitals in orders. All orders, unless they otherwise
provide, shall be deemed to be based on the records and
papers used on the motion and the proceedings theretofore
had and shall recite the nature of the motion, the appear-
ances, the dates on which the motion was heard and decided,
and the order signed. No other formal recitals are necessary.
(d) Formal requirements. The rules applicable to cap-
tions, signing and other matters of form of pleadings apply
to all motions and other papers in an action, except that
affidavits in support of a motion need not be separately cap-
tioned if served and filed with the motion.
(e) When deemed made. In computing any period of
time prescribed or allowed by the statutes governing proce-
dure in civil actions and special proceedings, a motion which
requires notice under s. 801.15 (4) shall be deemed made
when it is served with its notice of motion.
(3) DEMURRERS AND PLEAS ABOLISHED. Demurrers and
pleas shall not be used.
[Vol. 59
NEW RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Subsection (1) is similar to Federal Rule 7(a) and enumer-
ates the only pleadings permitted under the new rules. The
most significant feature of this subsection is that it excludes
the demurrer. The demurrer is not mentioned as a permissible
pleading in subsection (1) and is expressly abolished by subsec-
tion (3). Its procedural function is picked up by the motion to
dismiss under section 802.06(2). The other change is found in
the last sentence which changed the rule under former sections
263.20(1) and 263.15(3) that a party need not respond to a
pleading seeking only contribution of him.
Subsection (1) must be read together with sections 802.02,
802.03 and 802.06 to understand the modified function of
pleadings under these rules. The former Wisconsin pleading
statutes were based on the Field Code under which the plead-
ings carried virtually the entire burden of issue-formulation.
The parties were expected to define the issues by countering
written pleadings with answers, replies, demurrers and mo-
tions. The new rules, like the Federal Rules on which they are
based, emphasize the notice function of pleading and relieve
pleading of some, though certainly not all, of its issue-
formulating function.
Under these rules, the pleadings may simply identify the
general nature of the dispute. Discovery will then identify the
full factual background of the dispute and the version of the
facts relied upon by each party. Finally, the pretrial conference
will frame the issues. The trial should then center on the true
controversy between the parties instead of an artificial one pro-
duced by pleadings drafted before discovery was completed, or
indeed even started.
Since development and formulation of the issues occurs
during discovery and pretrial, the complaint and answer serve
only to give the opposing party general notice of the claim or
defense. A reply (other than to a counterclaim denominated as
such) should not often be needed, but in exceptional circum-
stances the rule provides for one.
Only those pleadings permitted by subsection (1) are au-
thorized. Unauthorized pleadings may be treated as super-
fluous, or may be dismissed upon motion.2 Even when so
treated, unauthorized pleadings may be harmful to a client's
22. Landis Mach. Co. v. Parker-Kalon Corp., 73 F. Supp. 421 (D.C. N.Y. 1947).
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cause since they may constitute admissions against interest.2 3
Federal Rule 7(a), on which subsection (1) is based, is am-
biguous on the question of whether an answer is "required"
within the meaning of Federal Rule 8(d), the federal counter-
part of section 802.02(4), to an intervention complaint in an
interpleader action. The question arose in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Company v. Lucey Prodcuts Co.,24 and the court sim-
ply declined to answer the question. Even though there was no
response to the intervention complaint, the court concluded
that, since all parties had acted in good faith, it would be too
harsh to treat the allegations in the intervention complaint as
admitted pursuant to Federal Rule 8(d).
Subsection (1) could, by an overly technical and restrictive
construction, be interpreted as forbidding a reply to a counter-
claim in a cross claim answer or third-party answer. It is not
the committee's intent that the rule be so interpreted. A cross
claim or third-party complaint should be treated as a "new"
complaint which would permit both an answer and a reply to
a counterclaim denominated as such.
Subsection (2) is based on Federal Rule 7(b). It expressly
requires that any motion "shall state with particularity the
grounds therefor." The amount of particularity required will
vary, of course, depending on the kind of motion made. For
example, in federal practice, motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted rarely detail the
grounds on which the movant relies. Nonetheless, such motions
have been upheld as not impermissibly non-particularized.2 It
is not intended that a different result should obtain in Wiscon-
sin under the new rule. On the other hand, a motion for a new
trial merely asserting that the "verdict is not sustained by the
evidence" or the "verdict is contrary to law" has been held
insufficient to meet the particularity requirements of Rule
7(b)(1). 26 The same result would obtain under this rule. In gen-
eral, the question should be whether the motion contains
enough information for the court to deal fairly and adequately
with it. Attorneys would be well advised to make reasonable
23. Middle West Const. Inc. v. Metropolitan District, 2 F.R.D. 117 (D. Conn.
1941).
24. 403 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1968).
25. See Kenney v. Fox, 132 F. Supp. 305 (D. Mich. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 288 (6th
Cir. 1956).
26. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Britten, 301 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1962).
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efforts to achieve particularity, at least where motions other
than a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted are involved.
Orders to show cause are not provided for in either the
Federal Rules or in these rules. Such orders are too often used
simply as substitutes for motions when for any reason, valid or
not, a party wishes to avoid the time limitation on a notice of
motion. Under these rules, a party with a legitimate reason for
bringing a motion on for hearing sooner than five days after
notice may move the court under section 801.16(4) for cause
and ex parte, for an order shortening the notice time allowed
on a motion. It is hoped that this change will curtail the wide-
spread disregard of notice of motion rules while retaining the
functional equivalent of the order to show cause.
The penultimate sentence of paragraph (2) (a) is designed to
do away with the unnecessary practice of putting the notice of
motion and the motion itself on separate papers. It is sufficient
if the motion is stated in the written notice of motion.
Paragraph (2) (b) is derived from former subsection
269.32(2).
Paragraph (2) (c) is new. It is designed to reduce formalistic
recitals in orders. It also requires that written orders recite not
only the date on which the order was signed, but also the dates
on which the motion was argued and decided. Not infre-
quently, of course, the motion will be decided from the bench,
with the written order not signed until sometime thereafter."
Paragraph (2)(d) requires that motions and other papers be
captioned and signed as are pleadings, with an exception for
affidavits in support of motions which are served and filed with
the motion.
The former statutes do not define the time at which a mo-
tion is considered "made." The question can, of course, be of
critical significance. For example, section 806.07 permits a
party to "make" a motion for relief from a judgment, order or
stipulation on certain specific grounds only within one year
after the judgment was entered or the order or stipulation was
made. Is a motion "made" when served or when filed or when
heard? Under paragraph (2)(e) of this section, the answer is
clear.
Subsection (3) is derived from Federal Rule 7(c) which
27. See Wis. STAT. § 807.11.
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reads: "(c) Demurrers, Pleas, Etc. Abolished. Demurrers, pleas
and exceptions for insufficiency of a pleading shall not be
used." Since the "exception for insufficiency of a pleading" is
not presently an accepted pleading in Wisconsin, its inclusion
in subsection (3) would have added nothing useful but could
have served to obfuscate the simple "message" of this part of
section 802.01. Accordingly, this part of the rule is identical to
the Federal Rule except for the reference to "exceptions for
insufficiency of a pleading."
The function presently served by the demurrer will be
served by the motion to dismiss under section 802.06(2) and the
motion to strike an insufficient defense under section 802.06(6).
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted may receive broader treatment than a
demurrer, however, in that if affidavits are presented to the
court, the motion may be treated as one for summary judgment
under section 802.08.
802.02 General rules of pleading. (1) CLAIMS FOR
RELIEF. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether
an original claim, counterlcaim, cross claim, or third-party
claim, shall contain (a) a short and plain statement of the
claim, identifying the transaction, occurrence or event out of
which the claim arises and showing that the pleader is enti-
tled to relief and (b) a demand for judgment for the relief to
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or
of several different types may be demanded.
(2) DEFENSES; FORM OF DENIALS. A party shall state in
short and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted and
shall admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse
party relies. If he is without knowledge or information suffi-
cient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall
so state and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly
meet the substance of the averments denied. The pleader
shall make his denials as specific denials of designated aver-
ments or paragraphs, but if a pleader intends in good faith
to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, he shall
specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny
only the remainder.
(3) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES. In pleading to a preceding
pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively any matter con-
stituting an avoidance or affirmative defense including but
not limited to the following: accord and satisfaction, arbitra-
tion and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence,
discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of a condi-
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tion subsequent, failure or want of consideration, failure to
mitigate damages, fraud, illegality, immunity, incompet-
ence, injury by fellow servants, laches, license, payment, re-
lease, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations,
superseding cause, and waiver. When a party has mistakenly
designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as
a defense, the court, if justice so requires, shall permit
amendment of the pleading to conform to a proper designa-
tion. If an affirmative defense permitted to be raised by mo-
tion under s. 802.06 (2) is so raised, it need not be set forth
in a subsequent pleading.
(4) EFFECT OF FAILURE TO DENY. Averments in a pleading
to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those
as to the fact, nature and extent of injury and damage, are
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Aver-
ments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is re-
quired or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided.
(5) PLEADINGS TO BE CONCISE AND DIRECT; CONSISTENCY. (a)
Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and
direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are re-
quired.
(b) A party may set forth two or more statements of a
claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one
claim or defense or in separate claims or defenses. When two
or more statements are made in the alternative and one of
them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading
is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more
of the alternative statements. A party may also state as many
separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consist-
ency and whether based on legal or equitable grounds. All
statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth
in s. 802.05.
(6) CONSTRUCTION OF PLEADINGS. All pleadings shall be so
construed as to do substantial justice.
Sections 802.02, 802.10 and 804.01 are the keystones of the
new procedural system. They create an issue-formulation pro-
cedure based on non-particularized pleading, liberal discovery
and strong pretrial conferences and orders.
Subsection (1) is based on Federal Rule 8(a). Unlike the
Federal Rule, however, this rule does not require a jurisdic-
tional statement in the original pleading since Wisconsin state
courts do not have the jurisdictional problems of minimum
dollar amount or diversity of citizenship.
It is this subsection that discards the concept of "ultimate
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fact" pleading. Pleadings have served at least four major func-
tions: (1) giving notice of the nature of the claim or defense;
(2) stating the facts each party believes to be true; (3) defining
the issues that must be litigated; and (4) providing a means for
speedy disposition of sham claims and insubstantial defenses.
Under the Federal Rules and these new rules, it is the notice-
giving function which is preeminent, the other functions being
shifted to discovery, pretrial conferences and summary judg-
ment.
This subsection will have a significant impact on Wisconsin
practice. Under former section 263.03(2), a complaint had to
contain a "plain and concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting each cause of action, without unnecessary repeti-
tion." The pleader was required to steer a narrow, often inde-
finable course between "conclusions of law" and "mere evi-
dence" in order to escape a demurrer, a motion to strike or a
motion to make more definite and certain, the form of the
language being all important.28
The new rule requires only "a short and plain statement of
the claim identifying the transaction, occurrence or event out
of which the claim arises and showing that the pleader is enti-
tled to relief." Thus, it is immaterial whether a pleading states
"facts" or "conclusions" so long as fair notice is given, and the
statement of the claim is short and plain .29 The complaint must
still show a justifiable claim for relief, but it is not subject to
dismissal unless it appears clearly that no relief could be
granted under any set of facts which could be proved in support
of its allegations."
It should be emphasized that the rejection of ultimate fact
pleading was not intended as an invitation to sloppy pleading.
Although the new rule is intended to eliminate many technical
requirements of pleading, it should be clear that it envisions a
statement of circumstances, occurrences and events in support
28. See Pengra Bros. v. Peter Nelson & Sons, 256 Wis. 454, 41 N.W.2d 631 (1950)
(allegation that a contract was entered into is a legal conclusion); Thauer v. Gaebler,
202 Wis. 296, 232 N.W. 561 (1930) (allegations that director's salary increases were
"excessive and unreasonable," or "unlawful" were mixed conclusions of fact and law,
and properly pleaded); Strohmaier v. Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co., 214 Wis. 564, 253
N.W. 798 (1934) (in action for damages from explosion resulting from contractor's
severance of gas pipe in laying water main, allegations of prior breakage of other pipes
were merely evidentiary).
29. See Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456-58, 460-62.
30. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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of the claim presented. This is indicated not only by the re-
quirement that the pleading identify the transaction, occurr-
ence or event out of which the claim arises but also by section
802.06(5) which by implication forbids pleadings which are so
vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required
to frame a responsive pleading. Thus a complaint which reads
"Plaintiff says defendant owes him $1,000. Wherefore plaintiff
demands judgment against defendant in the sum of $1,000 and
costs" would be subject to a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim on which relief can be granted."
Particular Matters. In pleading the existence of an express
written contract, the plaintiff, at his election, may set it forth
verbatim in the complaint, attach a copy as an exhibit, or
plead it according to its legal effect.2 In an action based on a
contract implied in law or fact, the allegations must show the
facts and circumstances giving rise to the implied or quasi-
contract.3
In negligence actions, duty, breach, cause and damage
should be alleged, as under present pleading, but the form of
the statement may be quite simple. For example, Form 9 in the
Appendix of Official Forms to the Federal Rules reads (absent
its jurisdictional allegation):
2. On June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Boylston
Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove
a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing said
highway.
3. As a result plaintiff was thrown down and had his leg
broken and was otherwise injured, was prevented from trans-
acting his business, suffered great pain of body and mind,
and incurred expenses for medical attention and hospitaliza-
tion in the sum of one thousand dollars.
Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against defendant
in the sum of-dollars and costs.
Such a form, although quite brief, contains all the essential
elements of a claim grounded in negligence. Indeed, a Form 9
complaint is sufficient as against a demurrer even under the
31. See Wis. STAT. § 802.06(2).
32. Graffius v. Weather-Seal, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 125 (N.D. Ohio E.D. 1946); Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Kelly, 3 F.R.D. 28 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
33. Re v. Fullop, 22 F.R.D. 52 (E.D. Ill. 1958); Strauss v. Spiegal, Inc., 153 F.2d
268 (7th Cir. 1946); See the Appendix of Official Forms to the Federal Rules for
illustrations of complaints on a promissory note, on an account, for goods sold and
delivered, and for specific performance of a contract to convey land.
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former pleading rules. 4 However, under those pleading rules,
a Form 9 complaint was subject to a motion to make more
definite and certain. Under the new rule, a motion to make
more definite will not lie; the defendant will have to obtain his
information through discovery.
If a plaintiff's claim is based upon ownership of property,
it should be sufficient simply to allege the plaintiffs ownership
in the complaint without showing how title was acquired."
Subsection (2) is the basic provision governing defensive
pleading, superseding section 263.13. There is a split of author-
ities in the federal courts on the question of whether denials
containing conclusions of law are improper. 6 It would seem
that the best test for determining the adequacy of such a denial
would be whether, in the words of subsection (2), it "fairly
meet(s) the substance of the averments denied."
It is the opinion of the Judicial Council Committee that the
requirements that "all denials shall fairly meet the substance
of the averments denied" renders improper the pleading of
negative pregnants. However, eminent commentators on the
Federal Rules have urged that negative pregnants should not
be treated as defects in pleading, but rather as effective deni-
als .3 Also, there appears to be only one reported decision since
the promulgation of the Federal Rules that has adhered to the
negative pregnant concept.3 Nevertheless, almost as a matter
of definition, a negative pregnant does not "fairly meet the
substance of the averments denied," and hence should be sub-
ject to a motion to strike, with leave to replead.3 1
Subsection (3) is based on Federal Rule 8(c) and supersedes
section 263.03(2). It requires that a responsive pleading must
set forth certain enumerated affirmative defenses and "any
34. See Weber v. Naas, 212 Wis. 537, 250 N.W. 436 (1933).
35. Rambo v. U.S., 2 F.R.D. 200 (N.D. Ga. 1942); Bobricker v. Denebeim, 25 F.
Supp. 208 (D. Mo. 1938). See also Wis. STAT. §]] 802.03(1) (capacity); Wis. STAT. §
802.03(2) (fraud, mistake, condition of mind); Wis. STAT. § 802.03(3) (conditions pre-
cedent) Wis. STAT. § 802.03(4) (official documents or acts) Wis. STAT. § 802.03(5)
(judgments) Wis. STAT. § 802.03(6) (libel or slander) Wis. STAT. § 802.03(7) (sale and
delivery of goods or performing of labor or services); and Wis. STAT. § 802.03(8) (time
and place).
36. Compare Burke v. Mesta Machine Co., 5 F.R.D. 134 (W.D. Pa. 1946) with
Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 127 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
37. 5 WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE 287 (1969).
38. Freedom Nat'l Bank v. Northern Illinois Corp., 202 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1953).
39. See Wauwatosa v. Milwaukee, 266 Wis. 59, 62 N.W. 2d 718 (1954); Prestin v.
Baumgartner, 47 Wis. 2d 574, 177 N.W.2d 825 (1970).
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other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense."
The rule uses the term "affirmative defense" instead of "new
matter" but the change is one of terminology rather than sub-
stance.
There are nineteen enumerated defenses in Federal Rule
8(c) which must be specially pleaded: accord and satisfaction,40
arbitration and award,41 assumption of risk,42 contributory neg-
ligence,43 discharge in bankruptcy," duress,45 estoppel," failure
of consideration, 47 fraud," illegality,49 injury by fellow serv-
ant,5" laches,5' license, 52 payment, 3 release, 4 res judicata,55
statute of frauds, 5 statute of limitations,57 and waiver. 8
To the above-enumerated defenses, section 802.02(3) has
added: failure of a condition subsequent (e.g., failure to pro-
vide proof of loss on an insurance claim), failure to mitigate
damages, want of consideration, immunity, incompetence, and
superseding cause.
The list of affirmative defenses is not exhaustive. Other
defenses that have been required to be specially pleaded in
federal courts include: apparent authority, 9 good faith pur-
chase," breach of warranty,' election of remedies, 2 prescrip-
tion,6 3 and many others. 4
40. Nemitz v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 287 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Ohio W.D. 1968).
41. U.S. v. Commercial Union Ins. Group, 294 F. Supp. 768 (S.D. N.Y. 1969).
42. Kanelos v. Kettler, 406 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
43. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Napoli, 166 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1948).
44. Personal Indus. Loan Corp. v. Forgay, 240 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1957).
45. Systems, Inc. v. Bridges Electronics Co., 335 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1964).
46. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Arbogast, 45 F.R.D. 87 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
47. Carr v. Wisecup, 263 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1959).
48. Welch v. Sherwin, 300 F.2d 716 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
49. Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Harbison, 304 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1962).
50. American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Sutyak, 175 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1949).
51. Tornello v. Deligiannis Bros. Inc., 180 F.2d 553 (7th Cir. 1959).
52. There are no reported cases involving license under the federal rules.
53. Disjardins v. Disjardins, 308 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1962).
54. Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Harbison, 304 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1962).
55. Crowe v. Cherokee Wonderland, Inc., 379 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1967).
56. Wineberg v. Park, 321 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1963).
57. Bodway v. U.S., 367 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1966).
58. Atlas Assur. Co. v. Standard Brick and Tile Corp., 264 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1959).
59. Calloway v. Hamilton Nat. Bank, 195 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
60. United States v. Demmon, 72 F. Supp. 336 (D. Mont. 1947).
61. Atlantic Elec. Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 375 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1967).
62. Kuhl v. Hayes, 212 F.2d 37 (10th Cir. 1954).
63. In re Southern Land Title Corp., 301 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. La. 1968).
64. For a discussion of affirmative defenses, see Note, 26 MARQ. L. REv. 198 (1942);
Conway, Survey of Wisconsin Pleading, 1947-1954, 1955 Wis. L. Rav. 348, 349-50; 5
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Subsection (4) on the effect of failure to deny, changes the
former rule providing that it is not necessary to deny the fact,
nature and extent of injury and damage in order to raise issues
with respect thereto." Otherwise, subsection (4) preserves the
rule on effect of failure to deny.66
Subsection (5) is taken from Federal Rule 8(e). Paragraph
(a) contains no substantial change from prior Wisconsin prac-
tice. Paragraph (b) permits the pleading of hypothetical and
inconsistent defenses. Hypothetical pleading is permitted in
Wisconsin by case law, but the statutes made no reference to
the matter. 7 Also, under the prior law, inconsistent defenses
were permitted to be pleaded unless the defenses were so repug-
nant that proving one necessarily disproved the other.6" This
rule contains no express provision forbidding repugnant defen-
ses, but the rule is expressly made subject to section 802.05's
certification of good faith. Thus, there may well be cases, under
the new rule, where inconsistent allegations will be subject to
a motion to strike. For example, in a battery action, defensive
allegations that "(1) defendant did not strike the plaintiff, and
(2) that even though defendant did hit the plaintiff, the act was
privileged," could violate section 802.05, depending on whether
the underlying circumstances of the alleged striking were such
that defendant must know whether he struck plaintiff or not.
Subsection (6) is based on Federal Rule 8(f) and is substan-
tially the same as former section 263.27.
802.03 Pleading special matters. (1) CAPACITY. It is not
necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or
the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative
capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of
persons that is made a party. If a party desires to raise an
issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of
any party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue
or be sued in a representative capacity, he shall do so by
specific negative averment which shall include such support-
ing particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowl-
WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1271 at 303-16 (1969).
65. Cf. Seitz v. Seitz, 35 Wis. 2d 282, 151 N.W.2d 86 (1967).
66. See Wis. National Loan & Bldg. Assn. v. Pride, 136 Wis. 102, 116 N.W. 637
(1908); Topel v. Correz, 273 Wis. 611, 79 N.W.2d 253 (1965).
67. See Zeidler v. Johnson, 38 Wis. 335 (1875).
68. See Gilman v. Brown, 115 Wis. 1, 91 N.W. 227 (1902); Robert v. Decker, 120
Wis. 102, 97 N.W. 519 (1903); J. H. Clark Co. v. Rice, 127 Wis. 451, 106 N.W. 231
(1906).
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edge, or by motion under s. 802.06 (2).
(2) FRAUD, MISTAKE AND CONDITION OF MIND. In all aver-
ments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice,
intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person
may be averred generally.
(3) CONDITIONS PRECEDENT. In pleading the performance
or occurrence of condition precedent in a contract, it shall not
be necessary to state the facts showing such performance or
occurrence, but it may be stated generally that the party duly
performed all the conditions on his part or that the conditions
have otherwise occurred or both. A denial of performance or
occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity.
If the averment of performance or occurrence is controverted,
the party pleading performance or occurrence shall be bound
to establish on the trial the facts showing such performance
or occurrence.
(4) OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OR ACT. In pleading an official
document or official act it is sufficient to aver that the docu-
ment was issued or the act done in compliance with the law.
(5) JUDGMENT. In pleading a judgment or decision of a
domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal,
or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment
or decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction
to render it.
(6) LIBEL OR SLANDER. In an action for libel or slander,
the particular words complained of shall be set forth in the
complaint, but their publication and their application to the
plaintiff may be stated generally.
(7) SALES OF GOODS, ETC. In an action involving the sale
and delivery of goods or the performing of labor or services,
or the furnishing of materials, the plaintiff may set forth and
number in his complaint the items of his claim and the rea-
sonable value or agreed price of each. The defendant by his
answer shall indicate specifically those items he disputes and
whether in respect to delivery or performance, reasonable
value or agreed price. If the plaintiff does not so plead the
items of his claim, he shall deliver to the defendant, within
10 days after service of a demand therefor in writing, a state-
ment of the items of his claim and the reasonable value or
agreed price of each.
(8) TIME AND PLACE. For the purpose of testing the suffi-
ciency of a pleading, averments of time and place are mate-




Subsection (1) makes lack of capacity of a party to sue or
be sued a matter of affirmative defense to be particularly
pleaded and places the burden of proof upon the party chal-
lenging capacity. The reasoning behind the rule is that capac-
ity is rarely an issue in lawsuits and thus it will usually serve
no purpose to require detailed pleading of capacity. On the rare
occasions when capacity is an issue, the defendant may raise
the issue by specific negative averment. Defect incapacity may
also be raised by motion under section 802.06(2). This option
is not available under the Federal Rules, but the Judicial
Council Committee thought it desirable to make it available to
the party objecting.
The requirement of "specific negative averment" means
that an issue of capacity cannot be raised by general denial69
or by a denial of knowledge or of information sufficient to form
a belief, at least not when the information concerning capacity
is a matter of record or is readily accessible to the party at-
tempting to put the matter in issue.70
Subsection (2) is identical to Federal Rule 9(b) which itself
was based on common law and Field Code pleading rules. Wis-
consin has long required that fraud be pleaded with particular-
ity."1 A well-pleaded claim based on mistake should include
averments of what was intended, what was done, and how the
mistake came to be made.72 The second sentence of this subsec-
tion is based on a recognition that an attempt to require specif-
icity in pleading a condition of mind would be unworkable and
would violate the "short and plain statement of the claim"
mandate of section 802.02(1).
Subsection (3) is based on Federal Rule 9(c) and is substan-
tially the same as former section 263.34.71 It differs from its
predecessor by expressly including within its scope conditions
precedent which are not "performed" by an actor but simply
''occur," as for example by an act of God.
Subsection (4), identical to Federal Rule 9(d), is designed
to obviate the necessity of a proponent's setting forth in detail
69. Young v. Pattridge, 40 F.R.D. 376 (N.D. Miss. 1966).
70. Tractortechnic Gebrueder Kulenkempft & Co. v. Bousman, 301 F. Supp. 153
(E.D. Wis. 1969).
71. Prentice v. Madden, 3 Pin. 376, 4 Chand. 170 (1852); First Credit Corp. v.
Myricks, 41 Wis. 2d 146, 163 N.W.2d 1 (1968).
72. United States v. $3,216.59 in U.S. Currency, 41 F.R.D. 433 (D.S.C. 1967).
73. Gamma Tau Educational Foundation v. Ohio Ca. Ins. Co., 41 Wis. 2d 675, 165
N.W.2d 135 (1969).
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the circumstances surrounding the execution of an official doc-
ument or the doing of an official act. Of course, the pleader
relying on such a document or act will be required to prove it
at the trial.
Subsection (5) is identical to Federal Rule 9(e) and is sub-
stantially the same as former section 263.33.14
Subsection (6) is based on Section 3016(a) of New York's
Civil Practice Law and Rules and replaces former sections
263.37 and 263.38. In requiring that the particular words com-
plained of be set forth in the complaint, the rule is simply
requiring in the first instance information that would be de-
manded by interrogatory in virtually every case. The provision
that publication and application to the plaintiff may be stated
generally follows section 263.37.
Subsection (7) is based on Section 3016(f) of New York's
Civil Practice Law and Rules and replaces former section
263.32. In the case of Innis, P. & Co. v. G.H. Poppenberg, Inc.,"
the court said of this rule:
Where a complaint is properly framed under this section,
the effect is to take away from a defendant the right to
traverse by a general denial the allegations of delivery, rea-
sonable value or agreed price. If defendant desires to controv-
ert the items, or any of them, in respect to those matters, or
either of them, he must do so by specifically denying the
numbered item or items in the respect controverted. Not-
withstanding a general denial in the answer, any item not
specifically denied stands admitted in respect to delivery,
reasonable value, or agreed price as stated in the schedule.
No motion to strike or to compel amendment is necessary.
The word "items" as used in (this section) will generally
mean the particulars in such detail that the account may be
readily examined and its correctness tested entry by entry.
The numbering of the items in the schedule is an essential
part of the pleading. Without it there would inevitably be
prolixity and lack of clear definition in the answer, leading
74. Although Rule 9(e), as is true of Rule 9(a), is intended to discourage unneces-
sary pleading and to provide for simplicity in allegations, good pleading still requires
that the court, body, or person rendering the judgment or decision be identified, the
date of the judgment or decision be given, the parties to the earlier proceeding be
named, and the character and effect on the judgment or decision be specified. How-
ever, no particular set of words or formula is necessary. 5 WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 1306 at 436 (1969). See also, Waukesha Devel. Corp. v. City
of Waukesha, 10 Wis. 2d 621, 103 N.W.2d 668 (1960).
75. 213 A.D. 789, 210 N.Y.S. 761 (1925).
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to doubt and confusion on the part of both court and counsel.
The object of the section is to narrow and define the field of
controverted facts, primarily for the benefit and convenience
of plaintiff, and incidentally to save the time, of the courts.
If plaintiff seeks the benefit of the section, he must comply
with its provisions by numbering the items. By omitting to
number, he fails to present his claim in the issuable form
contemplated. The defendant is not then bound to attempt
a specific denial.
Subsection (8) is identical to Federal Rule 9(f).
802.04 Form of pleadings. (1) CAPTION. Every pleading
shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court,
the venue, the title of the action, the file number, and a
designation as in s. 802.01 (1). In the complaint the title of
the action shall include the names of all the parties, indicat-
ing the representative capacity, if any, in which they sue or
are sued and, in actions by or against a corporation, the cor-
porate existence and its domestic or foreign status shall be
indicated. In pleadings other than the complaint, it is suffi-
cient to state the name of the first party on each side with
an appropriate indication of other parties.
(2) PARAGRAPHS; SEPARATE STATEMENTS. All averments of
claim or defense shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the
contents of each of which shall be limited as far as practicable
to a statement of a single set of circumstances; and a para-
graph may be referred to by number in all succeeding plead-
ings. Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or oc-
currence and each defense other than denials shall be stated
in a separate claim or defense whenever a separation facili-
tates the clear presentation of the matters set forth. A coun-
terclaim must be pleaded as such and the answer must de-
mand the judgment to which the defendant supposes himself
entitled upon his counterclaim.
(3) ADOPTION BY REFERENCE; EXHIBITS. Statements in a
pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of
the same pleading or in another pleading or in any motion.
A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a
pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.
Subsection (1) is substantially the same as Federal Rule
10(a). Unlike the Federal Rule, however, there is an express
requirement that the caption indicate the representative ca-
pacity, if any, in which a party sues or is sued. This subsection
simply sets forth standards of good form in pleading. These
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standards are quite familiar to Wisconsin attorneys and do not
represent a departure from prior practice.
Subsection (2) is substantially the same as Federal Rule
10(b). Like subsection (1), it is designed simply to codify re-
quirements of good form and practice that have long been fa-
miliar to experienced Wisconsin attorneys. The numbering of
the paragraphs within pleadings is for clarity and easy refer-
ence. Separate claims arising from separate transactions or
occurrences should be set forth as separately designated
claims. A violation of this paragraph would render a party
subject to a motion to state separately and number. As a pract-
ical matter, such a motion should be granted only when confu-
sion is caused by the failure to state separately and number,
such that the opposing party cannot properly respond. The
federal courts have not been overly technical about separately
stating and numbering paragraphs and claims." The last sent-
ence of subsection (2) restates former section 263.14(2).
Identical to Federal Rule 10(c), subsection (3), like the
other paragrphas of this proposed rule, does not represent a
change from prior practice. 7
802.05 Signing of pleadings. Every pleading of a party
represented by an attorney shall contain the name and ad-
dress of the attorney and the name of his law firm, if any, and
shall be subscribed with the handwritten signature of at least
one attorney of record in his individual name. A party who is
not represented by an attorney shall subscribe his pleading
with his handwritten signature and state his address. Except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute,
pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him
that he had read the pleading; that to the best of his knowl-
edge, information, and belief there is good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not
signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this
section, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action
may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For
a wilful violation of this section an attorney may be subjected
to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be
taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
76. See 2A MooRE's, FEDERAL PRACTICE 10.30 at 2005-10 and 10.04 at 2011-12.
77. See Boek v. Wagner, 1 Wis. 2d 337, 83 N.W.2d 916 (1957); Olson v. Johnson,
267 Wis. 462, 66 N.W.2d 346 (1954).
1976]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
All pleadings (and motions and other papers under subdivi-
sion 802.01(2)(d)) must be signed in the individual name of at
least one attorney of record when the party responsible for the
pleading, motion or other paper is represented by counsel. By
force of this rule, "[t]he signature of the attorney constitutes
a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief, there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay."
The purpose and effect of this rule is simply to place a profes-
sional obligation on the attorney as an officer of the court to
satisfy himself that there are grounds for the action, defense or
motion.
The rule provides that "[fjor a wilful violation of this rule
an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary ac-
tion." What the disciplinary action might be is not specified in
the rule since attorney discipline is not properly a matter of
civil procedure. Disciplinary actions in the federal courts have
ranged from filing an official record in the court files adversely
reflecting on the attorney 8 to contempt and disbarment. 9
This rule abolishes verification with but few exceptions. An
exception is found in section 804.02(1)(a) which requires that
a petition for the perpetuation of testimony before an action is
commenced must be verified. In the majority of cases, the bur-
den for the truthfulness of pleadings is on the attorney as an
officer of the court. In effect, his signature becomes the verifi-
cation.
This rule requires that the attorney signing the pleading
include the name and address of his firm, if he is a member of
or associated with a firm. This requirement simply codifies the
present practice among Wisconsin attorneys.
802.06 Defenses and objection; when and how pre-
sented; by pleading or motion; motion for judgment on the
pleadings. (1) WHEN PRESENTED. A defendant shall serve his
answer within 20 days after the service of the complaint upon
him unless a different time is prescribed under s. 802.10 (1)
by the judge to whom the case has been assigned. If a guard-
ian ad litem is appointed for a defendant, the guardian ad
litem shall have 20 days after his appointment to serve the
answer. A party served with a pleading stating a cross claim
78. American Auto. Assn. Inc. v. Rothman, 104 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. N.Y. 1952).
79. In re Lavine, 126 F. Supp. 39 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
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against him shall serve an answer thereto within 20 days after
the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his reply to a
counterclaim in the answer within 20 days after service of the
answer. The state or an officer or agency of the state shall
serve an answer to the complaint or to a cross claim or a reply
to a counterclaim within 45 days after service of the pleading
in which the claim is asserted. If any pleading is ordered by
the court, it shall be served within 20 days after service of the
order, unless the order otherwise directs. Any of the times
prescribed herein may be modified in the scheduling order
under s. 802.10 (1) by the judge to whom the case has been
assigned. The service of a motion permitted under sub. (2)
alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time
is fixed by order of the court: (a) if the court denies the
motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the mer-
its, the responsive pleading shall be served within 10 days
after notice of the court's action; (b) if the court grants a
motion for a more definite statement the responsive pleading
shall be served within 10 days after the service of the more
definite statement.
(2) How PRESENTED. Every defense, in law or fact, except
the defense of improper venue, to a claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or
third-party claim shall be asserted in the responsive pleading
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses
may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (a) lack
of capacity to sue or be sued, (b) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, (c) lack of jurisdiction over the person or res,
(d) insufficiency of summons or process, (e) insufficiency of
service of summons or process, (f) failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, (g) failure to join a party
under s. 803.03, (h) res judicata, (i) statute of limitations, Ci)
another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause. A motion making any of these defenses shall be
made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted.
Objection to venue shall be made in accordance with s.
801.53. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading,
he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that
claim for relief. If on a motion asserting the defense described
in (f) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, or on a motion asserting the
defenses described in (h) or (i), matters outside of the plead-
ings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the mo-
tion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and dis-
posed of as provided in s. 802.08, and all parties shall be given
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reasonable opportunity to present all material made perti-
nent to such a motion by s. 802.08.
(3) JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS. After issue is joined be-
tween all parties but within such time as not to delay the
trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If,
on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in s. 802.08, and all parties shall be
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such motion by s. 802.08.
(4) PRELIMINARY HEARINGS. The defenses specifically
listed in sub. (2), whether made in a pleading or by motion,
the motion for judgment under sub. (3) and the motion to
strike under sub. (6) shall be heard and determined before
trial on motion of any party, unless the judge to whom the
case has been assigned orders that the hearings and determi-
nation thereof be deferred until the trial. The hearing on the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person or res shall be
conducted in accordance with s. 801.08.
(5) MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT. If a pleading
to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or
ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to
frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite
statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The
motion shall point out the defects complained of and the
details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the
court is not obeyed within 10 days after notice of the order or
within such other time as the court may fix, the court may
strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make
such order as it deems just.
(6) MOTION TO STRIKE. Upon motion made by a party
before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading
is permitted upon motion made by a party within 20 days
after the service of the pleading upon him or upon the court's
own intiative at any time, the court may order stricken from
any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, scandalous or indecent matter.
(7) CONSOLIDATION OF DEFENSES IN MOTIONS. A party who
makes a motion under this section may join with it any other
motions herein provided for and then available to him. If a
party makes a motion under this section but omits therefrom
any defense or objection then available to him which this
section permits to be raised by motion, he shall not thereafter
make a motion based on the defense or objection so omitted,
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except a motion as provided in sub. (8) (b) through (d) on any
of the grounds there stated.
(8) WAIVER OR PRESERVATION OF CERTAIN DEFENSES. (a) A
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person or the res, insuf-
ficiency of process, insufficiency of service of process or an-
other action pending between the same parties for the same
cause is waived only 1. if it is omitted from a motion in the
circumstances described in sub. (7), or 2. if it is neither made
by motion under this section nor included in a responsive
pleading or an amendment thereof permitted by s. 802.09 (1)
to be made as a matter of course.
(b) A defense of failure to join a party indispensable
under s. 803.03 or of res judicata may be made in any plead-
ing permitted or ordered under s. 802.01 (1), or by motion
before entry of the final pretrial conference order. A defense
of statute of limitations, failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, and an objection of failure to state a
legal defense to a claim may be made in any pleading permit-
ted or ordered under s. 802.01 (1), or by a motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings, or otherwise by motion within the
time limits established in the scheduling order under s.
802.10 (1).
(c) If it appears by motion of the parties or otherwise
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the
court shall dismiss the action.
(d) A defense of lack of capacity may be raised within
the time permitted under s. 803.01.
Subsection (1) is based on Federal Rule 12(a). It provides a
simple, uniform twenty day standard for responsive pleadings
by any party in any action. The twenty day period is already
familiar to Wisconsin attorneys."
There is also a "safety valve" provision that allows the
judge to modify the time schedules by scheduling order under
section 802.10(1).
Subsection (2), when considered in conjunction with section
802.02, is one of the most significant changes introduced by the
new rules. This subsection provides that every defense,
whether of law or fact, with the exception of nine enumerated
and specified defenses, must be raised by responsive pleading,
80. See Wis. STAT. § 263.05 (1973) (demurrer or answer to complaint), and Wis.
STAT. § 263.10 (1973) (demurrer or answer to amended complaint), and Wis. STAT. §
263.15(3) (rules relating to answers and demurrers also governing pleading to cross-
complaints and third-party complaints), and Wis. STAT. § 263.17 (demurrer to answer
or counterclaim), and Wis. STAT. § 263.20 (replies).
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if a responsive pleading is required. The enumerated defenses
which may be raised by motion are:
(a) lack of capacity to sue or be sued.8 1
(b) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Under the
former practice, an attack addressed to the competence of the
court to adjudicate the particular case before it was made by
demurrer under section 263.03(1)(b). However, section 263.12
provided that a failure to raise the issue of subject matter juris-
diction did not constitute a waiver. In this regard, the statute
simply restates long-standing case law on non-waiver of subject
matter jurisdiction.8 2 Thus, after the time runs within which a
demurrer may be entered, the defense of subject matter juris-
diction may be raised by motion to dismiss. Section 802.01 (3)
abolishes the demurrer, thereby restricting the defendant to
the motion to dismiss or answer. The non-waiver rule of former
section 263.12 is retained by paragraph (8)(c).
(c) lack of jurisdiction over the person or res. The procedure
for questioning jurisdiction over the person under former sec-
tion 262.16 was rather technical and tended to be a trap for the
unwary. Such a question could be raised only by entering a
special appearance for the purpose of raising the question and
filing: (1) a motion (when the defect was claimed in the service
of the summons without a complaint, or when the defect ap-
peared on the face of the record other than the complaint, or
in the case of a judgment on cognovit or by default); or (2) a
demurrer (when the defect appeared upon the face of the com-
plaint); or (3) by answer (in all other cases). The defendant had
to exercise great care in contesting personal jurisdiction since
any failure to comply with section 263.16 constituted a waiver
of the jurisdictional defense (except in the case of persons
under disability).3
The inadequacy of former section 262.16 was demonstrated
in Pavalon v. Thomas Holmes Corp.," where the defendant
attempted to raise by demurrer two law issues: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the person; and (2) failure of the complaint to
81. See commentary on Wis. STAT. § 802.03(1) supra p. 44.
82. See Damp v. Town of Dane, 29 Wis. 419 (1972); Harrigan v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis.
127, 99 N.W. 909 (1904).
83. See, e.g., Lees v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 49 Wis.
2d 491, 182 N.W.2d 245 (1971); Milwaukee County v. Schmidt, Garden & Erickson,
35 Wis. 2d 33, 150 N.W.2d 354 (1967); 51 Marq. L. Rev. 113 (1967).
84. 25 Wis. 2d 540, 131 N.W.2d 331 (1963).
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state a cause of action. Section 262.16(2)(b) provided that the
demurrer could be used to raise the jurisdictional issue only
when the jurisdictional defect appeared on the face of the com-
plaint. The defect claimed by the defendant was insufficient
minimal contacts to render it amenable to Wisconsin jurisdic-
tion, a matter which was not (and would not normally be) the
subject of allegations in the complaint. Hence, the demurrer
was an inappropriate way to raise the jurisdictional defense.
Unfortunately, the defendant's fact situation did not bring it
within the scope of section 262.16(2)(a) which would have al-
lowed the jurisdictional issue to be raised by motion. Thus, it
was restricted to section 262.16(2)(c): "By answer in all other
cases." But an answer, of course, follows disposition of a de-
murrer on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Un-
fortunately, as the court pointed out:
If [defendant] were to wait until after disposition of the
demurrer to raise the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction
by answer, it would have waived its right to do so since a
demurrer on the ground of failure to state a cause of action
constitutes a general appearance."
Thus, under the statute as written the defendant was effec-
tively precluded from joining his defense grounded on lack of
personal jurisdiction with his demurrer for failure to state a
cause of action. Fortunately, the court relieved the defendant
from its dilemma by looking beyond the statutory language to
the statute's underlying purpose and ruling that the jurisdic-
tion issue could be raised by motion, supported by an accompa-
nying affidavit, served with the demurrer.86
The problem of the Pavalon case will not arise under the
new rule. Both law issues could be raised in either an answer
or by motion and in any event the defendant would not have
to be concerned with waiver of the jurisdictional defense.
(d) insufficiency of summons or process. Under the former
practice, there were three ways to raise an issue concerning the
sufficiency of summons or process or the sufficiency of service
of summons or process, all three of which were controlled by
section 262.16. First, if the defect appeared on the face of the
complaint (an extremely unusual occurrence) the issue had to
be raised by demurrer, under sections 263.06(1)(a) and
85. Id. at 546, 131 N.W.2d at 334.
86. See also Bazon v. Kux Machine Co., 52 Wis. 2d 325, 190 N.W.2d 521 (1971).
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262.16(2)(b). Secondly, if the defect was in the service of the
summons without a complaint, or when the defect appeared
upon the face of the record other than the complaint, the issue
was to be raised by motion, under section 262.16(2)(a). In all
other cases, section 262.16(2)(e) provided that the issue had to
be raised by answer.
The new rule gives the defendant an unfettered option by
allowing insufficiency of process and service of process to be
raised by motion or, if no motion is filed, then by answer. The
new rule thus eliminates the serious waiver problems of the
former law under which the insufficiency had to be raised by a
special appearance and in a particular way. The new rule also
permits the court to allow evidence or affidavits to challenge
the summons or process or service thereof on a motion to dis-
miss or it may be received at the trial if the issue is raised by
answer.
(e) insufficiency of service of summons or process.87
(f) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted serves basically the same function as the
demurrer for failure to state ultimate facts constituting a cause
of action under former section 263.06(6), that is, to test the
legal sufficiency of the complaint. Unlike section 263.03(2),
however, the new rules do not require that the complaint state
all the "ultimate facts constituting each cause of action."
Thus, the motion to dismiss usually will be granted only when
it is quite clear that under no conditions can the plaintiff re-
cover.
The new rule also allows the motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted to be con-
verted into a "speaking motion" which will, in effect, be
treated as a motion for summary judgment.
(g) failure to join a party under section 803.03. Failure to join
an indispensable party is a law defense that existed under the
repealed statutes. Section 260.12 provided (rather cryptically),
"of the parties to the action those who are united in interest
must be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. . . ." The same
statute allowed a plaintiff who refused to join voluntarily to be
made a defendant. Under section 263.06(4) a defect in parties
87. See commentary on paragraph (d), supra p. 53.
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was required to be raised by demurrer. Under the new rules, of
course, a "party defense" must be raised by motion to dismiss
or by answer.
(h) res judicata. Under section 802.02(3), res judicata and
statute of limitations are affirmative defenses which must be
specially pleaded in the answer. Section 802.06(2)(h) provides,
however, that these issues may also be raised by motion. Fur-
thermore, subsection (8) provides that the defense of res judi-
cata is waived only if not raised in a responsive pleading or by
motion prior to the entry of the final pretrial conference order.
(i) statute of limitations."
Subsection (3) is essentially the same as Federal Rule 12(c),
the only change being that the federal rule provides that the
motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made "[a]fter
the pleadings are closed . . ." whereas the new rule provides
that the motion may be made "[a]fter issue is joined between
all parties." The change is one of form rather than substance,
issue joinder being a more familiar concept in Wisconsin prac-
tice than is closing of the pleadings.
Judgment on the pleadings has long been an available pro-
cedure under Wisconsin case law."9 Its use was expressly sanc-
tioned by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1968 when, by Su-
preme Court rule, it created former section 263.227.11
Unlike section 263.227, the new rule does not contain a
specific time limit within which the motion must be made. The
rule is clear, however, that the motion must be made "within
such time as not to delay the trial." Thus, a motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings made on the trial date immediately
before the jury was called, as in Buckley v. Park Building
Corp.,9" would be improper.
The motion for judgment on the pleadings is also tied to the
motion for summary judgment under section 802.08. Subsec-
tion (3) in effect recognizes that the two motions serve similar
purposes. That is, a judgment on the pleadings is, in reality, a
88. See commentary on paragraph (h), supra.
89. See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Pacific Bank, 11 Wis. 239 (*230) (1860).
90. 35 Wis. 2d vii. See generally, Madregano v. Wisconsin Gas & Elec. Co., 181
Wis. 611, 195 N.W. 861 (1923); All Electric Service, Inc. v. Matousek, 46 Wis. 2d 194,
174 N.W.2d 511 (1970). See also J. CONWAY, WISCONSIN AND FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE,
§ 26.58 at pp. 26-54 and 26-55 (1966).
91. 31 Wis. 2d 626, 143 N.W.2d 493 (1966).
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summary judgment minus affidavits and other supporting
documents.
Under subsection (4) the law defenses enumerated in
subsection (2) will normally be heard before the trial. This
procedure comports with the former practice.
Subsection (5) is identical to Federal Rule 12(e). Under
former Wisconsin practice, the motion to make more definite
and certain was authorized by section 263.43. The law also
allowed a bill of particulars in cases involving accounts. There
is no provision for a bill of particulars, so denominated, in these
rules.
Attorneys and judges should keep in mind the limited func-
tion of pleading under these rules, i.e., general notice of the
nature of the claim or defense. Since most factual information
is to be obtained through discovery, the motion for a more
definite statement should be sparingly granted.
Subsection (6) is identical to Federal Rule 12(f) and is quite
similar to former sections 263.42 and 263.44. Section 263.43
provided that, on motion, the attorney who signed a pleading
containing irrelevant, redundant or scandalous matter could be
ordered to pay costs on the motion to strike. There is no sanc-
tion provided in the new rule. However, in appropriate cases,
a sanction may be available under section 802.05.
Subsection (7) is derived from Federal Rule 12(g). When
read in conjunction with subsection (2), it is quite similar to
the practice under former sections 263.06, 263.11, and 263.12.
The new rule, however, contains a broader range of defenses
that must be included in the consolidated motion.
Subsection (8) governs the waiver and preservation of cer-
tain defenses. Paragraph (8)(a) contains the rule on waiver of
jurisdictional defenses. It overturns decisions such as
McLaughlin v. Chicago M., St. P. &'P.R. Co.,92 and Milwaukee
County v. Schmidt, Garden & Erickson,93 which held respec-
tively that simply serving a notice of retainer and appearance
(McLaughlin) and asking in a letter for a copy of the complaint
(Milwaukee County) constituted "appearances" subjecting the
defendants to personal jurisdiction. The new rule gives to de-
fendants and their attorneys fair opportunity to assess whether
a jurisdictional defense may exist and to raise the defense in
92. 23 Wis. 2d 592, 127 N.W.2d 813 (1963).
93. 35 Wis. 2d 33, 150 N.W.2d 354 (1967).
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due course as with other law defenses and without the worry
that any act with respect to the action will be deemed a waiver
of the defense.94
Paragraph (8)(b) permits party defenses and the defense of
res judicata available up to the entry of the final pretrial order
since the existence of these defenses frequently will not become
known until during the course of discovery proceedings.
Paragraph (8)(c) allows the defense of lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to be raised at any time. It accords with the
practice under former sections 263.06(l)(b) and 263.12.
802.07 Counterclaim and cross claim. (1)
COUNTERCLAIM. A defendant may counterclaim any claim
which he has against a plaintiff, upon which a judgment may
be had in the action. A counterclaim may or may not dimin-
ish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It
may claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind
from that sought in the pleading of the opposing party.
(2) COUNTERCLAIM MATURING OR ACQUIRED AFTER PLEADING.
A claim which either matured or was acquired by the pleader
after serving his pleading may, with the permission of the
court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental plead-
ing.
(3) CROSS CLAIM. A pleading may state as a cross claim
any claim by one party against a co-party if the cross claim
is based on the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences as is the claim in the original
action or as is a counterclaim therein, or if the cross claim
relates to any property that is involved in the original action.
Such cross claim may include a claim that the party against
whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross claimant
for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the
cross claimant.
(4) JOINDER OF ADDITIONAL PARTIES. Persons other than
those made parties to the original action may be made parties
to a counterclaim or cross claim in accordance with ss. 803.03
to 803.05.
(5) SEPARATE TRIALS; SEPARATE JUDGMENTS. If the court
orders separate trials as provided in s. 805.05 (2), judgment
on a counterclaim or cross claim may be rendered in accord-
ance with s. 806.01 (2) when the court has jurisdiction so to
do, even if the claims of the opposing party have been dis-
missed or otherwise disposed of.
94. See also Wis. STAT. § 801.06.
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(6) CONTRIBUTION. Any party who seeks contribution
shall pray for contribution in his complaint, answer or reply,
or in a counterclaim, cross claim, or third-party complaint;
the party from whom contribution is sought shall file and
serve an appropriate responsive pleading.
In a rather significant departure from its general acceptance
of the policies underlying the Federal Rules governing plead-
ing, the committee declined to recommend the compulsory
counterclaim provided in Federal Rule 13(a). The reasoning
behind the decision was that the absence of a compulsory coun-
terclaim rule has not caused any significant problem in Wis-
consin practice. The adoption of such a rule, it was felt, would
surely cause some initial confusion without any significant con-
comitant benefit. Also, the purpose of compulsory counter-
claims, i.e., disposing of all aspects of a single litigable transac-
tion or occurrence in a single action, is promoted in Wisconsin
law by the rules of collateral estoppel. 5 Thus, the language of
the first sentence of subsection (1) is identical to the language
of section 263.14(1).
It should be noted in connection with the counterclaim rule,
that the set-off statutes, sections 895.07 through 895.13 have
been repealed. The reasoning of the Judicial Council Commit-
tee on repeal of these statutes was:
(1) The set-off statutes have been erroneously con-
strued to apply to recoupment and in fact to limit re-
coupment.Y
(2) The set-off statutes are not clearly exhaustive;
they do not contain all the situations where set-off will
be allowed. It has long been held in this state that eq-
uity will permit an equitable set-off whenever justice
requires it, even in a case not within the statute of set-
offs." Moreover, there could be cases where a defendant
would meet the conditions of set-off in section 895.07,
but nonetheless be precluded from asserting the set-
off.
98
95. See J. CONWAY, WISCONSIN AND FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE, Ch. 85, pp. 85-1 to
85-6 (1966).
96. See Peoples Trust & Savings Bank v. Standard Printing Company, Inc., 19
Wis. 2d 27, 119 N.W.2d 378 (1963); Comment, 47 MARQ. L. REV. 379 (1973-74).
97. Piotrowoski v. Czerwinski, 138 Wis. 396, 120 N.W. 268 (1909).
98. For a case not precisely on point but generally illustrative of the context in
which one might be entitled to a set-off by the language of section 895.07 but where
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(3) In some respects these set-off statutes are un-
necessarily restrictive. For example, section 895.07(1)
provides that the set-off must be based upon a judg-
ment or contract. This subsection corresponds to the
counterclaim statute as it existed from 1856 to 1934.
Thus, an unliquidated tort claim could not be set off
against a contract claim or even another tort claim.
There is no good reason for such a rule.
Also section 895.07(3) permits set-off only if the
claim existed at the time of commencement of the ac-
tion and if it belonged to the defendant at commence-
ment. This is functionally equivalent to section
263.14(3). Section 802.07(2) which allows the asserting
of after-acquired or after-maturing claims by leave of
court, seems clearly preferable.
(4) In some respects, the set-off statutes are simply
redundant. For example, section 895.07(2) provides that
the defendant's claim "must be due him in his own
right, either as being the original creditr or payee or as
being the assignee and owner of the demand." It seems
that this says nothing more than that the defendant
must be the real party in interest with respect to his
claim, or indeed simply that the defendant must have
a claim.
(5) Section 895.07(6) intrudes on and, as inter-
preted by our court, contradicts the law of commercial
paper found in chapter 403.11
Subsection (2) is identical to Federal Rule 13(e). It changes
the former law of section 263.14(3) insofar as it permits the
counterclaim of a claim assigned to a defendant after com-
mencement of action, provided the court permits it. There
may be cases in which such a counterclaim could be handled
expeditiously in an action. In cases in which a counterclaim
based on after-acquired rights would unnecessarily complicate
a case, or prejudice a plaintiff, the court is empowered to refuse
the pleading of the counterclaim.
Subsection (3) is based on Federal Rule 13(g), but a signifi-
the set-off would not be permitted, see Wisconsin Mutual Ins. Co. v. Manson, 24 Wis.
2d 673, 130 N.W.2d 183 (1964).
99. See Peoples Trust and Savings Bank v. Standard Printing Company, Inc., 19
Wis. 2d 27, 119 N.W.2d 378 (1963); Comment, 47 MARQ. L. REv. 379 (1963-4).
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cant change of wording has been made. Both Federal Rule
13(g) and its Wisconsin counterpart, former section 263.15(1),
provide that a crossclaim must be based on the transaction or
occurrence that is the "subject matter" of the original claim.
The term "subject matter" of the original claim received an
unfortunately restrictive interpretation in Liebhauser v. Mil-
waukee Electric Ry. & Light Co. 00 In Liebhauser, the plaintiff
sued two defendants for personal injuries arising out of a colli-
sion between a streetcar operated by one defendant and an
automobile operated by the other defendant. The operator of
the auto attempted to assert a cross claim against the streetcar
company on the theory that the streetcar's operator's negli-
gence was the cause of the accident. The court refused to per-
mit the counterclaim on the ground that the "subject matter"
of the plaintiff's action was her right to have the defendants
exercise ordinary care with respect to her person and that, thus,
the cross-claiming defendant's rights did not involve the trans-
action which was the "subject matter" of plaintiff's claim. Ten
years after Liebhauser, the supreme court amended section
263.15 to permit the Liebhauser-type crossclaim. °l The term
"subject matter" has been omitted from these rules (except in
the jurisdictional context) to avoid any implication that the
Liebhauser decision is to be followed.
Based on Federal Rule 13(h), subsection (4) parallels former
section 260.19. The right to bring in additional parties is con-
trolled by sections 803.03, 803.04 and 803.05.
Subsection (6) changes the rule under former sections
263.15(3) and 263.20(1), that no responsive pleading is required
against a pleading that seeks contribution only. It also requires
the party seeking contribution to pray for it in his pleading,
changing the former rule that even where defendants do not file
a crosscomplaint asking judgment for contribution, the court
should treat the pleadings as amended and grant such relief if
the record shows the parties are entitled to it.I 2
802.08 Summary judgment. (1) AVAILABILITY. At any
time after issue is joined but not later than the time provided
in the scheduling order under s. 802.10, any party may move,
100. 180 Wis. 468, 193 N.W. 522, 43 A.L.R. 870 (1923).
101. Supreme Court Order, 212 Wis. ix. (1934).
102. Haines v. Duffy, 206 Wis. 193, 199, 240 N.W. 152 (1931); Crye v. Mueller, 7
Wis. 2d 182, 200, 96 N.W.2d 520, 524 (1959).
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with or without supporting affidavits, for a summary judg-
ment in his favor on any claim, counterclaim, cross claim or
third-party claim which he asserts or which is asserted
against him. Amendment of pleadings shall be allowed as in
cases where objection or defense is made by motion to dis-
miss.
(2) MOTION. The motion shall be served at least 20 days
before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior
to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judg-
ment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
(3) SUPPORTING PAPERS. Supporting and opposing affida-
vits shall be made on personal knowledge and shall set forth
such evidentiary facts as would be admissible in evidence.
Copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto and served therewith, if not already
of record. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this section, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleadings but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise pro-
vided in this section, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so re-
spond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against him.
(4) WHEN AFFIDAVITS UNAVAILABLE. Should it appear from
the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to jus-
tify his opposition, the court may refuse the motion for judg-
ment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or
may make such other order as is just.
(5) AFFIDAVITS MADE IN BAD FAITH. Should it appear to the
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits
presented pursuant to this section is presented in bad faith
or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith
order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the
19761
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affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees.
(6) JUDGMENT FOR OPPONENT. If it shall appear to the
court that the party against whom a motion for summary
judgment is asserted is entitled to a summary judgment, the
summary judgment may be awarded to such party even
though he has not moved therefor.
This section replaces section 270.635. The forty day rule is
abolished in favor of a flexible time limit established in the
scheduling order under section 802.10(1). Almost as a matter
of course in most courts the forty day period has been enlarged
on the grounds of "excusable neglect" under section 269.45(2)
when the facts thought to entitle a movant to summary judg-
ment do not become known (through discovery, proceedings or
otherwise) until after the forty day period has expired. Most of
the "delays" in these cases are really not based on neglect at
all-excusable or otherwise-and to go through the enlarge-
ment motions should be unnecessary. Under the new rules, the
judge will establish a time period for making a motion for sum-
mary judgment which takes into account time needed for dis-
covery. 03
Also, the new rule does not require that supporting affida-
vits be filed with the motion for summary judgment. The
pleadings and other papers filed in the action (depositions,
answers to interrogatories, responses to requests for admissions
or denials) may reflect the fact that there is no genuine issue
for trial. There is no need for affidavits in such cases.
Subsection (2) of this rule provides that the motion for sum-
mary judgment shall be served at least twenty days before the
time fixed for hearing. The increased notice of motion period
(compared to the former five day period) is deemed necessary
to allow the party against whom the motion is asserted to mar-
shall his counter-affidavits. The last sentence of subsection (2)
is but one example of the partial summary judgment author-
ized by subsection (1).
Subsection (3) requires that the affidavits set forth eviden-
tiary facts which would be admissible in evidence. This re-
quirement is intended to reduce the incidence of affidavits con-
taining incompetent evidence, such as hearsay statements.
Subsection (4) is identical to Federal Rule 56(f).
103. See Wis. STAT. § 802.10(1).
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Subsection (5) is identical to Federal Rule 56(g) except that
it does not include contempt proceedings as an available sanc-
tion for affidavits made in bad faith.
Subsection (6) is based on former section 270.635(3).
802.09 Amended and supplemental pleadings. (1)
AMENDMENTS. A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of course at any time prior to the entry of the schedul-
ing order provided in s. 802.10 (1). Otherwise a party may
amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written con-
sent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an
amended pleading within 20 days after service of the
amended pleading unless (a) the court otherwise orders or (b)
no responsive pleading is required or permitted under s.
802.01 (1). At any stage of the action, the court may allow
amendment of any process or proceeding if justice requires it.
(2) AMENDMENTS TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE. If issues
not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as
if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform
to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but
failure to so amend does not affect the result of the trial of
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings,
the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall
do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action
will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to
satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the
merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the
objecting party to meet such evidence.
(3) RELATION BACK OF AMENDMENTS. If the claim asserted
in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transac-
tion, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date
of the filing of the original pleading. An amendment changing
the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the
foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period pro-
vided by law for commencing the action against him, the
party to be brought in by amendment has received such no-
tice of the institution of the action that he will not be preju-
diced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and knew or
should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the
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identity of the proper party, the action would have been
brought against him.
(4) SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS. Upon motion of a party the
court may, upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve
a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurr-
ences or events which have happened since the date of the
pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be
granted even though the original pleading is defective in its
statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems
it advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental
pleading, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor.
Subsection (1) is the counterpart of Federal Rule 15(a) and
former sections 263.45 and 269.44. Under the new rule, the
timing of amendments has been tied into the section 802.10(1)
scheduling conference rather than the service of the original
pleading (as under section 263.45) or service of a responsive
pleading.
Subsection (2) is identical to Federal Rule 15(b). Its provi-
sions conform substantially with the Wisconsin case law that
has developed under section 269.44.104
Identical to Federal Rule 15(c), subsection (3) makes a sig-
nificant change to Wisconsin law. The rule deals with the rela-
tion back of permissible amendments and thus it is directly
related to statutes of limitation. The relation back theory of
this rule involves both amendments concerning the pleadings
and amendments concerning parties to the action.
With respect to relation back of claims, the proposed rule
would overturn the rule of Meinshausen v. A. Gettleman Brew-
ing Co. 105 In Meinshausen, the supreme court held that an
amendment to a complaint which introduced a different cause
of action, and made a different demand from that in the origi-
nal complaint, did not relate back to the beginning of the ac-
tion. Thus, the statute of limitations continued to run until the
date of the amendment, even though the second cause of action
arose out of the same transaction as the first cause of action. 10
Under this rule, whenever the claim asserted in the amended
pleading arises out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence
104. See, e.g., Nelson v. Preston, 262 Wis. 547, 55 N.W.2d 918 (1952); Martell v.
Klingman, 11 Wis. 2d 296, 105 N.W.2d 446 (1960).
105. 133 Wis. 95, 113 N.W. 408 (1907).
106. Compare Frederickson v. Kabat, 264 Wis. 545, 59 N.W.2d 484 (1953) (amend-
ment which merely restated original cause of action in different form related back).
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set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading,
the amendment relates back to the date of filing the original
pleading.
With respect to relation back of amendments adding par-
ties, this rule would overturn the rule in Baker v. Tormey.'"7 In
Baker, the plaintiff received personal injuries in an accident
allegedly caused by the negligence of the driver of a certain
automobile. The plaintiff knew that the driver was "X" but for
some reason, he sued X's brother, "Y", who was a passenger
in the car when the accident occurred. Service of process was
made by leaving a copy of the summons with "Z", the mother
of X and Y, at the home where X, Y, and Z all resided. Y
defended the action and at the trial it appeared that X was the
driver of the auto. The trial court allowed the plaintiff to
amend his summons and complaint to substitute X for Y as
defendant, even though the statute of limitations had run
against X. The supreme court reversed. "As against a party
added by amendment, the statute of limitations continues to
run until the amendment is filed making him a party to the
suit." Under subsection (3), the result would be contrary.
Subsection (4), derived from Federal Rule 15(d), is, with
one exception, the same as former section 263.47. The excep-
tion is that under section 263.47, facts which were in esse at the
time of the original pleading but the existence of which did not
become known to the pleader until later could be alleged by
supplemental pleading. Under the new rule, such pre-existing
unknown facts would be alleged in an amended pleading rather
than by a supplemental pleading. The role of supplemental
pleadings is limited to the raising of facts occuring after the
date of the original pleading.
802.10 Scheduling and pretrial conferences. (1)
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE. (a) Scope. This subsection governs
all actions and special proceedings except those governed by
chs. 48, 52, 288, 299, 345, 812, and Title XLII-B.
(b) Conference. Not less than 60 nor more than 120 days
after the summons is filed, the judge to whom the case has
been assigned shall set a date for a scheduling conference,
upon at least 10 days written notice by mail to all attorneys
of record and to all parties who have appeared of record and
are not represented by counsel. The conference shall be held
107. 209 Wis. 627, 245 N.W. 652 (1932).
1976]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
at a place designated by the judge and shall be attended by
the judge and at least one attorney of record for each party
to the action who is represented by counsel. Any party who
has appeared and who is not represented by counsel shall
attend personally, or by its officer or agent. After consulta-
tion, the judge shall set:
1. The time at which a motion for default judgment may
be heard;
2. The times within which discovery must be completed;
3. The time, prior to the pretrial conference, within
which impleader shall be completed and within which plead-
ings may be amended;
4. A time at or prior to the pretrial conference within
which motions before trial shall be served and heard;
5. A date for the pretrial conference and a date or tenta-
tive date for trial as soon as practicable after the pretrial
conference but not later than 30 days thereafter.
(c) Scheduling order. The judge shall issue a written
order which recites the schedules established. Such order
when entered shall control the course of the action, unless
modified as herein provided. If at any time it should appear
that such schedules cannot reasonably be met, the judge may
amend the order upon timely motion of any party. Whenever
the judge shall determine that he cannot reasonably meet the
pretrial date or trial date established, he may amend the
order on his own motion.
(d) Use of telephone and mail; standard order. In lieu of
a scheduling conference under par. (b), the judge may obtain
scheduling information by telephone, mail or otherwise and
enter a scheduling order on the basis of the information so
obtained or may serve upon the parties a standard scheduling
order. Such orders are subject to amendment as provided in
par. (c). If a standard scheduling order is entered, it shall be
entered within 150 days after commencement of the action.
(e) Sanctions. Violation of a scheduling order is subject
to s. 805.03.
(2) PRETRIAL CONFERENCE. (a) Scope. In all contested
civil actions and contested special proceedings except those
under chs. 48, 52, 288, 299 and 345, the judge shall, unless
waived by the parties with the approval of the judge, and in
all other civil actions and special proceedings, the judge may
direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before him for
a pretrial conference to determine whether an order should be
entered on any or all of the following matters:
1. Definition and simplification of the issues of fact and
law;
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2. Necessity or desirability of amendment to the plead-
ings;
3. Stipulations of fact and agreements concerning the
identity of or authenticity of documents which will avoid
unnecessary proof;
4. Limitation of the number of expert witnesses and the
exchange of the names of expert witnesses;
5. Whether issues shall be tried by court or jury;
6. Advisability of preliminary reference of issues for
findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury;
7. Number of jurors to be impaneled, voir dire examina-
tion, and the number of strikes to be allowed;
8. Order of proof and order of argument;
9. Separation or consolidation of claims for trial;
10. Jury views and the costs thereof;
11. Disclosure of insurance policy limits;
12. Filing and exchanging of trial briefs; and
13. Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of
the action.
(b) Time; participants. The date and time for the
pretrial conference shall be set in the scheduling order as
provided in sub. (1). At least one attorney planning to take
part in the trial shall appear for each of the parties and par-
ticipate in the pretrial conference. Attorneys appearing at the
conference must have authority to enter stipulations.
(c) Additional conferences. If necessary or advisable, the
judge may adjourn the pretrial conference from time to time
or may order an additional pretrial conference.
(d) Pretrial order. The judge shall make an order which
recites the action taken with respect in the matters described
in par. (a) and which sets or confirms the final trial date. The
order when entered shall control the subsequent course of
action, unless modified thereafter on motion of a party or the
court for good cause. If for any reason, the action is not tried
on the date set in the scheduling order or the pretrial order,
the judge shall, within 30 days after the date set in the sched-
uling order or pretrial order, set another date for trial on the
earliest available trial date.
(e) Sanctions. If without just excuse or because of failure
to give reasonable attention to the matter, no appearance is
made on behalf of a party at a pretrial conference, or if an
attorney is grossly unprepared to participate in the confer-
ence, the judge may, in his sound discretion:
1. Reschedule the conference and order the payment by
the delinquent attorney or, when just, by the party he repre-
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sents of the reasonable expenses, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, to the aggrieved party;
2. Conduct the conference and enter the pretrial order
without participation by the delinquent attorney;
3. Order dismissal or entry of a default judgment.
Subsection (1) has no express counterpart in the Federal
Rules or in the Wisconsin statutes. It is based on the practice
of many federal district courts to call in the attorneys in an
action shortly after commencement for a report on the status
of the action and for the setting of dates. This scheduling con-
ference is essentially a "pre-pretrial." The purpose of the
scheduling conference is to get the litigation moving and keep
it moving. In probably the most significant change from the
current practice, the new rules-most especially section
802.10-place the responsibility for moving the case on the
court, as well as on the attorneys.
At the scheduling conference, the attorneys should be suffi-
ciently familiar with the case to form a realistic opinion as to
the amount of time necessary to complete discovery and to
discover whether impleader of third parties will probably be
necessary. The judge's decision on dates for pretrial conference
and trial will necessarily be predicated on the time required for
discovery and impleader.
At the conference, the judge issues a scheduling order recit-
ing the dates established. This order controls the course of the
action and relief from it should not be granted lightly. One of
the primary goals of the rules is to establish a system in which
lawyers and litigants may confidently expect their cases to
move along apace. The scheduling order is intended to provide
the framework in which lawyers can realistically allocate time
to the pretrial activities in each case. Since modifications of the
scheduling order necessarily lessens the scheduling certainty
that is the goal of this rule, they should be granted sparingly.
Subsection (2) is substantially the same as Federal Rule 16
and former section 269.65, although it is more explicit than its
counterpart in enumerating the matters that should be consid-
ered at the pretrial conference. The expanded list of matters
which may be considered should not be considered exhaustive.
When subsection (2) is read together with subsection (1)
and other new pleading rules, it is easily seen that the role of
the trial judge during the pretrial stage of litigation will be
expanded significantly by these rules. Issue formulation cur-
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rently is accomplished primarily by pleadings; under the new
rules, the real issues will often be articulated in the judge's
pretrial order, following the pretrial conference. Under the for-
mer practice, moving each case along was a matter of concern
only to the litigants and the attorneys. In counties other than
Milwaukee, a case is not on the judge's calendar until after a
notice of trial and certificate of readiness is filed by one of the
attorneys. Under the new rules, each case is to be on a judge's
scheduling calendar within sixty to one hundred and twenty
days after commencement and thereafter the judge has a sig-
nificant role in moving the case. It can easily be seen that the
success of these rules is to a great extent dependent upon the
judge's authoritative implementation of section 802.10.
Paragraphs (2) (b) and (2) (c) are designed to lessen a serious
problem caused by the unprepared "participant" at the
pretrial conference. These rules require that each attorney par-
ticipating at the pretrial: (1) expect to take part in the trial
itself; (2) have authority to enter into stipulations; and (3) be
prepared to participate meaningfully in the conference. A fail-
ure to comply with the rules exposes the litigant and his attor-
ney to the sanctions listed in paragraph (2)(e) and, in appropri-
ate cases, to contempt proceedings. It merits repeating that the
success of the new rules respecting procedure from commence-
ment to trial depends on the vigor with which trial court judges
exercise their judicial authority under section 802.10. In the
hands of a judge who refuses to exercise the authority that is
his, these rules will be "like the necks of the flamingoes in Alice
in Wonderland which failed to remain sufficiently rigid to be
used effectively as mallets by the croquet-players."''0 A pretrial
conference that consists of little more than "What do you
want?", "What will you take?", "Bring in my book, Mary.",




803.01 Parties plaintiff and defendant; capacity.
(1) REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. No action shall be dismissed on
108. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, 258 (1970).
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the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed
after objection for ratification of commencement of the action
by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and
such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same
effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of.
the real party in interest.
(2) REPRESENTATIVES. A personal representative, execu-
tor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express
trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has
been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized
by statute may sue in his own name without joining with him
the person for whose benefit the action is brought. A partner
asserting a partnership claim may sue in his own name with-
out joining the other members of the partnership, but he shall
indicate in his pleading that the claim asserted belongs to the
partnership.
(3) INFANTS OR INCOMPETENT PERSONS. (a) Appearance by
guardian or guardian ad litem. If a party to an action or
proceeding is a minor, or if the court has reason to believe
that a party is mentally incompetent to have charge of his
affairs, he shall appear by an attorney, by the general guard-
ian of his property who may appear by attorney or by a guard-
ian ad litem who is an attorney. A guardian ad litem shall be
appointed in all cases where the minor or incompetent has no
general guardian of his property, or where the general guard-
ian fails to appear and act on his behalf, or where the interest
of the minor or incompetent is adverse to that of the general
guardian. Except as provided in s. 807.10, if the general
guardian does appear and act and his interests are not ad-
verse to the minor or incompetent, a guardian ad litem shall
not be appointed. Where the interests of the minor or men-
tally incompetent person are represented by an attorney of
record the court shall, except upon good cause stated in the
record, appoint that attorney as the guardian ad litem.
(b) Guardian ad litem.
1. The guardian ad litem shall be appointed by a circuit
or a county court of the county where the action is to be
commenced or is pending.
2. When the plaintiff is a minor 14 years of age or over,
upon his application; or if the plaintiff is under that age or is
mentally incompetent, upon application of his guardian or of
a relative or friend. If made by a relative or friend, notice
thereof must first be given to his guardian if he has one in this
state; if he has none, then to the person with whom the minor
or mentally incompetent resides or who has him in custody.
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3. When the defendant is a minor 14 years of age or over,
upon his application made within 20 days after the service of
the summons or other original process; if the defendant is
under that age or neglects to so apply or is mentally incompe-
tent, then upon the court's own motion or upon the applica-
tion of any other party or any relative or friend or his guard-
ian upon such notice of the application as the court directs
or approves.
4. If the appointment, for a plaintiff or a defendant, is
after the commencement of the action, it shall be upon mo-
tion entitled in the action. If the appointment is for a plaintiff
and is made before the action is begun, the petition for ap-
pointment shall be entitled in the name of the action pro-
posed to be brought by the minor or incompetent, and the
appointment may be made before the summons is served.
Upon the filing of a petition for appointment before sum-
mons, the clerk may impose a suit tax and filing fee but in
that event no additional suit tax and filing fee shall be im-
posed when the summons is filed.
5. The motion or petition under sub. 4 shall state facts
showing the need and authority for the appointment. The
hearing on the motion or petition under sub. 4, if made by a
minor or mentally incompetent person for his own guardian
ad litem, may be held without notice and the appointment
made by order. If the motion or petition is made for a minor
or mentally incompetent who is an adverse party, the hearing
shall be on notice.
6. If a compromise or a settlement of an action or pro-
ceeding to which an unrepresented minor or mentally incom-
petent person is a party is proposed, a guardian ad litem shall
be appointed, upon petition in a special proceeding, to pro-
tect the interest of the minor or incompetent even though
commencement of an action is not proposed. Any compro-
mise or settlement shall be subject to s. 807.10.
(c) Procedure where minor or incompetent not
represented.
1. If at any time prior to the entry of judgment or final
order, the court finds that either a minor, or a person believed
by the court to be mentally incompetent to have charge of his
affairs, has not been represented in the action or proceeding
as provided in par. (a), there shall be no further proceedings
until a guardian ad litem is appointed. In making such ap-
pointment, the court shall fix a reasonable time within which
the guardian ad litem may move to vacate or strike any order
entered or action taken during the period when a guardian ad
litem was required; and as to all matters to which objection
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is not made, he and his ward shall be bound. Any such mo-
tion by a guardian ad litem shall be granted as a matter of
right.
2. If the court finds after the entry of judgment or final
order that a person, who at the time of entry of judgment or
final order was a minor or mentally incompetent, was not
represented in the action or proceeding by an attorney of
record or otherwise represented as provided in par. (a) the
judgment or order shall be vacated on motion of:
a. The minor or mentally incompetent, for whom no
appointment was made, at any time prior to the expiration
of one year after his disability is removed; or
b. The personal representative of such minor or men-
tally incompetent at any time prior to the expiration of one
year after the death of the minor or mentally incompetent.
Subsection (1), which replaced section 260.13, is based on
the last sentence of Federal Rule 17. This provision preserves
the common law real-party-in-interest rule, although the em-
phasis is somewhat different.
The "real party in interest" has been defined as "one who
has a right to control and receive the fruits of the litigation. 1 °9
This concept closely resembles the concept of standing to sue.
Standing to sue, however, addresses the question of whether
the plaintiff has suffered legal injury sufficient to invoke the
judicial process. 10 The real-party-in-interest rule on the other
hand, operates to identify who, among several persons, pos-
sesses the substantive right upon which the suit depends.
The real party in interest has always been required to bring
the action, but at common law he was required to bring the
action in the name of the person with whom the defendant
originally had privity. This phenomenon, called the "name
suit," was the result of the common law court's refusal to recog-
nize assignments of choses in action or other equitable inter-
ests.
Equity courts, on the other hand, were more concerned with
having the parties with actual ownership interests before the
court in order to resolve disputes completely. The courts of
equity recognized the rights of trustees, equitable assignees,
subrogees, guardians and similar interest-holders to bring ac-
109. Mortgage Associates v. Monona Shores, 47 Wis. 2d 171, 179, 177 N.W.2d 340,
346 (1970).
110. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
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tions in their own names without joining the original interest-
holder of the substantive right being enforced. Consequently,
it was never necessary to resort to the "name suit" practice in
equity.
With the merger of law and equity, the more practical ap-
proach of the courts of equity was adopted in the New York
Code, requiring every action to be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest except for certain actions where legal
representatives or statutorily-authorized persons could sue
without joining the person who would benefit by the action."'
The obstacle which the rule was designed to overcome was
eliminated when courts of law finally recognized the assign-
ments of choses in action."' The modem functions of the rule
have primarily been to prevent separate actions by the assignor
and assignee of the same interest to enforce the same substan-
tive right, and to ensure the proper res judicata effect of judg-
ments:
The purpose of the real-party-in-interest statute is to prevent
a multiplicity of suits, to make sure that a defendant can
assert his defenses when sued upon an assigned claim, to
assure that a judgment will completely settle the claim, and
to make it possible to discharge the debt by paying the as-
signee with no vestigial right of action remaining in the assig-
nor.113
Since the modem purpose for the rule is to protect defen-
dants from vexatious litigation with respect to the same claim,
it would seem that this function has been subsumed by the
mandatory joinder rule, section 803.03.114 Indeed, the modem
elements of the real-party-in-interest rule are nearly identical
to the functional test laid out in section 803.03(3) for determin-
ing whether a party should be joined if feasible:
111. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 22 (2d ed. 1947), p. 158.
112. See Federal Rules Advisory Committee's Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 17.
113. State ex rel. State Bar of Wisconsin v. Bonded Collections, Inc., 36 Wis. 2d
643, 651, 154 N.W.2d 250, 254 (1967).
114. New York has abolished the real-party-in-interest rule altogether. According
to 2 WEiNSTEiN, KORN & MILLER, Naw YORK CIVIL PRACrcE § 1004.01:
[The rule] was unnecessary because (1) the law would be the same without
any express rule, (2) it was an inept statement of an obvious principle of sub-
stantive law, (3) it misleadingly seemed to say that the action must be brought
by the party to be benefited, and (4) the second part of [the former New York
rule equivalent to the second sentence of Federal Rule 17(a)] . . . was not an
exception to the first part even though it was cast in the form of an exception.
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[A] fundamental test [in determining the real party in in-
terest] . . . is whether the prosecution of the action will save
the defendant from further harassment for the same demand,
will cut the defendant off from any just defense, offset, or
counterclaim against the demand, and whether the discharge
of the judgment in behalf of the party suing will fully protect
the defendant.1'5
Because the affirmative requirement that the party who pos-
sesses the right to receive the fruits of the litigation be joined
is implicit in section 803.03, this mandatory joinder aspect of
the original real-party-in-interest rule has been eliminated in
its positive terms from the new language of section 803.01(1)."'
The new rule addresses only the procedural impact of the fail-
ure to join the real party in interest. It is the purpose of the
"necessary and indispensable party" rule, section 803.03, to
ensure that the parties with material interests which might be
affected be joined in the action. The purpose of the real-party-
in-interest rule, on the other hand, was merely to get around
the common law privity problems. For this reason the new
section 803.01 will minimize the consequences and injustice of
dismissing an action where an honest mistake has been made
in choosing the party in whose name the action has been filed.
The new language expels mandatory joinder questions from
real party in interest cases, leaving such questions to their
proper place in section 803.03.
Intrusion of mandatory joinder questions under the guise of
real-party-in-interest issues arose in cases such as Borde v.
Hake,.17 where less than all interested holders of a substantive
right brought an action on the claim held between them. In
such cases, the interrelatedness of the real-party-in-interest
rule and the "necessary and indispensable party" rule immedi-
ately became apparent. In Borde v. Hake, the plaintiff, who
was injured in an automobile collision with the defendant,
brought an action for personal injury and property damage.
The defendant interposed a plea in abatement alleging that the
plaintiff was not the real party in interest in that a portion of
115. Mortgage Associates v. Monona Shores, 47 Wis. 2d at 179, 177 N.W. 2d at 346,
347.
116. The old rule read: "260.13 Real party in interest must prosecute. Every
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest except as otherwise
provided in section 260.15." (Emphasis supplied).
117. 44 Wis. 2d 22, 170 N.W.2d 763 (1969).
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the claim belonged to the plaintiffs collision insurance carrier
(Heritage) who had paid plaintiff's property damage less a fifty
dollar deductible. The circuit court held that the plea in abate-
ment was proper under Patitucci v. Gerhardt.' That case had
held that a collision insurance carrier, which had paid a plain-
tiff's claim under a collision policy, was an indispensable party
to the lawsuit, and the failure to join the insurer would be
grounds for a plea in abatement."9 The circuit court in Borde
ordered the entire action suspended until all parties united in
interest were joined. However, the statute of limitations had
since run on the property damage claim in which the insurer
held an interest, and a holding that the action had not been
commenced would have barred the entire claim-even the per-
sonal injury claim in which Heritage held no interest. On ap-
peal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the property and
personal injury damages were two separate "rights of action"
within one cause of action, and the circuit court's abatement
of the "right of action" in which Heritage held no interest was
error. But as to the property damage "right of action," the
abatement was correct. The net effect, from the plaintiff's
point of view, was to lose the fifty dollar deductible interest still
held by him in the property damage right of action "while
preserving the more substantial personal injury right of ac-
tion."
In essence, the Borde court held that by virtue of Heritage's
subrogation, the cause of action became two separate claims
which had to have been commenced together in order to toll the
statute of limitations. In so concluding, the court stated that:
... [O]nce a defendant is freed of potential liability by the
running of the statute of limitations in a civil suit, [to extend
the period of limitations] . . .would subject a defendant to
118. 206 Wis. 358, 240 N.W. 385 (1932).
119. This holding has since been modified, and to a considerable degree the theo-
retical problems which developed under the old necessary and indispensable party
rule, § 260.12(1), were resolved in Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 111, 120, 211 N.W.2d
834, 840 (1973), wherein it was stated that "[iut is better to think of the [subrogated]
insurer as an assignee of part of the claim than to speak of the insured and the insurer
as joint owners of the claim." Thus, a subrogated insurer is really only a "necessary"
party under the old mandatory joinder rule, although the court in Heifetz did not
definitely rule to this effect. See Commentary on Wis. STAT. § 803.03, infra p. 81.
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liability without due process of law in violation of the Consti-
tution of the United States.'20
Thus, the court invoked the real-party-in-interest rule-a
purely procedural rule ' 2 1-to impose the substantive bar of lim-
itations of actions. There is little authority or logic to support
this conclusion. Both the old and new versions of the real-
party-in-interest rule require prosecution rather than
institution by the real party in interest.12 2 The question of
commencement of actions is irrelevant in this context. A cu-
rious situation would have resulted if the insurer had paid the
plaintiff's claim subsequent to the commencement of the ac-
tion but before judgment was rendered. It would be absurd to
hold that the subrogation at that point would void the action
ab initio.
The commencement of the action by one of the interested
parties in Borde should have been effective to toll the statute
as to the entire claim. If, as the court declared in Heifetz v.
Johnson,'1' "acceptance of payment from an insurer. . . oper-
ates as a virtual assignment of the cause of action to the insurer
and a part payment operates as an assignment pro tanto," then
the assigned portion of the plaintiffs claim in Borde was a part
of the original claim for which only one commencement would
be necessary. This is the only logical result since the real-party-
in-interest rule has nothing to do with the commencement of
actions. While the Wisconsin court in Heifetz withdrew some-
what from the position taken in Borde, claiming that the dis-
cussion relating to the statute of limitations was dicta, the
court still remains enmeshed in problems of limitations of ac-
tions in the area of joinder.' 24
120. Borde v. Hake, 44 Wis. 2d at 31, 170 N.W.2d at 772. In Wisconsin, limitations
"are not treated as statutes of repose. The limitation of actions is a right as well as a
remedy, extinguishing the right on one side and creating a right on the other, which is
as of high dignity as regards judicial remedies as any other right and it is a right which
enjoys constitutional protection." Maryland Casualty Co. v. Beleznay, 245 Wis. 390,
393, 14 N.W.2d 177, 179 (1944).
121. CLARK, CODE PLEADING, § 22 (2d ed. 1947).
122. Aiken, Timothy J., Heifetz and the New Rules of Civil Procedure, (unpub-
lished monograph, 1975).
123. 61 Wis. 2d at 114, 211 N.W.2d at 836.
124. This problem is very similar to the question of whether a failure to join a
"necessary party" under § 803.03 is a jurisdictional defect. See Commentary on Wis.
STAT. § 803.03, infra p. 81. In both real party in interest and "necessary" party issues,
the courts have continually overlooked the fact that these are procedural rather than
substantive rules. The thrust of the new joinder provisions of Chapter 803 is to elimi-
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Hence, under new section 803.01(1), commencement of the
action by any of the persons holding a part of the claim will toll
the statute of limitations as to all, provided that within a rea-
sonable time after objection is made, the other persons holding
parts of the claim ratify the plaintiff's commencement of the
action or are themselves joined or substituted in the action.
Two matters remain unclear under the wording of section
803.01(1). The first, related directly to the discussion immedi-
ately above, is that the rule recognizes by implication that an
action may be dismissed when a reasonable time has expired
following a real-party-in-interest objection and no joinder, sub-
stitution, or ratification has taken place. Does this mean that
the entire action would be dismissed, or, as in Borde, would the
plaintiff who had commenced the action stay in court on his
right of action?
A second problem is that the rule retains the phrase "the
real party in interest" with the connotation that there can be
only one such party with respect to a given claim. It must
carefully be noted that "there may be as many real parties in
interest as there are rights of action by substantive law."' 25
One further caveat must be taken into account with respect
to the provision for nondismissal until a reasonable time has
been allowed for ratification, joinder or substitution of the real
party in interest. The Federal Rules Advisory Committee's
Note to Federal Rule 17(a) (the equivalent of section 803.01)
observed:
The provision should not be misunderstood or distorted. It is
intended to prevent forfeiture when determination of the pro-
per party to sue is difficult or when an understandable mis-
take has been made. It does not mean, for example, that,
following an airplane crash in which all aboard were killed,
an action may be filed in the name of John Doe (a fictitious
person), as personal representative of Richard Roe (another
fictitious person), in the hope that at a later time the attorney
filing the action may substitute the real name of the real
personal representative of a real victim, and have the benefit
of suspension of the limitation period.
nate this confusion by substituting pragmatic considerations in the place of theoretical
classifications of property interests in framing actions. Under the new pragmatic anal-
ysis, it is readily seen that limitations of action and subject matter jurisdiction ques-
tions are irrelevant to joinder questions.
125. CLARK, CODE PLEADING, § 22, (2d ed. 1947), p. 161.
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Section 803.01(2) is based on section 260.15 and Federal
Rule 17(a). This subsection adds guardians and bailees to the
list of persons authorized under the old rule 260.15 to bring
suits without naming the person for whose benefit the suit is
brought. This section also allows a partner to sue on a partner-
ship claim without joining the other members of the partner-
ship, provided the pleading indicates that the claim belongs to
the partnership.
Section 803.01(3) is derived from former sections 260.22
through 260.24.
803.02 Joinder of claims and remedies. (1) A party as-
serting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim,
cross claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as indepen-
dent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal or equita-
ble, as he has against an opposing party.
(2) Whenever a claim is one heretofore cognizable only
after another claim has been prosecuted to a conclusion, the
two claims may be joined in a single action; but the court
shall brant relief in that action only in accordance with the
relative substantive rights of the parties. In particular, a
plaintiff may state a claim for money and a claim to have set
aside a conveyance fraudulent as to him, without first having
obtained a judgment establishing the claim for money.
Subsection (1) creates an unlimited right of claim joinder.
In cases involving a single plaintiff and defendant there is no
limitation upon joining any number of claims, legal or equita-
ble. The party joinder rules, sections 803.03 and 803.04, provide
the limitation on the size and cohesiveness of multi-party
cases. 28 If a party must be dropped under section 803.06 for
misjoinder, the claim for relief asserted against that party is
also dropped.
Section 803.02 is derived from Federal Rule 18(a) which
"proceeds upon the theory that no inconvenience can result
from the joinder of two or more matters in the pleadings, but
only from trying two or more matters together which have little
or nothing in common." ' Thus, the Federal Rules Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 18 states that the claim joinder rule
126. The problems of "uniting causes of action" in multi-party cases under the old
rule § 263.04 are dealt with in the commentary on permissive joinder of parties under
§ 803.04 infra p. 92.
127. Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. Va. L. Q. 5, 13 (1938); See CLARK,
CODE PLEADING, § 58 (2d ed. 1947).
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"has permitted a party to plead multiple claims of all types
against an opposing party, subject to the court's power to direct
an appropriate procedure for trying the claims." Under the new
rules, the appropriate procedure for making the trial of multi-
ple claims more manageable is through the severance provi-
sions of section 803.04(2)(b), section 803.04(3) and section
803.06. This approach saves the time, effort, and expense of
instituting separate lawsuits on each claim.
While joinder of claims is completely permissive, the plain-
tiff must be careful not to split a single claim into two separate
lawsuits, because a judgment in the first action may bar recov-
ery in the second action under the doctrine of res judicata. 8
In this regard, it must also be noted that the concept of a
"claim" under the Federal Rules and new Wisconsin rules has
a broader connotation than the concept of "cause of action."'' 9
Subsection (2), derived from Federal Rule 18(b), allows a
plaintiff to join claims in one action regardless of the fact that
the plaintiffs right to recover on one claim so joined depends
upon the successful prosecution of the other claim. This provi-
sion is purely procedural. Its practical effect is to save the
expense, delay, and effort of initiating separate suits. The last
sentence of subsection (2) is intended to abolish the rule of
Lipman v. Manger,"'o that "[i]f the plaintiffs were general
creditors and desired to follow property fraudulently trans-
ferred . . . it would be necessary first to procure judgment
against the real debtor and exhaust their remedies against [the
real debtor]."
803.03 Joinder of persons needed for just and com-
plete adjudication. (1) PERSONS TO BE JOINED IF FEASIBLE. A
person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as
a party in the action if (a) in his absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (b) he
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is
so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence
may 1. as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest or 2. leave any of the persons already
128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), OF JUDGMENTS §§ 61-61.1 (TENT. DRAFr No. 1,
1973).
129. Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cir. 1959). See also CLARK, CODE PLEADING,
§ 73, at 473-74 (2d ed. 1947).
130. 185 Wis. 63, 73, 200 N.W. 663, 667 (1924). See also Running v. Widdes, 52 Wis.
2d 254, 190 N.W.2d 169 (1971).
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parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, mul-
tiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his
claimed interest.
(2) CLAIMS ARISING BY SUBROGATION, DERIVATION AND
ASSIGNMENT. (a) Joinder of related claims. A party asserting
a claim for affirmative relief shall join as parties to the action
all persons who at the commencement of the action have
claims based upon subrogation to the rights of the party as-
serting the principal claim, derivation from the principal
claim, or assignment of part of the principal claim. For pur-
poses of this section, a person's right to recover for loss of
consortium shall be deemed a derivative right. Any party
asserting a claim based upon subrogation to part of the claim
of another, derivation from the rights or claim of another
shall join as a party to the action the person to whose rights
he is subrogated, from whose claim he derives his rights or
claim, or by whose assignment he acquired his rights or
claim.
(b) Options after joinder. Any party joined pursuant to
par. (a) may 1. participate in the prosecution of the action,
2. agree to have his interest represented by the party who
caused his joinder, or 3. move for dismissal with or without
prejudice. If the party joined chooses to participate in the
prosecution of the action, he shall have an equal voice with
other claimants in such prosecution. If he chooses to have his
interest represented by the party who caused his joinder, he
shall sign a written waiver of his right to participate which
shall express his consent to be bound by the judgment in the
action. Such waiver shall become binding when filed with the
court, but a party may withdraw his waiver upon timely mo-
tion to the judge to whom the case has been assigned with
notice to the other parties. A party who represents the inter-
est of another party and who obtains a judgment favorable
to such other party may be awarded reasonable attorney's
fees by the court. If the party joined moves for dismissal
without prejudice as to his claim, he shall demonstrate to the
court that it would be unjust to require him to prosecute his
claim with the principal claim. In determining whether to
grant the motion to dismiss, the court shall weigh the possible
prejudice to the movant against the state's interest in econ-
omy of judicial effort.
(c) Scheduling and pretrial conferences. At the schedul-
ing conference and pretrial conference, the judge to whom the
case has been assigned shall inquire concerning the existence
of and joinder of persons with subrogated, derivative or as-
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signed rights and shall make such orders as are necessary to
effectuate the purposes of this section.
(3) DETERMINATION BY COURT WHENEVER JOINDER NOT
FEASIBLE. If any such person has not been so joined, the judge
to whom the case has been assigned shall order that he be
made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to
do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an
involuntary plaintiff. If a person as described in subs. (1) and
(2) cannot be made a party, the court shall determine
whether in equity and good conscience the action should pro-
ceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the
absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The fac-
tors to be considered by the court include:
(a) To what extent a judgment rendered in the person's
absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties;
(b) The extent to which, by protective provisions in the
judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the
prejudice can be lessened or avoided;
(c) Where a judgment rendered in the person's absence
will be adequate; and
(d) Whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy
if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(4) PLEADING REASONS FOR NONJOINDER. A pleading assert-
ing a claim for relief shall state the names, if known to the
pleader, of any persons as described in subs. (1) and (2) who
are not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined.
(5) EXCEPTION OF CLASS ACTIONS. This section is subject
to s. 803.08.
All of this rule, with the exception of subsection (2), is de-
rived from Federal Rule 19, as amended in 1966. Section 803.03
deals with mandatory joinder,"3 ' as distinguished from permis-
sive joinder under section 803.04, and is closely related to sec-
tion 803.09 governing intervention.
The general purpose behind section 803.03 is to require,
when feasible, the inclusion in an action of those parties neces-
sary to a complete determination of a single controversy for res
judicata purposes. Since this rule is fundamentally a departure
from the theory under the old mandatory joinder rule in Wis-
131. Although it is commonly assumed that the concept of mandatory joinder
embraces the real-party-in-interest rule (§ 803.01), the latter, in its proper application,
simply raises the question of whether or not a plaintiff possesses the particular sub-
stantive right which he seeks to enforce. See commentary on § 803.01, supra p. 77.




consin, the theoretical underpinnings of both the old and new
rules must be examined.
The old Wisconsin mandatory joinder rule provided:
260.12 Parties united in interest to be joined; class actions;
alternative joinder.
Of the parties to the action those who are united in interest
must be joined as plaintiffs or defendants, but if the consent
of any one who should be joined as plaintiff cannot be ob-
tained he may be made a defendant, the reason thereof being
stated in the complaint, and when the question is one of a
common or general interest of many persons or when the
parties are very numerous and it may be impracticable to
bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or de-
fend for the benefit of the whole. And when more than one
person makes a separate claim for damage against the same
person or persons based upon the same alleged tortious con-
duct, they may unite in prosecuting their claims in one ac-
tion.
A determination of whether a party had to be joined depended
upon defining the phrase "united in interest." The statute
never used the terms "necessary" or "indispensable" parties
yet those classifications were central to the analysis under the
old rule.12 The terms originated in case law dating back to the
nineteenth century.1 33 In Shields v. Barrow,1 34 the Supreme
Court attempted to define these two generic types of litigants:
Persons having an interest in the controversy, and who
ought to be made parties, in order that the court may act on
that rule which requires it to decide on, and finally determine
the entire controversy, and do complete justice, by adjusting
all the rights involved in it. . . are commonly termed neces-
sary parties; but if their interests are separable from those of
the parties before the court so that the court can proceed to
a decree, and do complete and final justice, without affecting
other persons, not before the court, the latter are not indis-
pensable parties. . . .Persons who not only have an interest
in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a
final decree cannot be made without either affecting that
132. See e.g., Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973), and
Kochel v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 66 Wis. 2d 405, 225 N.W.2d 604 (1975).
133. See Mallow v. Hinde, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 193 (1927); Northern Indiana R.R.
v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 56 U.S. (15 How.) 223 (1853); Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17
How.) 130 (1854).
134. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854).
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interest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that
its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity
and good conscience [are indispensable parties] . ... 1
Largely as a result of this language in Shields, courts began
to examine the nature of a person's property interest in the
subject matter of the controversy in order to determine whether
a party was "necessary" or "indispensable." This analysis pro-
ceeded upon a theoretical basis-attempting to fit the joint,
common, or several interest into one of the two theoretical
categories of "necessary" or "indispensable." ' From this anal-
ysis, the old Wisconsin mandatory joinder rule derived the
"united in interest" concept.
Wisconsin case law, operating under the "united in inter-
est" concept and the approach of looking for the proper theoret-
ical category in which to place the absent person's interest, has
resulted in the rule that "joint owners must sue jointly and
neither can recover in an action in which he is the sole plain-
tiff." 7 But the concept of joint ownership is difficult to define
in all its applications and thus fails to advance much farther
than the concept of "united in interest." Under the recent cases
of Heifetz v. Johnson'35 and Kochel v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co.,'" the court has remedied this definitional prob-
lem somewhat by further refining the concept of joint owner-
ship to require "joint owners in the same sense as the joint
payees of a note."'' The rationale for this rule was stated in
Kochel to be, "Joint payees of a note are entitled to one undi-
vided recovery because of the inherent nature of their claim. If
one sues and recovers, the other would be left with no cause of
action." '' Even with this narrower definition of joint owner-
ship, the analysis remains unsatisfactory since it is premised
upon the questionable assumption that all joint owners bear
such a relation to the action that their presence is indispensa-
135. Id. at 139.
136. This type of analysis was also the basis upon which class action theory pro-
ceeded under original Federal Rule 23. This rule distinguished between "joint," "sev-
eral," and "spurious" unions. See, 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE § 23.01[8].
137. Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d at 119, 211 N.W.2d at 840.
138. 61 Wis. 2d 111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973).
139. 66 Wis. 2d 405, 225 N.W.2d 604 (1975).
140. Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d at 120, 211 N.W.2d at 839.




ble. The Federal Rules Committee Note of 1966 to Rule 19
emphasized this point:
• . . [P]ersons holding an interest technically "joint" are
not always so related to an action that it would be unwise to
proceed without joining all of them, whereas persons holding
an interest not technically "joint" may have this relation to
an action.
The assumption, under present Wisconsin law, that all joint
interest holders bear an indispensable relation to an action
must itself be premised on either or both of the following propo-
sitions: (1) failure to join an "indispensable" party presents a
jurisdictional defect; or (2) the court is incapable of shaping the
relief awarded to the joint-owner party to the action so as to
protect the absent joint-owner. As to the former proposition,
the Wisconsin court has held in definitive terms that failure to
join an indispensable party does not present a jurisdictional
defect."' As to the latter proposition, there has never been any
doubt that a court is capable of shaping relief to protect an
absent party, but this function has largely been ignored as an
alternative to dismissal of an action when joinder of a party
who ought to be joined is not feasible."4 For this reason, the
ability of the court to overcome prejudice to the absent party
by shaping relief is specifically emphasized as a relevant factor
under section 803.03(3)(b) in considering whether or not the
action may proceed.
Thus, the concept of "jointness" of interest is not of itself
indicative of whether or not a person is so related to the subject
matter of the action that he must be joined in order to avoid
dismissal. The concept is relevant insofar as it aids in the iden-
tification of parties who ought to be joined in the action, but
the decision as to whether an action should be dismissed be-
cause of such a party's absence should be controlled by a con-
sideration of the practical alternatives. This was the thrust of
142. Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973).
143. A case in which the tool of "shaping relief" was employed was Patatucci v.
Gerhardt, 206 Wis. 358, 240 N.W. 385 (1932). In that case, the court recognized that
where the subrogated interest of an insurer in its insured's claim did not come to the
court's attention before it proceeded to judgment, the insurer could recover the entire
amount of the damages, including those accruing to the insurer's "right" of action, and
would then hold the insurer's portion as trustee. Thus, the court protected the insurer's
interest by shaping the relief awarded to the plaintiff.
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the Federal Advisory Committee's criticims of the old Federal
Rule 19 in its Note to the 1966 revision:
The use of "indispensable" and "joint interest" in the con-
text of original Rule 19 directed attention to the technical or
abstract character of the rights or obligations of the persons
whose joinder was in question, and correspondingly dis-
tracted attention from the pragmatic considerations which
should be controlling.
Thus, the amended Federal Rule 19 and new section 803.03 set
up functional tests, based on pragmatic considerations, for de-
termining: (1) who must be joined in the action among the
parties subject to service of process; and (2) whether or not the
court should proceed to judgment in the absence of a person
who, but for his being beyond the reach of process, would other-
wise be mandatorily joined.
Subsection (1) provides the test for parties who must be
joined unless their absence is excused under subsection (3). A
party who satisfies the requirements of either paragraph (a) or
paragraph (b) of subsection (1) must be joined if subject to
service of process. These criteria focus upon the practical effect
of nonjoinder. In Wisconsin, because of the liberal "long-arm"
provisions of Chapter 801, there will be very few instances
where a party who must be joined, under the test set out in this
subsection, will not be subject to service of process."'
When a party is not subject to service of process, subsection
(3) provides a functional test for determining whether or not
"in equity and good conscience" the court should proceed to
judgment with the parties before it, or dismiss the action. The
court must consider the factors set out in paragraph (a)
through (d) after which the decision of dismissal or non-
dismissal is made. Included in these factors is the consideration
of whether prejudice can be avoided by the shaping of relief. If
a decision of dismissal is reached, it is only at such time that
the absent party is, in a conclusory sense, deemed "indispensa-
ble."
Even under the new pragmatic analysis there will more
144. Problems of joinder under Federal Rule 19 become more complex due to the
limitation on extraterritorial service of process in Federal Rule 4(f), although 4(e)
permits extraterritorial service whenever a statute or rule of the forum state provides
therefor. Of greater significance, however, is the requirement in Federal Rule 19 that
joinder not destroy federal diversity jurisdiction.
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often be a finding of "indispensability" in those instances
where an absent person holds a "truely joint" and "material"
interest which is inseparable from a right or liability held by a
party joined in the action. In such cases a trial might-as a
practical matter-be declarative of the absent party's right or
liability. But the mere existence of such a "joint" interest is not
a substitute for the functional analysis set out in the rule. The
court must look not only at the interest held by the absent
party, but primarily at the practical effect of nonjoinder. In
close cases, the court, after complying with the analysis under
the rule, will be forced to make a decision which will result in
leaving a defendant open to a second suit with inconsistent
results, or leave a plaintiff with only "hollow" relief or no trial
at all, or leave an absent party with a fait accompli.
A theoretical problem which has frequently arisen under
the federal and state mandatory joinder rules is whether the
absence of a party who ought to be joined, such as a joint owner
of a note, deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.'
The Federal Advisory Committee Note of 1966 to Rule 19 ex-
plained that subject matter jurisdiction does not properly enter
into questions of mandatory joinder:
Even if the court is mistaken in its decision to proceed in
the absence of an interested person, it does not by that token
deprive itself of the power to adjudicate as between the par-
ties already before it through proper service of process. But
the court can make a legally binding adjudication only be-
tween the parties actually joined in the action. It is true that
an adjudication between the parties before the court may on
occasion adversely affect the absent person as a practical
matter, or leave a person to a later inconsistent recovery by
the absent person. These are matters which should be consid-
ered in deciding whether the action should proceed, or should
rather be dismissed; but they do not themselves negate the
court's power to adjudicate as between the parties who have
been joined.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Heifetz v. Johnson' held
that nonjoinder of "indispensable" parties has never been
viewed as a defect going to the jurisdiction of the court in
145. See e.g., Samuel Goldwyn, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 113 F.2d 703, 707 (3d
Cir. 1940); Sellman v. Haddock, 310 P.2d 1045 (1957); Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d
111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973).
146. 61 Wis. 2d at 121, 211 N.W.2d at 840.
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Wisconsin, withdrawing any contrary language in Borde v.
Hake.'47 This ruling is consistent with the theory underlying
section 803.03. However, the court in Heifetz became entangled
in the question of commencement and limitations of actions
while considering a case dealing with mandatory joinder and
thereby elevated a purely procedural rule to a place of substan-
tive significance.'48
In Heifetz, the plaintiff had been injured in an automobile
collision with the defendant in 1968. and was paid $2,000 for
medical expenses by his insurer, Heritage Mutual Insurance
Co. (Heritage). Heifetz executed a "subrogation receipt and
assignment" to Heritage in 1969. Heifetz then commenced an
action for personal injury damages against defendant in 1971,
eleven days before the statute of limitations was due to run,
and without joining Heritage in the action. After the eleven
days had passed, defendants moved for summary judgment on
the basis that Heritage was an indispensable party to the ac-
tion and that the failure to join such an indispensable party
before the running of the statute of limitations was ineffective
to toll the statute even as to those plaintiffs already joined in
the action. The trial court denied the motion for summary
judgment and the defendant appealed.
On appeal, the supreme court held that although Heritage
was initially indispensable, the statute of limitations had effec-
tively barred Heritage from asserting its cause of action:
The respondents also persuasively argue that the purpose of
the mandatory joinder statutes ... is to protect the defen-
dant against a multiplicity of suits and that the purpose is
served when by operation of the statute of limitations the
insurer is barred forever from any claim against the defen-
dant. There is, in effect, no longer any lack of an indispensa-
ble party for the insurer no longer has any interest in the
action."'
The court grounded this conclusion on the principle that in
Wisconsin the running of the statute of limitations extin-
guishes the cause of action as well as the right of action."'
147. 44 Wis. 2d 22, 170 N.W.2d 768 (1969).
148. The confusion of commencement of actions with mandatory joinder has also
arisen in regard to the real-party-in-interest rule. See commentary on § 803.01, supra,
particularly note 119 and accompanying text.
149. Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d at 123, 211 N.W.2d at 840-41 (1973).
150. Id. at 115, 211 N.W.2d at 836-37.
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This result was also reached in the recent case of Kochel v.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 151 in which two brothers
commenced an action for the wrongful death of their father
without joining their three sisters. The defendant was granted
summary judgment by the trial court on the basis of nonjoinder
of indispensable parties. On appeal, the court held that the
action was properly commenced as to the two brothers, but
that because the statute of limitations had since run on the
wrongful death claims of the three sisters, the statute of limita-
tions would preclude them from commencing independent
wrongful death actions in the future. Therefore, the sisters were
no longer indispensable parties.
The problem with the court's reasoning is that there is no
justification for the rule that the statute of limitations on a
split cause of action cannot be tolled by the commencement of
an action by an owner of a part of the action.1 5 The Heifetz
court stated that "it is better to think of the insurer as an
assignee of part of the claim than to speak of the insured and
the insurer as joint owners of the claim."'-3 Similarly, "a cause
of action for wrongful death is a single cause of action with
ownership thereof vested in 'the person to whom the amount
recovered belongs' as designated [in the wrongful death stat-
ute]." 54 If, then, there is only one cause of action, albeit, split
into two or more parts, there is no logical reason to require more
than one commencement of that cause of action. The court in
Heifetz ironically observed:
It was well stated in Bank of California v. Superior Court
[16 Cal. 2d 516, 521, 106 P.2d 879 (1940)]:
".. . Bearing in mind the fundamental purpose of the doc-
trine, we should, in dealing with "necessary" and "indispen-
sable" parties, be careful to avoid converting a discretionary
"'In Wisconsin the running of the statute of limitations absolutely extin-
guishes the cause of action for in Wisconsin limitations are not treated as stat-
utes of repose. The limitation of actions is a right as well as a remedy, extin-
guishing the right on one side and creating a right on the other, which is as of
high dignity as regards judicial remedies as any other right and it is a right
which enjoys constitutional protection ... '
Haase v. Sawicke, 20 Wis. 2d 308, 311, 312, 121 N.W.2d 876 (1963), quoting from
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Beleznay, 245 Wis. 390, 393, 14 N.W.2d 177 (1944).
151. 66 Wis. 2d 405, 225 N.W.2d 604 (1975).
152. See also commentary on § 803.01, supra p. 69.
153. Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d at 120, 211 N.W.2d at 839.
154. Truesdill v. Roach, 11 Wis. 2d 497, 105 N.W.2d at 874 (1960).
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power or a rule of fairness into an arbitrary and burdensome
requirement. "1...,,55
Yet, the court proceeded to do just that, namely to invoke a
rule of procedure, the mandatory joinder statute, to impose the
substantive bar of the statute of limitations.
Subsection (2) of section 803.03 is designed to eliminate the
confusion of statute of limitations questions with the rules gov-
erning joinder of parties. This subsection mandates the joinder
of persons who at the commencement of the action possess a
part of the original cause of action by virtue of subrogation to,
derivation from, or assignment of, a part of the principal claim
possessed by the plaintiff. By this part of subsection (2), such
persons are included in the class of persons needed for just and
complete adjudication. The Judicial Council Committee's
Note, 1974, emphasizes that subsection (2) "is intended to fos-
ter economy of judicial effort by requiring that all 'parts' of a
single cause of action whether arising by subrogation, deriva-
tion, or assignment, be brought before the court in one action."
It should be noted that this subsection refers to these three
types of related claims as "parts" of the principal claim. This
emphasis makes it apparent that one commencement is suffi-
cient to toll the statute of limitations since there is actually
only one cause of action.
Similarly, the thrust of section 803.01, the real-party-in-
interest rule, with its relation back provision, is directly related
to section 803.03(2)(b) which recognizes the right of a person
holding a related claim to have such claim represented by the
party who caused his joinder-a frequent ground for real-party-
in-interest objections under present case law. Therefore, the
relation back provision of section 803.01 should apply equally
to section 803.03.
Paragraph (c) of subsection (2) also makes it clear that the
entire claim, including all of its constituent parts, is effectively
commenced with the filing of one summons by the principal
claimant. At the scheduling and pre-trial conferences, the
judge assigned to the case "shall inquire concerning the exist-
ence of and joinder of persons with subrogated, derivative, or
assigned rights and shall make such orders as are necessary to
effectuate the purposes of this section." If the new rules were
155. Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d at 123, 211 N.W.2d at 841.
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to recognize the Heifetz and Kochel holdings with reference to
the statute of limitations, the judge would be unable to order
the joinder of a party possessing a subrogated, assigned or de-
rivative part of the principal claim if the statute of limitations
had run between that time and the commencement of the prin-
cipal action. But the rule recognizes no such limitation. Thus,
the new rules provide a clear basis for a change in the rulings
of Heifetz and Kochel with respect to commencement of ac-
tions in those cases where a claim is split. 156
Paragraph (b) of subsection (2) provides the mechanism
whereby a party joined as a related-claim holder under para-
graph (c) of subsection (2) may choose among several proce-
dural alternatives including: (1) participating in the prosecu-
tion of the action, (2) consenting to having his interest repre-
sented by the party causing his joinder, and (3) moving for
dismissal without prejudice.
This paragraph recognizes the practical problems encoun-
tered in cases involving subrogated insurers. Since the insur-
ance industry operates on the basis of actuarial tables, with a
conceded measure of losses, subrogated insurers are not inter-
ested in expending money and effort in doubtful cases, and
therefore frequently ignore a subrogated claim upon which they
are legally entitled to act. In such cases, the insurer can merely
agree to have his interest represented by its insured in a suit
against the tort-feasor.
803.04 Permissive joinder of parties. (1) PERMISSIVE
JOINDER. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if
they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alter-
native in respect of or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any
question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise
in the action. All persons may be joined in one action as
defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally,
or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transac-
tions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact com-
mon to all defendants will arise in the action. A plaintiff or
defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending
against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for
156. Cf., commentary on § 802.09 Amended and Supplemental Pleadings, supra
p. 63. Section 802.09 overturns case law that had set up a procedural rule of pleading
as an aid to the substantive defense of limitations of actions.
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one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective
rights to relief, and against one or more defendants according
to their respective liabilities.
(2) NEGLIGENCE AcTIONS; INSURERS. (a) In any action for
damages caused by negligence, any insurer which has an in-
terest in the outcome of such controversy adverse to the
plaintiff or any of the parties to such controversy, or which
by its policy of insurance assumes or reserves the right to
control the prosecution, defense or settlement of the claim or
action, or which by its policy agrees to prosecute or defend
the action brought by plaintiff or any of the parties to such
action, or agrees to engage counsel to prosecute or defend said
action or agrees to pay the costs of such litigation, is by this
section made a proper party defendant in any action brought
by plaintiff in this state on account of any claim against the
insured. If the policy of insurance was issued or delivered
outside this state, the insurer is by this paragraph made a
proper party defendant only if the accident, injury or negli-
gence occurred in this state.
(b) If an insurer is made a party defendant pursuant to
this section and it appears at any time before or during the
trial that there is or may be a cross issue between the insurer
and the insured or any issue between any other person and
the insurer involving the question of the insurer's liability if
judgment should be rendered against the insured, the court
may, upon motion of any defendant in the action, cause the
person who may be liable upon such cross issue to be made a
party defendant to the action and all the issues involved in
the controversy determined in the trial of the action or any
third-party may be impleaded as provided in s. 803.05. Noth-
ing herein contained shall be construed as prohibiting the
trial court from directing and conducting separate trials on
the issue of liability to the plaintiff or other party seeking
affirmative relief and on the issue of whether the insurance
policy in question affords coverage. Any party may move for
such separate trials and if the court orders separate trials it
shall specify in its order the sequence in which such trials
shall be conducted.
(3) SEPARATE TRIALS. The court may make such orders as
will prevent a party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put
to expense by the inclusion of a party against whom he asserts
no claim and who asserts no claim against him, and may




Potential parties to an action fall into one of two categories:
(1) those who must be joined in the action in order to give
proper res judicata effect to judgments, unless their absence is
excused; or (2) those who may properly be joined, at the option
of the pleader, because their relation to the subject matter of
the action is such that their inclusion will save unnecessary
expense, delay, and duplication of effort generally. Those per-
sons falling into the first category (mandatory joinder) are
dealt with in section 803.03, and those in the latter category
(permissive joinder) are dealt with in this rule, section 803.04.
Subsections (1) and (3) are taken from Federal Rule 20(a)
and (b), with respect to which it has been said:
• . .[F]ree joinder of parties has become one of the common-
places of procedural reform. . . . [T]he purpose and con-
struction of Rule 20 . . . [section 803.04] . . . is obviously
• . . to center in one piece of litigation all the controversies
related to a particular transaction and affecting all the par-
ties thereto. Rule 20 [section 803.04] is simply a procedural
rule, the sole purpose of which is to remove the procedural
obstacles of the common law as well as of the earlier codes in
certain regards. . . . Convenience is the avowed criterion.' 57
Since the rule is permissive, defendants may not compel the
plaintiff to join other persons as defendants. Of course the de-
fendant might be able to accomplish this himself by impleader
under section 803.05, provided its requirements are met.
Under subsection (1) of section 803.04, permissive joinder of
plaintiffs depends upon the satisfaction of two requirements:
(1) the right to relief asserted by all plaintiffs must be "in
respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences," and (2) "any question of
law or fact common to all" plaintiffs will arise in the action.
Permissive joinder of defendants depends upon the satisfaction
of the same two requirements, but the transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences which "binds" all defen-
dants need not (and often will not) be the same transaction, or
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences which
"binds" all plaintiffs.
This rule, by its requirements of "transactional relation-
ship" and common questions of law or fact, operates not only
to identify those persons who would be proper parties, but also
157. 6 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE, § 21.119 (3rd ed. 1966).
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those who are improper parties and excluded from participat-
ing in the action.
It should be emphasized that once a party is properly joined
under this rule, any claim may be asserted by or against that
party regardless of whether, under the terms of the old claim
joinder rule, section 263.04, they "affect all parties to the ac-
tion." The new language now states that "[a] plaintiff or de-
fendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending
against all the relief demanded." However, since a party who
is not interested in one of the claims asserted by or against a
co-party might be put through unnecessary expense, delay, or
embarrassment by awaiting the trial phases of that issue,
subsection (3) provides for separate trial of such claims.
Subsection (2) preserves the language of the old statute,
section 260.11, except for the first two sentences. It is by this
provision that Wisconsin allows direct action against insurers
in negligence actions.
The major importance of the new party joinder rule is that
it will probably clear up the theoretical difficulties which the
Wisconsin court has encountered in multi-party cases where
plaintiffs have joined consecutive tortfeasors who produced
indivisible injuries, and those where different theories of action
(e.g., tort and contract) are asserted against different defen-
dants in the same action. In both of these types of actions the
Wisconsin court has sustained joinder objections for failure to
satisfy the provisions of former section 263.04.
The claim joinder statute under the old rules provided that:
The plaintiff may unite in the same complaint several causes
of action, whether they be such as were formerly denomi-
nated legal or equitable or both. But the causes of action so
united must affect all parties to the action and not require
different places of trial, and must be stated separately.' 8
The requirements of same place of trial and separate statement
presented little problem, but the requirement that the causes
of action united "must affect all the parties to the action"
presented substantial difficulty. 59
Fitzwilliams v. O'Shaughnessy,'60 is illustrative of the con-
158. Wis. STAT. § 263.04 (1973).
159. An example of a case where all three requirements were lacking is Caygill v.
Ipsen, 27 Wis. 2d 578, 135 N.W.2d 284 (1965).
160. 40 Wis. 2d 123, 161 N.W.2d 242 (1968).
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secutive tortfeasor problem. Fitzwilliams, a passenger in a car
driven by defendant Krzewinski, was initially injured when the
car was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by defendant
O'Shaughnessy. Fitzwilliams was subsequently placed in an
ambulance which became involved in a collision with defen-
dant Lauck's car. The length of time and distance between the
two accidents was unclear from the record but they were on the
same highway in the same county. Fitzwilliams alleged that
the injuries received from the two collisions were indivisible.
The trial court concluded that the complaint improperly
united two separate causes of action inasmuch as they failed
to affect all parties joined as defendants. The supreme court
affirmed.
The basis for the court's conclusion that the causes of action
did not affect all parties to the action was the theoretical defi-
nition of a cause of action. The court reaffirmed the definition
set out in Caygill v. Ipsen6' and Hartwig v. Bitter:1 2
[A] cause of action must be viewed as a grouping of facts
falling into a single unit or occurrence as a lay person would
view them. This grouping of facts consists of "the defendants
wrongful act."
On this basis, the court concluded that there were two separate
and distinct causes of action, even though it appeared that the
two collisions occurred closely in time and space. The court
observed that:
There may be a situation where the acts are consecutive and
closely enough related in time sequence to constitute one
event and therefore permit a proper joinder of causes in ac-
tion, but such is not the case now before us.'63
The court dismissed the plaintiffs arguments that: (1) joinder
should be allowed since the Wisconsin approach to causation
in negligence would extend the foreseeable results of the first
negligent act through the second collision; " ' and (2) the indivi-
sibility of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of
the two collisions was a proper basis for joinder.
The court's analysis by implication conceded that the join-
161. 27 Wis. 2d at 582, 135 N.W.2d at 287.
162. 29 Wis. 2d 653, 660, 139 N.W.2d 644, 650 (1966).
163. Fitzwilliams v. O'Shaughnessy, 40 Wis. 2d at 126, 161 N.W.2d at 244.
164. See Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W.2d 29
(1952).
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der question is relative, but emphasized the closeness of events
in time sequence as the important factor of relativity. Under
section 803.04, the new language emphasizes that the subject-
matter relatedness of various events constituting a claim
should be interpreted more broadly, and should be as impor-
tant in joinder questions as is the time factor. The persons
seeking to join together as plaintiffs may assert a right to relief
"arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences."'' 5 The joinder question in each
case will depend on how broadly the court views the phrase
"series of transactions or occurrences" with respect to the par-
ticular set of facts. ' In two cases factually similar to
Fitzwilliams, Rule 20 joinder was permitted.'67 In Lucas v.
Juneau,'68 the ambulance trip which resulted in a collision ag-
gravating the plaintiff's injuries from the first auto collision,
occurred eighteen days after the first collision, yet the court
allowed joinder since the ambulance trip was necessitated by
the first collision. The ultimate purpose of limitations on join-
der is to assure that actions do not become too complex to
resolve, but this purpose will now be resolved through the use
of the separate trials provision of section 803.04(3) and misjoin-
der is no longer grounds for dismissal.' 6'
The second type of case giving rise to problems under the
old statute was that in which a plaintiff joined different theo-
ries of action against different defendants. An illustration of
this misjoinder problem under the old statute was presented in
A. C. Storage Co. v. Madison Moving & Wrecking Corp. 170 The
plaintiff had stored equipment of the Fox Head Brewing Com-
pany which had allegedly breached its contract with plaintiff
for rents. Fox Head employed Madison Moving and Wrecking
Corporation to remove its equipment. In removing the equip-
ment, Madison Moving damaged plaintiff's premises. Plaintiff
165. Wis. STAT. § 803.04(1).
166. For an interesting illustration of how courts may differ over the definition of
"same transaction or occurrence" with respect to the same set of facts, compare the
district court opinion of Lasa Per L'Industria Del Marrno Societa Per Azioni v. South-
ern Builders, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 435 (W.D. Tenn. 1967), with the appellate court reversal
in 414 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1969).
167. Lucas v. Juneau, 127 F. Supp. 730 (D. Alaska 1955); State v. Weinstein, 398
S.W.2d 41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
168. 127 F. Supp. 730 (D. Alaska 1955).
169. Wis. STAT. § 803.06.
170. 38 Wis. 2d 15, 155 N.W.2d 567 (1968).
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attempted to unite the contract cause of action against Fox
Head with a negligence cause of action against Madison Mov-
ing. The court sustained a demurrer on grounds of improper
uniting of causes of action.
The problem with this result is that there is no justification
for prohibiting the joinder of causes of action based on different
legal theories.17" ' The joinder rules must find a balance between
the conflicting goals of avoiding overcomplexity of trials and
avoiding piecemeal litigation. This balance can be much more
readily accommodated through allowing joinder based upon a
series of transactions or occurrences with common legal or fac-
tual questions.
803.05 Third-party practice. (1) At any time after
commencement of the action, a defending party, as a third-
party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be
served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may
be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against
him, or who is a necessary party under s. 803.03. The third-
party plaintiff need not obtain leave to implead if he serves
the third-party summons and third-party complaint not later
than the time set in the scheduling order under s. 802.10 (1)
(b) 3. Otherwise, he must obtain leave on motion upon notice
to all parties to the action. The person served with the sum-
mons and third-party complaint, hereinafter called the third-
party defendant, shall make his defenses to the third-party
plaintiff's claim as provided in s. 802.06 and his counter-
claims against the third-party plaintiff and cross claims
against any other defendant as provided in s. 802.07. The
third-party defendant may assert against the plaintiff any
defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's
claim. The third-party defendant may also assert any claim
against the plaintiff if the claim is based upon the same
transaction, occurrence or series of transactions or occurr-
ences as is the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plain-
tiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-
party defendant if the claim is based upon the same transac-
tion, occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences as is
the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff, and the
third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses as
171. In this respect, the problem of joinder is similar to the problem of relation back
of amendments which change causes of action. The new rule 802.09(3) overturns the
bar to such amendments which was established in Meinshausen v. A. Gettleman
Brewing Co., 133 Wis. 95, 113 N.W. 408 (1907).
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provided in s. 802.06 and his counterclaims and cross claims
as provided in s. 802.07.
(2) When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff,
he may cause a third party to be brought in under circum-
stances which under this section would entitle a defendant to
do so.
Section 803.05 provides the procedure by which a party
against whom a claim is asserted may join a person not a party
to the action who actually or potentially shares in the substan-
tive liabilities asserted by the original claimant against the
defending party. The rule also governs the procedure by which
claims and defenses are to be asserted among the parties al-
ready joined in the action and the impleaded party.
Subsection (2) of the rule permits a plaintiff against whom
a counterclaim is asserted to implead a third party under the
same circumstances that the rule allows a defendant to do so.
Consequently, the discussion of impleader herein will be
treated from the defendant's perspective, but applies equally
to plaintiffs defending against counterclaims.
The rule, being permissive in nature, is designed taking into
account many of the same considerations which underly sec-
tion 803.04 governing permissive joinder of parties. Hence, the
rule should be construed liberally to accommodate a wider
scope of civil action. This procedure avoids multiplicity and
circuity of actions and eliminates the expense and delay of
initiating separate lawsuits. The court can prevent overcom-
plexity by ordering separate trials under sections 803.04(3) and
805.05(2).
This rule permits a defending party to implead a third
party, not already a party to the action, "who is or may be
liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him,
or who is a necessary party under s. 803.03." The function of
the phrase "is or may be" is to permit joinder before a determi-
nation of the third-party defendant's liability has been made.
In order to avoid delay and circuity of actions, the third-party
defendant's liability is properly made a question to be deter-
mined as a part of the same lawsuit with questions of fact
resolved by a single jury. 72
The phrase "is or may be liable to him" serves two func-
tions. The first is to require the third-party plaintiff to assert
172. Jeub v. B/G Foods, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 236 (D.C. Minn. 1942).
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a substantive basis for impleader. Such substantive bases may
include contribution or indemnity. The second function of this
provision is to recognize that the third-party plaintiff can only
attempt to shift liability to the impleaded party under this
rule, rather than substitute the impleaded party for himself.
The provision allowing impleader in order to join a neces-
sary party under section 803.03 is not included in Federal Rule
14. This use of impleader was added to the Wisconsin rule to
provide a procedural mechanism permitting a defendant to join
necessary parties which the plaintiff has omitted from the ac-
tion.
The major innovation produced by this rule is in its liberal
claim joinder provisions. The recent case of Bolton v. Chicago
Title & Trust Co. 173 presents a convenient factual framework in
which the old and new rules relating to joinder of claims in
impleader actions may be examined.
In Bolton, A commenced an action against B to recover on
a $5,000 draft drawn by B in A's favor pursuant to an escrow
agreement. B answered denying liability, asserting certain af-
firmative defenses, and counterclaimed against A for recission.
B also commenced a third-party action against C, who an-
swered asserting six counterclaims, four of which involved a
draft of $100,000 drawn by B from the same escrow account in
favor of C. B demurred to all six counterclaims on the ground
that they were not pleadable in a third-party action under the
old rule governing cross complaints and third-party actions.
The old rule, subsection 263.15(1), read:
263.15 Cross complaint and third-party actions. (1) A de-
fendant or a person interpleaded or intervening may have
affirmative relief against a codefendant, or a codefendant and
the plaintiff, or part of the plaintiffs, or a codefendant and a
person not a party, or against such person alone, upon his
being brought in: but in all such cases such relief must in-
volve or in some manner affect the contract, transaction or
property which is the subject matter of the action or relates
to the occurrence out of which the action arose. . . . (Em-
phasis supplied) .17
The demurrer was sustained by the trial court. On appeal, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court posed the issue thusly:
173. 64 Wis. 2d 714, 221 N.W.2d 911 (1974).
174. WIs. STAT. § 263.15 (1973).
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May a third-party defendant [C] seek affirmative relief by
way of counterclaim against a third-party plaintiff [B] when
such relief does not involve or affect the contract, transaction,
or property which is the subject matter of the action or relate
to the occurrence out of which the action arose? '
The court answered this question in the negative stating that:
• .. [T]he purpose of requiring or permitting concert of
action or joining of issues germane to the main controversy
is not intended to produce a result which would require a
plaintiff who commences an action, to be compelled to stand
by while others who have become plaintiffs and defendants
against his wishes litigate their causes of action.' 8
C conceded that his counterclaims did not involve the particu-
lar subject matter of the principal action (the $5,000 draft
drawn in A's favor), but argued that because four of the claims
arose out of B's obligation with respect to the same escrow
account, the same subject matter was involved. The court held,
nevertheless, that C's claims failed to satisfy the standard that
"such relief must involve or in some manner affect the con-
tract, transaction, or property which is the subject matter of
the action or relates to the occurrence out of which the action
arose.""'7 The court likened the case to Piper v. Strohn, "I where
the court held that a counterclaim involving management of
land in Michigan was not sufficiently related to a partition
action in Wisconsin. While it is arguable that claims relating
to two different parcels of land located in different states are
much less related than claims involving two drafts drawn from
the same escrow account, the Wisconsin court adopted the nar-
rower view of the terms "same transaction" and "subject mat-
ter."'79
Hence, under the old rules of civil procedure, claim joinder
was limited as to all parties. A plaintiff was limited to joining
causes of action by the requirement that all causes of action
175. 64 Wis. 2d at 714, 221 N.W.2d at 913.
176. Id. at 718, 221 N.W.2d at 914.
177. Id. at 719, 221 N.W.2d at 914, citing Wis. Stat. § 163.15 (1973).
178. 253 Wis. 503, 34 N.W.2d 859 (1948).
179. The Wisconsin court had given a restrictive construction to the words "subject
matter" in Liebhauser v. Milwaukee Elec. Railway & Light Co., 180 Wis. 468, 193
N.W. 522 (1923). For this reason, the Judicial Council Committee omitted the refer-
ences to subject matter in §§ 802.07 and 803.05 so that the provisions of those statutes
would not be interpreted restrictively. See the Judicial Council Committee's Notes to
§§ 802.07 and 803.05.
1976]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
"must affect all parties to the action." 8 ' As to defendants
(third-party plaintiffs), former section 260.19 made no express
limitation on claims against third-party defendants, but sec-
tion 260.19 allowed impleader only "when a complete determi-
nation of the controversy in court cannot be made without the
joinder of additional parties." 181 Since impleader was allowed
only when the particular controversy before the court could not
be resolved without the third-party defendant, there was an
implicit limitation of claims against the third-party defendant
to that controversy. Of course, there were no limitations upon
the subject matter of the defendant's claims against the plain-
tiff in the principal action."2 Finally, as to third-party defen-
dants, Bolton established the rule that a third-party defendant
could only assert counterclaims which "involve or in some
manner affect the contract, transaction, or property which is
the subject matter of the action or related to the occurrence out
of which the action arose.""8 3 In sum, then, the scope of the civil
action in Wisconsin was limited under the old rules to the
subject matter of the original action.
The basic scheme of joinder in the new Wisconsin rules of
civil procedure appears to be the same as that of the Federal
Rules in that claim joinder is limited only by the restrictions
on party joinder. Where C is properly a party, therefore, there
is no restriction on the claims which may be asserted by or
against him except for the discretionary power of the court to
order separate trials under section 803.04(3) or to sever claims
under section 803.06.
As a "party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim"
under the terms of new subsection 803.02(1), A may join "ei-
ther as independent or as alternative claims, as many claims,
legal or equitable, as he has against" B. Further, under new
section 802.07(1), B, as defendant, may counterclaim any
claim which he has against A. The Judicial Council Committee
Note indicates that the section is intended to be at least as
expansive as to counterclaims as the former section 263.14(1)
under which courts have not limited counterclaims to the sub-
180. Wis. STAT. § 263.04 (1973). See commentary on §§ 803.02 and 803.04, supra
p. 78.
181. Wis. STAT. § 260.19 (1973).
182. Wis. STAT. § 263.14 (1973).
183. Wis. STAT. § 263.15 (1973); Bolton v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 64 Wis. 2d
at 716, 221 N.W.2d at 913.
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ject matter of the plaintiff's claim. In any event, under section
803.02(1), B, as a party asserting a counterclaim which may or
may not be based on A's action, may join as many claims as
he has against A. In effect, then, as between A and B only, the
availability of claim joinder in cases involving third-party
claims is identical to the new practice under sections 803.02
and 803.04 with the objective of resolving in one judicial pro-
ceeding all points of controversy between parties to a lawsuit.
As a "defending party," B may join C under section
803.05(1) as a "person not a party to the action who is or may
be liable to him for all or part of" A's claim against him. The
Judicial Council Committee's Note to section 803.05 indicates
that the scope of impleader by defendants is intended to be
somewhat more limited than that which was permitted under
the "complete determination of the controversy" test of former
rule 216.19. Section 803.05 now limits impleader to cases in-
volving contribution, indemnity, or where a person is a neces-
sary party under section 803.03. For the purposes of this analy-
sis it will be assumed that B's claim against C, characterized
in Bolton as one of "equitable subrogation," fits within the
limits set forth in section 803.05, such that C is deemed to be
properly joined in the action as a third-party defendant.
The scheme of section 803.05(1) as to what claims may be
asserted by and against the impleaded third-party is substan-
tially the same as that of Federal Rule 14. Under the new rule,
the third-party defendant, C, "shall" assert his counterclaims
against the third-party plaintiff, B, as provided in section
802.07. As noted, there is no express limitation in that section
as to the subject matter of counterclaims asserted by C against
B, indicating that he may assert any counterclaim against B
that he has. At this point, then, the limitation of former section
263.15(1) which was held in Bolton to foreclose C's claim in
that case seems to have been overcome by the new rules.
An anomalous situation arises under section 803.05 in the
factual context of Bolton. The new "third-party practice" rule
allows C, as third-party defendant, to assert against A, the
original plaintiff, claims which are based upon the "transac-
tion, occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences" which
form the basis of A's claim against B, the third-party plaintiff.
Similarly, the plaintiff, A, may assert any claim against C, the
third-party defendant, which is based on the same "transac-
tion, occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences" on
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which his claim against B is based. Should A assert such a
claim, however, C may then assert his counterclaim under
subsection 802.07(1), which, as noted, does not place a limit on
the basis for such claims.
Under this state of affairs, then, the new Wisconsin rules
present the anomalous situation of limiting, in the first in-
stance, claims between A and C to the same transaction, oc-
currence or series of transactions or occurrences out of which
the claim asserted by A against B arose. But, there are appar-
ently no limitations on the claims which C is authorized by
section 803.05(1) to assert through the counterclaim provisions
of section 802.07 against the third-party plaintiff and the origi-
nal plaintiff should the original plaintiff choose to assert a
claim against C, the third-party defendant.
A further question remains with regard to the claims plead-
able by B against C. It might be argued that the first sentence
of section 803.05 limits B to claims against C for liability over
to A on a theory of contribution or indemnity. But it is clear
that such a restrictive interpretaiton would be inconsistent
with the thrust of the new rules. The first sentence, stating that
". .. a defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause
a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a
party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part
of the plaintiff's claim against him, or who is a necessary party
under 803.03." serves to identify when impleader is proper in
the first instance, rather than to limit the types of claims which
a third-party plaintiff may assert. A restrictive interpretation
would be inconsistent with section 803.02(1) which provides
that "[a] party asserting a . . . third-party claim, may join,
either as independent or alternate claims, as many claims,
legal or equitable, as he has against an opposing party." The
corresponding Federal Rule 14 has been interpreted to allow B
to assert any claims against C once C is properly impleaded.'84
The new Wisconsin section 803.05(1) and section 803.02 should
be liberally interpreted to fulfill the Judicial Council Commit-
tee's intention that the only formal limitation or claim joinder
was that imposed indirectly by the limitations on party joinder.
Where joined claims threaten to complicate the issues or make
the litigation unmanageable, the court is authorized to order
separate trials under subsection 803.04(3) and section 805.05,
184. Schwab v. Erie Lockawanna Railroad, 438 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1971).
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and to sever claims to be proceeded with separately under sec-
tion 803.06.
In summary, the result in Bolton is not commanded by the
new rules and, indeed, could be said to be erroneous under
those provisions.
An impleaded third-party generally takes control of the de-
fense. When he does so, section 803.05 allows him to "assert
against the plaintiff any defenses which the third-party plain-
tiff has to the plaintiff's claim." Since the third-party plaintiff
is bound by any judgment in the action, when considering im-
pleader he will take into consideration the fact that his liability
will depend upon the adequacy of the third-party defendant's
defense. In any case, where the third-party defendant has clear
liability over to the plaintiff for the total amount, impleader is
desirable.
The decision to allow or deny impleader rests in the discre-
tion of the court. Where impleader would not serve the purpose
of convenience and resolution of a single controversy it should
be denied. Another situation in which impleader should be
denied is where a third-party defendant is brought into the
action in order to attract jury sympathy and a smaller damage
award. This was the situation in Goodhart v. United States
Liner Co.,' 5 where an insurance company impleaded its in-
sured's employee for indemnification. It was obvious that the
impecunious employee would have been unable to indemnify
the insurance company for any substantial amount and that
the only purpose for impleader was to seek jury sympathy. The
court denied impleader because the plaintiff's case would have
been unduly prejudiced. The insurance company was protected
since it could properly commence a separate suit for indemnifi-
cation from the employee if it so desired. In such a case, the
court might also allow impleader but order separate trials and
thus save the expense of commencing separate actions.
803.06 Misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties. Misjoin-
der of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties
may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of
any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a party may
be severed and proceeded with separately.
185. 26 F.R.D. 163 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).
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Section 803.06, taken from Federal Rule 21, is consistent
with the liberal permissive joinder under sections 803.04 and
803.02. When a party is improperly joined under section 803.04
by reason of the failure to satisfy the "transactional relation-
ship" and "common question of law or fact" requirements, the
party may be dropped by the court without dismissing the
entire action. This eliminates unnecessary delay and the ex-
pense of commencing the action a second time.
The question of nonjoinder relates to the mandatory joinder
section 803.03. Whether or not the failure to join a party under
section 803.03 is a ground for dismissal is determined by the
functional test set out therein.
The Judicial Council Committee's Note states that nonjoin-
der and misjoinder issues may be raised by answer or motion
under section 802.06(2). In the case of nonjoinder objections,
section 802.06(2)(g) specifically provides for a motion. But with
respect to misjoinder objections it is unclear which provision
under section 802.06(2) would be appropriate. Subsection (f)
(failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted)
would be inappropriate since section 802.06 states that misjoin-
der is not a basis for dismissal, and none of the other motions
are relevant to misjoinder. Therefore, section 803.06 itself is
apparently the authority for the motion to drop a party for
misjoinder. Of course, the rule also authorizes the court to drop
or add parties on its own initiative at any stage of the action.
While the dropping of a misjoined party will necessarily
result in the dropping of the claim asserted by or against that
party; where the party has been properly joined but his pres-
ence in the action will make the trial of all claims too complex
for one proceeding, severance is the appropriate mechanism to
"unclutter" the trial. The severance provision may also be used
to provide jury trial of certain issues and a trial to the court of
the other issues.
803.07 Interpleader. Persons having claims against the
plaintiff may be joined as defendants and required to inter-
plead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may
be exposed to double or multiple liability. It is not ground for
objection to the joinder that the claims of the several claim-
ants or the titles on which their claims depend do not have a
common origin or are not identical but are adverse to and
independent of one another, or that the plaintiff avers that
he is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claim-
ants. A defendant exposed to similar liability may obtain
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such interpleader by way of cross claim or counterclaim. The
provisions of this section supplement and do not in any way
limit the joinder of parties permitted in s. 803.04.
Section 803.07, taken from rule 22 of the Federal Rules,
codifies the common law action of interpleader recognized in
Wisconsin as early as 1847 in Bird v. Fake.'6 Before the adop-
tion of section 803.07, the Wisconsin statutes recognized inter-
pleader only in cases where a defendant was subject to double
liability with respect to the same debt or specific property
sought by the plaintiff.' No statute recognized the right of a
person facing double liability with respect to the same fund to
initiate an interpleader action himself.
Generally, interpleader provides a procedure whereby a per-
son holding a fund or "stake," against which two or more per-
sons have claims incapable of being satisfied out of the value
of the "stake," may deposit the "stake" into court, receive a
discharge from further liability, and compel the adverse claim-
ants to litigate their claims to the "stake" among themselves.
Thus the procedure is a two-step process: (1) the stakeholder
must first deposit the stake into court; and (2) the claimants
then litigate their claims to the stake. The interpleader action
typically arises where two injured parties have sustained large
amounts of damages due to the negligence of A, and A's liabil-
ity insurance policy is insufficient to cover both claims. Since
the two claimants might start separate actions in separate
courts and receive separate judgments in the amount of the
entire policy limit (or added together in excess of the policy
limit), the insurance carrier is threatened with double liability
and may therefore interplead both claimants.
The availability of the traditional bill in equity for inter-
pleader was restricted by stringent requirements:
(1) The same thing, debt, or duty must be claimed by
both or all the parties against whom the relief is de-
manded;
(2) all of their adverse titles or claims must be depen-
dent or be derived from a common source;
(3) The one seeking a relief must not have nor claim
any interest in the subject matter; and
186. 2 Pinney 69 (1847).
187. Wis. STAT. § 260.19(5) (1973).
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(4) he must have incurred no independent liability to
either of the claimants.' 88
In modern practice the requirements have substantially been
dispensed with in order to accommodate the more liberal no-
tions of simplifying civil procedure. '89
Wisconsin's new section 803.07, following the language of
Federal Rule 22, allows interpleader when "the plaintiff is or
may be exposed to double or multiple liability." Hence, the
threat of double or multiple liability is sufficient to support an
interpleader action. Section 803.07 also dispenses with the
"same thing, debt, or duty" and common-origin-of-title re-
quirements, so long as the claims threatening the plaintiff re-
main adverse. Similarly, the requirements that the plaintiff be
completely disinterested from the stake and have incurred no
independent liability to any claimant, have been eliminated.
Now, the plaintiff may tender the stake into court and himself
become one of the adverse claimants in the second stage of the
interpleader action. Thus, the new requirements are limited to
(1) actual or threatened double or multiple liability, and (2)
adverse claimants.
Interpleader actions may arise in two ways: (1) the stake-
holder, recognizing the threat of multiple liability, may bring
an action in interpleader against the adverse claimants, or (2)
the stakeholder having been made a defendant in an action
brought by one or more of the adverse claimants, may obtain
interpleader by way of cross-claim or counterclaim. As men-
tioned before, the former Wisconsin rules allowed interpleader
only in the second situation mentioned above. The new section
803.07 permits interpleader in both situations.
With respect to personal jurisdiction in interpleader cases,
the Judicial Council Committee's Note states: "This statute is
not jurisdictional; that is, it does not do away with the require-
ment that there exist as to each defendant an independent
ground for asserting jurisdiction over his person."'9 0
188. Hancock Oil Co. v. Independent Distributing Co., 24 Cal. 2d 497, 150 P.2d 463
(1944); See 4 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed. 1941, § 1322, p. 906.
189. See John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Kegan, 22 F. Supp. 326 (D.C.
Md. 1938), and Hancock Oil Co. v. Independent Distributing Co., 24 Cal. 2d 497, 150
P.2d 463 (1944).
190. Jurisdiction in state interpleader actions does not present as complex a prob-
lem as do jurisdictional problems in the federal courts. See also New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916) and the statutory response thereto at 28 U.S.C.
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803.08 Class actions. When the question before the
court is one of a common or general interest of many persons
or when the parties are very numerous and it may be imprac-
ticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may
sue or defend for the benefit of the whole.
The Judicial Council Committee was presented with and
studied a substantial amount of material concerning class ac-
tion procedure, both under the "old" Federal Rule 23 and
under the "new" Rule 23 (i.e., as amended in 1966). During its
deliberations on class actions, the committee was fortunate to
have present Professor William Foster of the University of Wis-
consin Law School faculty. Professor Foster was on the research
staff of the American Bar Foundation engaged in a study of
class actions. He suggested that experience in the federal
courts has been less than felicitous under both the old Rule 23
and the new Rule 23 and that Wisconsin would probably be
well advised to adopt neither at this time. The Judicial Council
Committee agreed. The new rule is essentially identical to the
class action rule in former section 260.12.
803.09 Intervention. (1) Upon timely motion anyone
shall be permitted to intervene in an action when the movant
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that
the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair
or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the mov-
ant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(2) Upon timely motion anyone may be permitted to
intervene in an action when a movant's claim or defense and
the main action have a question of law or fact in common.
When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or de-
fense upon any statute or executive order or rule adminis-
tered by a federal or state governmental officer or agency or
upon any regulation, order, rule, requirement or agreement
issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the
officer or agency upon timely motion may be permitted to
intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the court
shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
(3) A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion
to intervene upon the parties as provided in s. 801.14. The
motion shall state the grounds therefor and shall be accompa-




nied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which
intervention is sought. The same procedure shall be followed
when a statute gives a right to intervene.
This section, based on Federal Rule 24, replaces section
260.205. The new section provides a mechanism whereby a per-
son not joined by the plaintiff or defendant may participate in
an action in which he claims an interest or in which legal or
factual questions will be tried which are related to the movant's
claim or defense. The rule is governed by the same considera-
tions of avoiding circuity of actions and achieving complete
determinations of controversies which underly sections 803.03
and 803.04 relating to mandatory and permissive joinder re-
spectively.
The former rule, section 260.205, provided in part:
260.205 Intervention. If in an action for the recovery of
property, a person not a party has an interest in the property,
or if any other action, a person not a party has such an inter-
est in the subject matter of the controversy as requires him
to be a party for his own protection, and such person applies
to the court to be made a party, the court may order him
brought in....
This rule was not governed by considerations of convenience
or avoiding multiple suits involving similar issues, and even in
its function of providing protection for absent parties' interests
was only permissive, i.e., permitted in the court's discretion.
Under the new rule, subsection (1) provides for intervention
of right when the movant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and
is so situated that a judgment in his absence may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect his interest.
While the intervention under subsection (1) is of right ("shall
be permitted"), the rule is still discretionary insofar as the
court must make a determination as to whether or not the
motion is timely, whether the absent party's ability to protect
his interest may as a practical matter be impaired, and
whether the absent party's interest is adequately represented
by existing parties.
Nevertheless, the new rule is founded upon the same con-
siderations underlying section 803.03 which define those par-
ties who must be joined in an action if feasible. 9 ' The practical
191. See commentary on § 803.03, supra p. 79.
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purpose for the provision for intervention of right is to permit
participation by a party who should have been mandatorily
joined under section 803.03, but was not so joined because he:
(1) was beyond the reach of process; or (2) possessed an interest
not discovered by the parties; or (3) possessed an interest of
only questionable relation to the subject matter of the action;
or (4) because the parties assumed his interest was already
adequately represented.
Subsection (2) provides for intervention in the court's dis-
cretion when the movant's claim or defense and the main ac-
tion have a common question of law or fact. This permissive
intervention is grounded on considerations of convenience and
economy of judicial effort such that the question common to
both the main action and the movant's claim or defense may
be resolved in the same proceeding. Thus, permissive interven-
tion under this subsection is proper under circumstances where
permissive joinder under section 803.04 is allowed. 9 ' Although
the requirement of "same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences" found in section 803.04 is not spe-
cifically mentioned under this rule, it is implicit in the last
sentence of subsection (2) which requires the court in exercising
its discretion to consider whether intervention will unduly
delay the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. If
the common legal or factual question does not relate to or arise
out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions
or occurrences, the presence of the intervenor will probably
result in undue delay.
The requirement under subsections (1) and (2) that the
motion for intervention be timely is directly tied to the last
sentence of subsection (2) which provides that the court shall
consider whether the intervention will unduly prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties. This require-
ment should not be confused with the question of commence-
ment and limitation of actions which has insinuated itself into
joinder questions in the case law under the former rules. '93
803.10 Substitution of parties. (1) DEATH. (a) If a
party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court may order substitution of the proper parties. The mo-
192. See commentary on § 803.04, supra p. 90.
193. See commentary on §§ 803.01 and 803.03, supra p. 69, on the question of com-
mencement and limitations of actions under the present case law and former rules.
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tion for substitution may be made by any party or by the
successors or representatives of the deceased party and, to-
gether with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the par-
ties as provided in s. 801.14 and upon persons not parties in
the manner provided in s. 801.11 for the service of a sum-
mons. Unless the motion for substitution is made not later
than 90 days after the death is suggested on the record by
service of a statement of the facts of the death as provided
herein for the service of the motion, the action shall be dis-
missed as to the deceased party.
(b) In the event of the death of one or more of the plain-
tiffs or of one or more of the defendants in the action in which
the right sought to be enforced survives only to the surviving
plaintiffs or only against the surviving defendants, the action
does not abate. The death shall be suggested upon the record
and the action shall proceed in favor of or against the surviv-
ing parties.
(2) INCOMPETENCY. If a party becomes incompetent, the
court upon motion served as provided in sub. (1) may allow
the action to be continued by or against his representative.
(3) TRANSFER OF INTEREST. In case of any transfer of in-
terest, the action may be continued by or against the original
party unless the court upon motion directs the person to
whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the ac-
tion or joined with the original party. Service of the motion
shall be made as provided in sub. (1).
(4) PUBLIC OFFICERS; DEATH OR SEPARATION FROM OFFICE.
(a) When a public officer, including a receiver or trustee ap-
pointed by virtue of any statute, is a party to an action in his
official capacity and during its pendency he dies, resigns, or
otherwise ceases to hold office, the action does not abate and
his successor is automatically substituted as a party. Pro-
ceedings following the substitution shall be in the name of the
substituted party, but any misnomer not affecting the sub-
stantial rights of the parties shall be disregarded. An order of
substitution may be entered at any time, but the omission to
enter such an order shall not affect the substitution.
(b) When a public officer sues or is sued in his official
capacity, he may be described as a party by his official title
rather than by name; but the court may require his name to
be added.
(5) DEATH AFTER VERDICT OR FINDINGS. After an accepted
offer to allow judgment to be taken or to settle pursuant to s.
807.01, or after a verdict, report of a referee or finding by the
court in any action, the action does not abate by the death
of any party, but shall be further proceeded with in the same
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manner as if the cause of action survived by law; or the court
may enter judgment in the names of the original parties if
such offer, verdict, report of finding be not set aside. But a
verdict, report or finding rendered against a party after his
death is void.
Section 803.10 is based on Federal Rule 25 with the excep-
tion of subsection (5) which is based on former section 269.22.
The new rule provides for substitution of parties who die,
become incompetent, or transfer their interest, under the same
circumstances in which substitution would be permitted under
the former sections 269.14 through 269.24. In the case of death,
resignation or removal of a public officer, receiver, or trustee
appointed by statute, the new rule extends substitution of his
successor to cases in which the party was a defendant in a
pending action when death or separation from office occurred,
in addition to where such party was a plaintiff in a pending
action.
The procedure for substitution prescribed in subsection (1)
is simplified and made to conform with section 802.01(2) which
eliminates the usage of orders to show cause unless specifically
authorized by statute."4 Under the new rule, the motion for
substitution may be made by any party or by the successor or
representative of the deceased party. Where the movant is a
party to the action attempting to substitute a non-party, serv-
ice is to be made as required by section 801.11 governing service
of summons. Where the movant is the deceased party's succes-
sor or representative, service is to be made as prescribed in
section 804.14 governing service of pleadings and other papers.
Subsection (5) is based on former section 269.22 which oper-
ated to continue those actions which were substantially com-
plete to their formal conclusion rather than for such actions to
abate. This subsection broadens the former rule, however, by
providing that the rule extends not only to deaths subsequent
to verdict, findings of the court, report of the referee, and ac-
cepted offers to allow judgment to be taken, but also to ac-
cepted offers to settle pursuant to section 807.01 (former rule
269.02).
194. Former § 269.23 provided that a party seeking to oppose the revival of an
action by a successor entitled to do so show cause by affidavit within twenty days or
else the action would stand revived.
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